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This thesis gives a critical study of the fairness and efficiency of the jury trial in 
the contemporary English justice system. It analyses the various pressures on the 
English criminal jury system, and attempts to justify the possible abolition of the 
criminal jury trials in England and Wales, hereafter referred to as ‘England’ for 
the sake of convenience. 
  
Firstly, it considers the origin, functions and theoretical basis of the existing 
English jury system, including the widespread perception of it being a 
constitutional mechanism designed to involve citizens in the delivery of justice 
and the implementation of criminal law. It considers the steady reduction in the 
number of jury trials in recent decades and the introduction of judge-only trials. 
Comparisons between jury trials in the Crown Courts and summary trials 
in magistrates' courts are drawn, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages 
of each, referring to empirical and sociological data.  
 
Secondly, it underlines weaknesses in the jury process stems from obstacles to 
fair trials, particularly: jury tampering, confusion in complex fraud cases and 
incidences of contempt of court committed by jurors resulting from their use of 
the Internet and social media; and draws on selected legal cases, the perceived 
quality of jury decision-making, the avoidance of institutional prejudice, and 
issues surrounding public confidence. 
   
3 
 
Finally, it will present a number of recommendations for English jury reform, 
including the new Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and explores the 
possibility of the abolition of the English criminal jury system and proposes the 
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The jury system has long been regarded as one of the pillars of the English 
common law system.
1
 Historically, ordinary English ‘lay’ people have worked 
as ‘determiners of fact’ in a criminal trial to achieve fairness and justice. Today 
most citizens of England are eligible for jury service.
2
 In addition, there are 
statistics which have shown that more than 80 per cent of British citizens 
support the jury system.
3
 Lord Patrick Devlin praised and expressed the jury as 
“the lamp that shows that freedom lives.”4 The previous Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve MP, states that “The jury system is an essential element of the 
justice system of England and Wales. It is deeply ingrained in our national 
DNA.”5 In his opinion, the experience of legal professionals familiar with the 
English jury system is “overwhelmingly that juries almost always do a 
conscientious job and do it effectively.”6 
 
Some people have criticised the jury system and rejected the notion that it 
functions as an idealist justice system. For example, it has been described as an 
                                                   
1 In this thesis, when ‘the English jury system’ is used, it means the jury system of  
England and Wales. 
2 See Robin White, ‘Lawyers and the Courts’ in Robert Blackburn (ed), Rights of  
Citizenship (Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1994) 245 
3
 See Cheryl Thomas, Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System (1
st
 edition, Ministry of 
Justice, 2007) 3 
4 Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury (6
th
 edition, Stevens& Sons Limited, 1978) 164 
5 Dominic Grieve, ‘Speech on the jury system and the challenges it faces, given as part of  
Politeia’s justice series’ (2013)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/in-defence-of-the-jury-trial> accessed 3 March  
2015, 1; Grieve continues, “Trial by jury provides a vital safeguard in a free society.” The  
protection of historic freedoms through the defence of trial by jury was part of the current  
coalition Government’s agreement when it was launched in 2010. See Prime Minister’s  
Office, ‘The Coalition: our programme for Government’ (2010) HM Government  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coal
ition_programme_for_government.pdf> accessed 8 March 2015, 11 
6 Ibid 3 
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“irrational, costly, and cumbersome institution which demands that ordinary 
people, with all their frailties of inattentiveness, ignorance, and prejudice 
pronounce upon sometimes extraordinary complex and consequential matters.”7 
In addition, from as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century, and all the 
way up until the recent past, especially the past three decades, the use of the jury 
system in England has very gradually declined. The system is beset by various 
and considerable difficulties and pressures. Juror misconduct involving the use 
of the Internet and social media has undermined the credibility of the English 
jury system, while the judiciary has not been able to monitor misbehaving jurors’ 
actions thoroughly enough. Further juror misconduct includes revealing 
information on jury deliberations and private research which leads juries to 
deliberate on facts not presented during the trial. Some influential critics forecast 
limiting the use and even the abolition of jury trials for certain types of criminal 
offence as it is both possible and reasonable.
8
 If we maintain that the jury 
system is one of the basic constitutional rights and duties for English people, 
how, and by what means, will it be possible to limit its usage when it is such an 
established judicial system? Are there preferable alternatives for the criminal 
justice system? Have English people begun to question the role of the jury in 
modern society? Will the use of jury trials be further reduced in the future? 
Could the system even be abandoned one day? 
                                                   
7 Neil Vidmar (ed), World Jury systems (Oxford University Press, 2003) General Editor’s 
Introduction 
8 For the most recent example, the Lord Chief Justice Thomas proposes limiting the right to 
trial by jury in various minor offences and complex fraud cases. See Frances Gibb and 
Sean O’Neill, ‘Lord Chief Justice condemns creeping secrecy in trials’ The Times (London, 




This thesis gives a critical study of the fairness and efficiency of the jury trial in 
the contemporary English justice system. It researches the defects of the English 
criminal jury system to show that the quality of an English jury as a judicial 
decision-making body has lessened, and the right to a fair trial is under 
significant pressure, therefore suggesting a move towards radical reform. 
 
To achieve this purpose, this thesis applies a doctrinal research methodology to 
empirical statistics from the Government and the judiciary. The thesis frequently 
compares an English jury trial with different criminal justice systems in England, 
including magistrates’ courts, and also with other judicial systems of contrasting 
countries. 
 
In the first part, this thesis considers the origin, functions and theoretical basis of 
the existing English jury system, including the widespread perception of it being 
a constitutional mechanism for involving citizens in the delivery of justice and 
assisting in the implementation of criminal law. It analyses the steady reduction 
in the number of jury trials in recent decades and the introduction of judge-only 
trials. The thesis compares jury trials in the Crown Court with summary and 
‘triable either-way’ trials in the magistrates' courts, focusing on the differences 
in their roles in a criminal trial and the necessity for legal training; thereby 
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each by referring to empirical 
and sociological data. The thesis also introduces several theories about the 
English jury by prominent legal theorists, researchers and judges for the purpose 
of contrasting different perceptions on the English jury trial as a traditional, 
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efficient and fair criminal justice system. This section includes theories about 
the English jury system by Blackstone, Bentham, Thompson, Devlin, Sargant, 
Darbyshire, Thomas and Blom-Cooper. This thesis will point out that there is  
little diversity in theories of the jury specialists in English Academia; they tend 
to lead their research conclusions in the same direction of maintaining the 
traditional English jury system because most of them are strong proponents of it. 
This thesis will question those theoretical authorities on jury research, especially 
Cheryl Thomas’s empirical research.    
 
In the second part, the thesis analyses the role of a jury and its misconduct, 
examining perceived quality of jury decision-making, the avoidance of 
institutional prejudice, and public confidence. The thesis will point out the 
existence of the weakness of a jury. In this section, it will discuss jury 
nullification (‘jury equity’ in other words) and consider whether it has a 
necessary ‘constitutional right’ in the current English society.  
 
Also in this part, it continues to introduce practical weaknesses of the jury 
process highlighted by obstacles to fair trials, particularly: jury tampering, 
confusion in complex fraud cases, and contempt of court committed by jurors’ 
use of the Internet and social media, drawing on selected legal cases. In this 
section, it will compare the pressure on the English jury system with several jury 
matters in different areas: for example, Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland from 
1993 to 2007 and current American, Australian and New Zealand’s restriction 
on juror’s use of the Internet and social media. The purpose of the comparison is 
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to evaluate clearly whether recent newly introduced restrictions on the English 
jury system would be peculiar ones among Common law countries, and whether 
they are really inappropriate and might possibly destroy the traditional virtues of 
the jury system: fairness and efficiency. In the last part of the section, the thesis 
will present the most current English reform which was introduced to solve the 
contemporary pressure on the jury: the enforcement of the new Criminal Justice 
and Courts Act 2015 this February, and discuss its possible advantages and 
disadvantages. 
  
Finally, this thesis will present a number of recommendations for English jury 
reform after the enforcement of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and 
explore the possibility of the abolition of the English criminal jury system. In 
addition, the thesis proposes the use of alternative models of criminal trial: 
specifically, the magistrates’ court model, judge-only trial or continental ‘mixed 
jury.’ In addition, it will examine whether the alternative criminal justice system 
instead of trial by jury will change the English traditional adversarial system to 
the continental inquisitorial criminal justice system, looking at the resumption of 
jury system and its difficulty in Spain.  
 
Through the whole of this PhD thesis, it will consider ‘lay element’ as the 
decisive reason for the long-lived English jury system. Referring to  
contemporary criminal cases and the increase in risks of perverse jury 
deliberations and miscarriages of justice by a jury, this thesis predicts that the 
abolition of criminal jury will be a possible and realistic option in England. It 
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will also reject the possibility of the abolition of the lay element in an English 
criminal trial. Among the alternative trial models which the thesis will suggest, 
lay magistrate would be an appropriate one which remains as a lay element in an 
English criminal trial as well as a jury trial. This thesis will conclude this is the 
most reasonable solution for the Government and the judiciary to achieve fair 
and efficient criminal trials and avoid extinguishing the lamp that shows that 
freedom lives in England. 
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Part 1: The existing English jury system  
1. The law and workings of juries in the English legal system 
1.) Historical account of judicial participation in England  
a.) History of the English jury  
 
As E.P. Thompson stated that “The jury is a very ancient creature, almost as old 
as the Monarchy and as old as Parliament.”1 Parliament assumed no part in 
creating the jury system which historically grew up “silently and gradually”2 in 
the English judicial system. The word ‘jury’ originally means a ‘sworn body’ in 
Latin (jurata).
3
 There are two major theories about the origin of the English 
jury system. The predominant view argued that the jury system was born in 
Francia, and after the Norman conquest of England in 1066, and it was brought 
to England from the Continent.
4
 Another theory suggested that the English jury 
had already surfaced before the Norman Conquest, as an Anglo-Saxon system 




The system was developed during the reign of King Henry II in the twelfth 
century. In that age, the origin of the civil jury which was called an ‘assize’ and 
a grand jury, was created. Jurors were then a “group of local individuals under 
oath to tell the truth.”6 Thus it could be suggested that jurors in that age were 
                                                   
1
 E.P. Thompson, ‘Subduing the Jury’ (1986) 8(21) London Review of Books 7, 8 
2
 William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury (2
nd
 edition, Burt Franklin, 1971) 1-2 
3
 See Halsbury’s Laws of England (5
th
 edition, LexisNexis, 2010) 61, 673 
4
 For example, see Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, ‘Decline of the ‘Little 
parliament’’ (1999) 62(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 7, 8 
5
 See Forsyth (n 2) 45-77 
6
 Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, ‘The Continuing Decline of the English Jury’ in 
Neil Vidmar (ed), World Jury systems (Reprinted edition, Oxford University Press, 2003) 
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“simply witnesses.”7 Now, by contrast, they are the examiners of facts. The 
Great Charter, ‘Magna Carta’ in 1215 mentioned English juries. Article 39 of 
Magna Carta stated that every free man shall be heard under the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.  
 
From the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century, the role of a 
jury gradually changed “from that of witness to that of adjudicator.”8 One 
symbolic case that showed the new character of a jury is R v Bushell in 1670.
9 
In 
this case, the jurors did not convict two Quakers, William Penn and William 
Mead, as guilty of seditious assembly. The judgment was against the direction 
by the judge, and the jurors, including Edward Bushell, the jury foreman, were 
confined to jails without any food, water, or fire for two nights until the Lord 
Chief Justice approved their release.
10
 The case established the principle that 
“the jury had the right to give a verdict according to its conscience”11 and 
“could not be penalised for taking a view of the facts which was at odds with 
that of the judge.”12 In effect, the R v Bushell created the modern role of a jury.13 
                                                                                                                                           
54 
7
 Michael McHugh, ‘Juror’s Deliberations, Jury Secrecy, Public Policy and the Law of 
Contempt’ in Mark Findley and Peter Duff (ed), The Jury under Attack (1st edition, 
Butterworths, 1988) 56 
8
 Ibid 57 
9
 R v Bushell [1670] Vaughan 135, 124 Eng Rep 1006 (CP 1670) 
10
 See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 6) 55 
11
 Stephen Bailey, Jane Ching and Nick Taylor, The Modern English Legal System (5
th
 
edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 1074 
12
 Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 6) 55 
13
 The previous Attorney General, Dominic Grieve MP, illustrates R v Bushell confirmed 
“the principle of juries’ independence that we value so greatly and which provides an 
essential guarantor of freedom.” See Dominic Grieve, ‘Speech on the jury system and the 
challenges it faces, given as part of Politeia’s justice series’ (2013) 




In the Bill of Rights 1688, the right to criminal trial by jury was clearly noted in 
a statutory form for the first time in the English history.
14
 As McEldowney 
suggested, “Jury service has now become a citizen’s right as well as his duty.”15 
 
The second half of the nineteenth century was the age that started to see a 
decline of various jury systems in England. Since the system of preliminary 
examination had developed, the grand jury in England was abolished by the 
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 and the Criminal 
Justice Act 1948. 
 
Nowadays, a jury is used in three categories of the English judicial procedures: 
the criminal process, the civil process, and the coronial process in coroners’ 
inquests. The number of English civil jury trials has been gradually declining 
since the middle of the nineteenth century when judges were approved to have 
the right to refuse trial by jury.
16
 Recently, the percentage of civil jury trials 
approximates less than one percent.
17
 According to Darbyshire, the most 
significant reason for this decline of the English civil jury is “inconsistent and 
exorbitant damages awards.”18 
 
                                                   
14
 Bill of Rights 1688 stated that “And whereas of late yeares Partiall Corrupt and 
Unqualifyed Persons have beene returned and served on Juryes in Tryalls and particularly 
diverse Jurors in Tryalls for High Treason which were not Freeholders.” 
15
 John McEldowney, ‘Stand By For The Crown: An Historical Analysis’ (1979) Criminal 
Law Review 272, 272 
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 Penny Darbyshire, Darbyshire on the English Legal System (10
th
 edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011) 544 
19 
 
The Coroners Amendment Act 1926 permitted a coroner to sit without a jury in 
almost all cases.
 
Since this reform, a coroner has never organised an inquest with 
a jury unless there is a necessity.
19
 Around 96 per cent of contemporary 
coroners’ inquests are held without juries.20 However, a coroner’s jury still sits 
where there has been a sudden death, a death which occurred in custody, or 
involves the conduct of the police.
21
 A coroner’s jury gives a verdict on the 
cause of death after hearing a case. In certain cases, a jury gives reasons for their 
verdicts. A recent high-ranking example of the coroner jury trial is the 
Hillsborough disaster ‘re-inquest.’ 
 
b.) History of the English magistrates 
 
The history of English magistrates started in 1195, when Richard I 
commissioned certain knights to ensure the peace in unruly areas.
22
 They were 
called ‘Keepers of the King’s Peace.’ An Act in 1327 regulated good and lawful 
men to be appointed in every county to preserve the peace and developed the 
role of lay magistrates as ‘justices of the peace.’23 They functioned as a judicial 
unit when they heard serious offence cases, as police, and as local executives by 
the eighteenth century.
24
 In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the justices 
                                                   
19
 See Nicholas Blake, ‘The Case for the Jury’ in Mark Findlay and Peter Duff (ed), The 
Jury Under Attack (1
st
 edition, Butterworths, 1988) 151 
20
 See Gary Slapper, How the Law Works (3
rd
 edition, Routledge, 2014) 190 
21
 See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 6) 59  
22
 See Slapper (n 20) 55 
23
 The title Justices of Peace derives from 1361, in the reign of Edward III. See Slapper (n 
20) 55 
24
 See Thomas Skyrme, The Changing Image of the Magistracy (2
nd
 edition, Macmillan, 
1983) 2; John Sprack, A Practical Approach to Criminal Procedure (14
th
 edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 9   
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of the peace were a group of the gentry.
25
 They were an influential class of men 
in the country, who also served as members of Parliament and administered their 
local area’s Quarter Sessions. From the late eighteenth century, the Government 
appointed stipendiary magistrates for a case in London and some other areas 
when the lay magistrates were not able to hear efficiently. However, vast 
amount of magisterial work was the role of lay people: justices of the peace. In 
the nineteenth century, justices of the peace lost their police and local 
Governmental functions. This was not because they worked inefficiently; rather, 
their institution was antiquated, so that it gave way to “a more democratic 
system of popular election.”26 After the Petty Sessions Act 1849 was enacted, 
magistrates mainly sat on summary jurisdiction. Thereafter, summary 
jurisdiction increased a great deal and magistrates have conducted an 
overwhelming majority of criminal cases. In addition, since 1925, a large 
number of cases that were formerly tried only by a jury have been brought 
within the jurisdiction of magistrates.
27
 The Justices of the Peace Act 1949 
substituted the word “magistrates’ courts” and the definition of magistrates.  
 
2.) Contemporary English criminal courts procedure 
 
Trial by jury in England is not clearly codified by any articles of any 
constitutional statutes, unlike the Constitution of the United States of America.
28
 
                                                   
25
 See Skyrme (n 24) 3 
26
 Ibid 4 
27
 Ibid 5 
28
 See Article 3, and the fifth, sixth and seventh Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States of America 
21 
 
As Lord Devlin suggested, “The jury system is the creation of the judges. 
Statutes have touched it only on the fringe.”29 Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas have 
pointed out that, it is easy to change the nature and extent of the right to trial by 
jury, because it is governed by an ordinary statute which can be altered by a 
simple Parliamentary Act.
30
 The prime statute that regulates the contemporary 
English jury system is the Juries Act 1974. 
 
In England, a jury is composed of twelve jurors.
31
 England does not have a 
system of alternate jurors who attend the trial and are ready to take the place of 
discharged jurors. A trial will be continued as long as the number of jurors does 




The Lord Chancellor is responsible for the juror summoning and the distribution 
of business in the Crown Court.
33
 Every year, around 400,000 people are called 
for jury service.
34
 If a person did not attend following a summons, it may 




                                                   
29
 Patrick Devlin, The Judge (1
st
 edition, Oxford University Press, 1979) 117 
30
 See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 4) 10-11 
31
 Auld stated that this number of jurors was “a matter of tradition rather than logic.” See 
Robin Auld, A Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (2001) Ministry of 
Justice 142 (The so-called Auld Report) 
32
 See Section 16(1) of the Juries Act 1974 
33
 The Government departments which are concerned with jury reform are the Lord 
Chancellors’ Department and the Home Office. Generally, the Lord Chancellor has 
responsibility for the administration of justice and the Home Secretary has responsibility 
for the penal system. See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 6) 57 
34
 See Malcom Davies, Hazel Croall, and Jane Tyrer, Criminal Justice (4
th
 edition, Pearson 
Education Limited, 2010) 312 
35
 Surprisingly, according to the empirical research by Darbyshire et al., five-sixths of 
summoned people for jury service in London avoided or evaded the duty. Darbyshire 
argues that, this tendency will distort jury representativeness and lead the English jury 
22 
 
The Juries Act 1974 stated that the qualification to serve as a juror.
36
 Every 
person will be qualified to be a juror if he or she is for the time being registered 
as a Parliamentary or Local Government elector and is aged under eighteen nor 
over seventy six;
37
 and he or she has been ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man for any period of at least five 
years since attaining the age of thirteen. A mentally disabled person and a 
person disqualified for jury service are exempted from jury service.
38
 Since the 
enactment of the Section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the 
only jury disqualifications would be for people in hospital, subject to recall to 
hospital, subject to a community treatment order as a result of a mental health 




A jury generally tries only one case. Jurors are randomly and electronically 
selected by the Jury Central Summoning Bureau from the electoral roll, and 
finally by an open ballot in the court.
40
 According to McGowan, the reason for 
the random jury selection could be that it contributes to assure the jury 
                                                                                                                                           
system to disrepute. See Penny Darbyshire, ‘Part D: conclusions and recommendations’ 
in Penny Darbyshire, Andy Maughan and Angus Stewart, What can the English legal 
system learn from jury research published up to 2001?:Research Papers in Law (1
st
 
edition, Kingston University, 2002) 64  
36
 See Section 1(1)(a)(b) and Schedule 1 of the Juries Act 1974 and Section 68 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
37
 The reason for the amendment to upper age limit for jury service to be 75 year-old by 
Section 68 of the ‘brand-new’ Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 was to “reflect 
changes in life expectancy and disability free life expectancy.” See House of Lords, 
‘Explanatory Notes: Criminal Justice and Courts Bill’ (2014) 14 
38
 See Schedule 1 of the Juries Act 1974 and Schedule 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
39
 See House of Lords (n 37) 
40
 See Section 11(1) of the Juries Act 1974 
23 
 
representativeness of the English citizens.
41
 The Jury Central Summoning 




It is preferable if the composition of a jury has diversity, however, there is no 
duty for a judge to adjust an ethnic and racial composition.
43
 A judge has the 
power to discharge a jury.
44
 Juries usually reach their verdicts according to 
Thomas’s empirical research.45 A judge cannot interfere with a jury’s 
composition.
46
 Where a person does not possess the necessary qualifications, 
and/or has obvious prejudice or has acted improperly against the defendant and 




The jury service has been frequently described as a significant public duty.
48
 As 
it was mentioned above, if someone tries to reject this compulsory duty without 
any appropriate reasons, he or she will need to pay the fine.
49
 The Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 eliminates various previous excusals and it has been more 
difficult for an English citizen to reject jury duty. Darbyshire states that one in 
                                                   
41
 See Laura McGowan, ‘Trial by Jury: Still a Lamp in the Dark?’ (2005) 69 Journal of 
Criminal Law 518, 526 
42
 See Davies et al. (n 34)  
43
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 See Cheryl Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (1
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46
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Cambridge University Press, 2007) 492 
47
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48
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49
 See Section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 
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six of the English citizens has an opportunity of being summoned as a juror in 




Darbyshire also suggests that the possibility of becoming a juror is decreasing. 
According to her, one of the possible reasons for this is because of the Criminal 





Section 118(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 eliminated peremptory 
challenges; however, the prosecutor uses a ‘stand by’ (or ‘stand aside’) 
procedure which functions in the same way as peremptory challenges. The stand 
by procedure permits a prosecutor to assign a juror to the back of the prospective 
jurors list, by the time that all other jurors’ examinations have been finished.  
 
After the examination, the individual on the back will only be recalled if there is 
a juror who cannot be seated. A stand by procedure is applied when the 
individual has a previous criminal record or assumes to be prejudiced against the 
case.
52
 However, the prosecution cannot exercise its right for the purpose of 
influencing the jury composition or its tactical advantages in a trial.
53
 The 
Attorney General issued the guidelines to prosecutors on their use of the right of 
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stand by in 1989 and amended partly on jury checks in 2012 to achieve the 
proper administration of justice.
54
 The amended guidelines have limited a 
prosecutor’s use of the right of stand by to only the criminal trials on the 
national security or terrorism.
55
 In addition, the guideline made clear that the 




3.) Comparison the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts 
a.) The Crown Court 
 
Jury trials account for only one per cent of all the English criminal trials.
57
 The 
criminal trials with jury take place only in the Crown Court.
58
 In cases where 
the defendant pleads not guilty for his or her serious criminal offence, juries will 
be summoned to the Crown Court; these cases are trials on indictment as well as 
appeals from the magistrates’ courts.59 
 
England and Wales have approximately 92 Crown Courts within seven circuits. 
The High Court judges, circuit judges and part-time recorders preside at the 
Crown Court where they usually sit and hear serious criminal trials with a jury.
60 
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 See Zander (n 46) 20  
58
 See Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3
rd
 edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 480 
59
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60
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High Court judges sit in the most serious cases coming before the Crown Court. Circuit 
judges preside over 80 per cent of the Crown Court trials. Recorders deal with 
approximately 15 per cent of trials in the Crown Court. See Sprack (n 24) 230 
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b.) The magistrates’ courts 
 
There are approximately 330 magistrates’ courts in England and Wales and 
around 23,000 lay magistrates, still named as ‘justices of the peace.’62 They are 
selected from the local community, are unpaid, work part-time and are trained to 
develop the essential skills including the court and prison visits. A magistrate 
that is selected can be any age from eighteen to sixty five.
63
 There are also 141 
professional full-time magistrates with legal certificates which are named the 
‘District judges’ (magistrates’ courts.)64 They are formerly called stipendiary 




Three, or at minimum two, lay magistrates usually hear a trial. All the 
magistrates have equal decision-making powers but only one magistrate speaks 
as the chairman in the court. Legal experts called justices’ clerks always 
accompany lay magistrates in a trial. Justices’ clerks give advice to lay 
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magistrates on the legal procedure and practice.
66
 When a District judge hears a 
trial, he or she sits alone. 
  
Skyrme suggested that, “A lay justice cannot equal the professional skill of a 
stipendiary [a District judge], but the function of magistrates is largely to decide 
questions of fact and for this purpose to exercise common sense and sound 
judgment against a background to knowledge and experience of the world at 
large.”67 To become a magistrate, formal qualifications are not required, 
however, a magistrate has to “demonstrate common sense, integrity, intelligence 
and the capacity to act fairly.”68 These are why the number of lay magistrates is 
larger than District judges. Except for the power of District judges to sit alone, 




c.) The type of cases  
 
A criminal trial is dealt with in either the Crown Court or magistrates’ courts. 
Almost all cases start in the magistrates’ courts. There are some cases in which 
the accused has a right to decide whether his or her case is heard in the Crown 
Court or magistrates’ courts.70 
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The magistrates’ courts deal with summary71 and ‘triable either-way 
offences.’72 More serious offences, cases that are labeled as indictable-only 
offences
73
 will be heard at the Crown Court.
74
 In 2010, summary offences 
accounted for 68 per cent, while triable either-way offences accounted for 24 per 
cent of all the proceedings in the magistrates’ courts.  
 
The jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts has grown with indictable-only 
offences downgraded to triable either-way and triable either-way offences to 
summary offences from the nineteenth century.
75
 The Criminal Law Act 1977 
put criminal damage below £200 into summary offences.
76
 After that, the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 included taking and driving a car without the owner’s 
consent and common assault and battery in the summary offence category.
77
 
Recently, the magistrates’ courts have dealt with over 95 per cent of all criminal 
cases in England since it is the virtual starting point of all the criminal cases in 
England.
78
 In 2010, approximately 1.68 million defendants were brought to the 
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magistrates’ courts and 180,000 trials were recorded.79 Conversely, 152,300 
cases were received by the Crown Court and listed around 43,300 trials in 
2010.
80
 The rate of defendants who entered a plea (in cases committed or sent 
for a trial) pleaded guilty in the Crown Court has been increasing over the years 
from 56 per cent in 2001 to 70 per cent in 2010.
81
 This would be one of the 
significant reasons for the decrease in the number of jury trials in the Crown 
Court.  
 
If the magistrates’ courts find the defendant guilty, magistrates will give a 
sentence of generally of up to six months’ imprisonment for a single offence 
(twelve months in total), or a fine, generally of up to £5,000.
82
 Recently, 
Section 85 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
abolished this limit of £5,000 on fines, and there has been no limit to the fine 
that can be imposed on by magistrates.  
 
If magistrates believe that the offence was very serious and their powers of 
punishment were inadequate on the case,
 
they will be able to send the case to the 
Crown Court. This is a case that is exceptional, nevertheless, there are aspects of 
the offence’s seriousness which emerge only after a conviction. In such a 




                                                   
79
 See Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2010 (Revised edition, 2011) 2-3 
80




 See Judiciary of England and Wales (n 62) 
83
 These are a) where the defendant is revealed as having a record of previous convictions 
by Section 143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; b) where the defendant asks for 
30 
 
d.) Role of a jury and a magistrate  
 
There are several roles assumed by the English jury. Firstly, a jury’s function is 
to decide the facts. A jury must decide the facts only based on evidence which 
was mentioned in a trial. Any judicial discretion by a jury based on any 
information from outside of the court which was not introduced during the 
criminal trial must not be employed when considering the verdict. In addition, if 
a jury cannot conclude that giving the defendant a guilty verdict beyond 
reasonable doubt, the jury must acquit the defendant. This is the English basic 
evidential rule and the minimum requirement for a jury to give a guilty verdict 
to a defendant.
84
 Secondly, a jury assumes the common sense role of a 
representative of the community.
85
 Vidmar stated that jurors are expected to 
“provide useful insights regarding contested facts and inject community values 
of equity and fairness into their decisions.”86 Securing this fairness is 
considered the most traditional and ultimate purpose of the English jury system. 
As Blake indicated, “it is a barometer of public opinion.”87 Related to this, 
Vidmar suggested that “juries also create a sense of legitimacy about the legal 
process.”88 In addition, the transparency of the legal process will be enhanced.89 
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This function of the English jury system might be labeled as one of the 
democratic roles. Thirdly, the jury system has educational effects for the people 
who become jurors. Through the trial, jurors would recognise what justice is, 
understand what laws are, and can feel what makes democracy, perhaps. 
 
The role of jury is passive and is simply listening to a case.
90
 Morrison 
expressed the role of contemporary jurors as “from an institution that originally 
had the power to determine both law and fact, the modern jury has become a 
singularly passive animal.”91 However, this description has not been entirely 
accurate. A juror would be approved to take notes on a trial although it depends 
on the judge’s discretion.92 Sometimes, a jury will put questions by passing a 
note of the judge.
93
 The judge usually warns jurors not to discuss their case 




At the end of a trial, a jury will tell their verdict without giving reasons: simply 
by saying ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty.’ The jury will not decide on legal 
interpretations and the sentences, because it is the role of a trial judge. 
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The jury’s verdicts had required to be agreed upon unanimously for the most 
part of the long history of English jury trials. If a jury could not be led into 
agreement of their verdict, it would become a ‘hung jury,’95 and then different 
jurors would start the trial again.
96
 However, in the last century, jury tampering 
has gradually become a serious threat to assuring fairness of a trial,
97
 thus 
Parliament enacted Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The act 
abolishes unanimous verdicts in criminal trials, and permits a jury to give 
majority verdicts. With these new types of verdicts, it could be a judgment when 
ten out of twelve jurors agreed with the verdict.
98
 However, even though 
majority verdicts are legitimately permitted, jurors will be required to try for at 
least two hours in their deliberation to reach a unanimous verdict.
99
 When a jury 
delivers its verdict, the judge asks the foreman whether the verdict was 
unanimous, and if not, by what majority.
100
 There are statistics showing that 81 
per cent of all convicted jury verdicts were unanimous, the remaining 19 per 




The role of magistrates is also to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not. 
In addition, if the defendant is guilty, the magistrates will decide the sentence of 
him or her. A District judge normally hears when the case is prolonged or more 
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complex, or involves considerations of public safety, public interest immunity 




Unlike jurors, lay magistrates need to take the legal training which is provided 
by the justice’s Clerk, the Magistrates Association and the Judicial College. The 
website of the Magistrates Association states that the contents of training for lay 
magistrates.
103
 At the first year of the term, lay magistrates take the training 
programme including lectures by mentors and visiting penal institutions. After 
one to one and half years, they will start their magisterial career at court. Lay 
magistrates are predicted to sit in court at least 26 times per a year.
104
 
According to Sprack, the average attendance of lay magistrates is approximately 
35 times during a year.
105
 Lay magistrates need to take an ongoing training 
programme after that and be examined their quality from time to time.
106
  
The Law Commission suggests that the training is meaningful to make lay 
magistrates not to have any prejudice.
107
 However, there is a discussion about 
whether legally trained lay magistrates could be expressed as ‘lay people.’ For 
example, Sprack shows his concern that “Through their initial training and 
through their regular attendance at court, often over many years, lay magistrates 
become knowledgeable about the work of their courts. Although the adjective 
‘lay’ is used to illustrate them, they are far from being ignorant of the ways of 
                                                   
102
 See Sprack (n 24) 95 
103
 See the Magistrates Association, ‘What about training’ (2015) The Magistrates 
Association <http://www.magistrates-association.org.uk/about-magistrates/training/> 
accessed 8 March 2015 
104




 For example, after a new legislation passed in Parliament 
107
 See the Law Commission, ‘Contempt of Court: A Consultation Paper’ (2012) 
Consultation Paper No. 209, 11 
34 
 
the law.”108 A discussion has developed about what the meaning and merit of a 
constitutional institution involving lay people in the justice system is in the next 
section. 
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2. The theoretical basis of English jury trial: perception of being a 
constitutional institution involving lay people in the English justice 
system 
 
Slapper proudly states that “The jury, over 800 years old in Britain, is generally 
seen as a desirable feature of the British constitution.”1 Is the jury system 
actually desirable in contemporary England? According to Cheryl Thomas, more 
than 80 per cent of British citizens support juries.
2
 However, there is also a 
certain amount of scepticism about the efficiency of the jury in contemporary 
England. In this section, I will raise various opinions on the English jury by 
well-known legal theorists, researchers and judges and introduce their 
perception of being a constitutional institution involving lay people in the 
English justice system. Comparing their opinions, theoretical basis of English 
jury trial will be clearly provided.  
 
1.) William Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham  
 
The contemporary image of the jury system has been created between the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century. The transformation from witness to a fact 
finder shows that a juror has been treated as a significant role in the English 
justice system. William Blackstone, the great legal theorist of the eighteenth 
century of England, was one of the representative praiser and a supporter of the 
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English jury system. Blackstone stated that “for whom the jury was the most 
admirably constituted fact-finding body in the world.”3 He highly evaluated the 
fact-finding body which consisted of lay people as a representative citizen to 
assure fair trial and justice. Conversely, Blackstone foresaw that a right to trial 
by jury would gradually be “sapped and undermined”4 by the introduction of 
other convenient methods of trial including justices of the peace. His prophecy 
was realised in the nineteenth century England. 
 
Unlike Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, a representative legal scholar in the 
nineteenth century England, was a critic of the jury system, especially the grand 
jury system in England.
5
 Bentham was against the English grand jury system.
6
 
Bentham was concerned about jurors’ secrecy and sceptical about its 
representativeness.
7
 He took an opposite view from Blackstone who praised the 
representative function of juries. Bentham suggested that, “Whatever it may 
have been at one time, as matters have stood for a long time, a grand jury has 
been, is, and will be, an instrument worse than useless.”8 About a hundred years 
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2.) E.P. Thompson 
 
E.P. Thompson, a high-ranking socialistic historian in twentieth century 
England gave comments on the jury system based on his historical analysis. He 
noted why juries could survive and keep their legitimacy in the modern English 
legal history was because its social profile has not been changed regardless of 
the rising new working-class in the English political culture of nineteenth 
century.
10
 In his understanding, “A jury of the middling sort of people, which in 
1649 or 1794 still watchfully confronted the ‘Crown,’ now turned itself about 
and confronted the challenge of democracy from their social inferiors.”11 This 
view was obviously by his socialistic way off thinking,
12
 but his next 
expression was more persuasive: “Perhaps this may explain why the jury 
survived into the twentieth century almost immune from the rationalisations 
imposed by Utilitarians in other areas.”13 Actually, the jury system was 
survived although its demerits and risks have been already pointed out by 
Bentham. 
 
Thompson analysed the contemporary movement of jury restriction in England 
was produced by “anti-jury lobby”14 and sarcastically argued that “After eight 
hundred years our betters have decided to bring the jury under their condign 
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 Thompson also stated that “the jury’s ancient legitimacy proved to be a useful resource in 
the control of working-class movements.” Ibid 
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control.”15 Conversely, Thompson has pointed out the vulnerable aspects of the 
English jury system correctly as: 
 
The jury is perhaps the last place in our social organisation where any person, 
any citizen, may be called upon to perform a fully adult role. It has not been 
shown that our fellow citizens have failed, when placed in the jury box. They 
appear, when they find themselves resources to fulfil the responsibility. But the 
very notion of it is ‘illogical’ and absurd. Only a crank could suggest such a 
direct exercise of democracy today. Indeed, although as a historian I have to 




Thompson took the severe position on the jury qualification. For instance, he 
stated that “This is not to say that the old system was beyond all possibility of 
reform. There could be more preparation for our rights and our duties as jurors 
in our schools.”17 He continued “It may be argued that eighteen is too young to 
fulfil the role, that literacy qualifications might be more scrupulous, or even that, 
for some modern types of case, qualifications might be required in numeracy. 
And education might go further still.”18 His concern on the jury qualification of 
young people has been shared with the contemporary British Government, and it 
will not change the lower age limit to be a juror. Instead, the Government raised 
the upper age limit of it as seventy-five.
19
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Conversely, Thompson was not perfectly against the English jury. Thompson 
stated that: 
 
The English common law rests upon a bargain between the Law and the people. 
The jury box is where the people come into the court: the judge watches them 
and the jury watches back. A jury is the place where the bargain is struck. The 
jury attends in judgment, not only upon the accused, but also upon the justice 




In other words, Thompson indicated the jury bargains with a trial judge to 
achieve the justice by the rule on behalf of the English people. He maintained 
“For the moment, randomness- and confidence in our fellow citizens- is 
enough.”21  
 
3.) Lord Patrick Devlin  
 
Lord Patrick Devlin was an outstanding judge of the twentieth century England. 
He wrote several books on the English jury, for example, Trial by Jury
22
 which 
was the record of his Hamlyn Lectures. Devlin was “generally favourable”23 for 
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the jury system. Devlin expressed the jury as a “little parliament.”24 In other 
words, Devlin thought the jury system is one of the efficient ways to secure 
democracy. For him, the jury system was “more than an instrument of justice 
and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that 
freedom lives.”25 Devlin believed that “The British have a taste for umpiring 
and feel flattered by having disputes referred to them.”26 He highly praised the 
lay element of a jury and was against any trial by experts. Devlin stated that: 
 
To refer a case for decision to a body of experts or even to men and women of 
superior mental powers would mean that the person accuses might be 
imprisoned for ten or fifteen years or for life, for reasons which could not be 





For Devlin, “There is no room in the criminal law for the idea that a case could 
be too complicated for a jury to understand.”28 This theory was followed by the 
people against the enforcement of Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
which introduced a non-jury trial on a case of complex fraud. Moreover, Devlin 
concerned a non-jury trial leads the decrease of chances of acquittal for a 
defendant.
29
 In addition, Devlin thought the jury system had the effect of 
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making citizens “a law-abiding people”30 and also “Good guardians of the law 
and gives them a sense of fairness that makes them happy judges.”31 Eventually, 
as Devlin indicated, “Twelve commonplace minds may reach a sounder solution 
than two or three brilliant ones.”32 
 
Through these descriptions, it is obvious that Devlin was a strong supporter for 
the jury system. Thompson indicated Lord Devlin: 
 
For Alexis de Tocqueville the American jury was an ‘eminently republican 
element in the Government.’ which ‘places the real direction of Society in the 
hands of the governed.’ I know of only one old judge, long retired from practice, 
who even understands this language today. And he- Lord Devlin- now writes in 
elegiac tone. Thirty years ago he could say that ‘the jury is the lamp that shows 
that freedom lives’ In 1978, he warned of the gathering signs ‘that the jury has 
another half-century or so of life to be spent in the sort of comfortable 
reservation which conquerors, bringing with them a new civilisation, assign to 
the natives whom they are displacing.’33  
 
Sometimes, Devlin’s theory such as “intuition and not intellect may be the safer 
guide”34 was so radical and Thompson’s cynical comments are understandable. 
However, Devlin did not ignore the fact that a trial by jury is not a perfect 
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judicial system. For example, he concurred with the theory that trial by jury “has 
been suspended or withdrawn in certain circumstances.”35 Devlin has pointed 
out that in some cases the use of jury will be difficult and care will need to be 
taken about the way the trial proceeding. For instance, in a criminal trial on 
sexual offences, if there were female jurors, they would probably feel 
“embarrassment of serving.”36 In such a situation, the judge needs to “relieve 
women”37 from serving on the jury. For another instance, Devlin was a 
supporter of the voir dire procedure of jury selection. He suggested that “I do 
not think that it would be objectionable to have an educational qualification 
recorded on the jury list in the same way as an occupation. Nor do I think that it 
would be objectionable to use the voir dire for the purpose of ensuring as 
competent a jury as the panel could provide.”38 Devlin correctly understood a 
long trial sometimes has a negative effect on a juror’s original job and life. He 
stated that: 
 
Jury service is a long case can be very burdensome to the jurors and indeed 
impossible for those who could not give the time without injury to their ordinary 
employments. I imagine that informally most such people are now excused. I see 
no reason why they do not have to be exempted in the same way as those in 
certain professions are exempt from all jury service. A partial exemption from 
long trials only ought to be workable.
39
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Conversely, Devlin claimed that “Is there any evidence that jury trials have 
increased disproportionately? Granted that a jury trial of any sort will take a 
percentage longer than a non-jury trial, is the increase of time taken so large as 
to be an unacceptable addition?”40 Devlin took a neutral position and 
objectively observed the cost factor of the English jury system in both money 
and time.  
 
It is clear that Devlin was practical, and was not just a close-sighted advocate of 
the jury system. Devlin objectively analysed the actuality of modern English 
society by his judicial career.  
 
4.) Tom Sargant 
 
In the book, Criminal Trials, Tom Sargant, the first secretary of JUSTICE and 
an eminent human rights activist in the twentieth century England, frequently 
analysed and reported the quality and reliability of the jury verdicts and 
judgment by magistrates in the English Criminal Courts. For him, “The jury 
system provides a vital safeguard against oppressive prosecutions but it has 
some serious weaknesses.”41 Among the weaknesses of the English jury system, 
he raised the problem of miscarriages of justice by a jury. Sargant stated that “A 
dozen or more serious cases in which the verdicts of juries have been manifestly 
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mistaken.”42 As the possible reason for this, Sargant illustrated the severe 
secrecy of jury deliberation. According to him, the ability of a jury to give a 
verdict appropriately and correctly based on evidence is uncertain since “No one 
will ever know how often they make tragic mistakes.”43 The factor undermines 
the credibility of jury and arouses suspicion on fairness of jury trial among 
English citizens. Sargant claimed “Juries are too often required to bring in their 
verdicts on the basis of a limited knowledge of the facts— sometimes on what 
can fairly be described as the tip of the iceberg.”44 For example, the limited 
knowledge of a juror would not understand complex fraud cases correctly.
45
 It 
would cause miscarriages of justice.   
 
In addition, he showed his concern on the case if a juror told other jurors false 
and prejudicial information about the defendant.
46
 Sargant suggested his reform 
plan of the English jury system. For example, Sargant asserted the minimum age 
of jury, eighteen year-old is too low as Thompson suggested. According to 
Sargant, “members of juries should have sufficient experience of life to be able 
to judge character and evaluate objectively.”47 Sargant suggested that, 
twenty-five year-old should be a “sensible minimum age.”48 The matureness of 
each juror is a solution for avoiding perverse verdicts and miscarriages of justice. 
Sargant also stated that, if the jury verdict was majority of ten to two, the 
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defendant would be approved to hold an automatic right to appeal.
49
 This would 
ease the concern on a majority jury verdict. 
 
Sargant suggested a jury needs to give the reason for the verdicts with the 
judgment. It makes an much more efficient appeal “particularly when the Court 
is asked to evaluate the probable effect of new evidence.”50 Sargant suggested a 





Sargant was a reformer but also a strong supporter of English criminal jury. His 
theory and positive attitude to suggest his original jury reform plan has been 
succeeded to JUSTICE, the organisation which he was the secretary. 
 
5.) Penny Darbyshire 
 
Penny Darbyshire and Cheryl Thomas are two well-known contemporary 
researchers on the English jury system and engage with empirical jury research. 
 
Darbyshire analysed diversity of jurors. Darbyshire and her team researched 
empirically, and concluded English juries “are unrepresentative of certain 
groups, notably women and minorities and, possibly, some occupational 
groups.”52 According to her, men tended to be more active in jury deliberation 
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and more likely to be foremen and even more likely acquit than women.
53
 
Darbyshire found “Jurors are more likely to empathise with defendants of their 
own gender.”54 In addition, Darbyshire suggested the age would influence the 
deliberation process because younger people can recall more instructions and the 
evidence.
55
 Darbyshire’s theory on the relation between ability of jury and ages 
was opposite from Thompson and Sargant.  
 
She put a question whether cotemporary jury actually represents English citizens. 
She maintained “Most people try to avoid jury service,”56 and “it must distort 
jury representativeness.”57 Thus the abolition of right of excuse and merging the 
list of juror summoning from the electoral roll to such as telephone directories 
would be a solution for the problem.
58
 Her theory connects to the contemporary 
jury reform by the Government including the abolition of peremptory challenges 
and expansion of the jury qualification toward more diversified citizens.  
 
Darbyshire thought jury does not have so much significance as Lord Devlin 
expressed “the lamp that shows that freedom lives”59 in the contemporary 
English society; she stated that “The jury’s symbolic significance is magnified 
beyond its practical significance by the media, as well as academics, thus 
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unwittingly misleading the public.”60 Darbyshire argued, in contemporary 
English society, “The traditional justifications used in praise and defence of the 
jury, suggesting that some of them are conceptually unsound.”61 Although her 
theory seems to be cold for an enthusiastic supporter of jury system, 
Darbyshire’s analysis is realistic in some aspects. For example, Darbyshire 
grasped that the rise of magistrates’ courts in contemporary English criminal 
justice scene. She has pointed out that media and academic have not closed up 
the importance of the magistracy in the English criminal justice system compare 
with the jury system.
62
 For another example, Darbyshire suggested that tried for 
indictable only offences could have the right to opt for judge-only trial.
63
 In 
addition, she argued that non-jury criminal trials are adequate for serious and 
complex fraud trials.
64
 However, these realistic suggestions have not focused 
comparing with the theory which strongly supports existing English criminal 
jury by Cheryl Thomas.   
 
6.) Cheryl Thomas 
 
Cheryl Thomas is one of the central experts on the English jury system recently. 
She is a strong supporter for jury system, has engaged empirical researches on 
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English jury, and contributed to preparing the Governmental research on its jury 
reform.  
 
Thomas’s basic thought is to protect the English criminal jury system. For her,   
criticisms of contemporary criminal jury system are myths. Thomas states that 
her “survey findings on who does and who does not do jury service at the Crown 
Courts in England and Wales have revealed that most current thinking about the 
representative nature of jury service in this country is based on myth, not 
reality.”65 For Thomas, people who take “the sky is falling”66 theory “would 
perhaps prefer to see an end to trial by jury, and who have a lack of faith in 
non-legally trained persons adjudicating criminal cases.”67 She argues the “let’s 
just blindly trust the jury”68 position people as “the blind faith approach suits 
media outlets in particular who would prefer not to have any restrictions on what 
they publish.”69 Thomas maintains: 
 
It is not just that we must (or must not) ‘trust the jury’. It should be that we must 
give the jury the best tools to do their job to the best of their ability— and then 
we must trust the jury to do that job. Blind trust in juries is not just misguided; it 
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As the Law Commission allows, “Reliable empirical research in England and 
Wales about the impact of publicity on jury and judicial decision-making is 
relatively scarce.”71 Thomas tends to suggest the significance of empirical 
evidence. For example, she states that “Any reform of the law of contempt in 
relation to juries and jury trials should be based on rigorous and reliable 
empirical evidence, not anecdotal evidence, exceptional cases or untested 
assumptions about juries.”72 She continues “Too often proposals for change are 
based on anecdotal claims about jury problems or single high profile or 
exceptional cases.”73 However, her empirical research is the main (could be said 
only the) evidence for her to support her theory, and she is confident of it too 
much. For instance, according to Thomas, “Are Juries Fair? is the most in-depth 
study into the issue ever undertaken in this country.”74 Actually, in this 
empirical research, Thomas had interviewed post-verdict jurors who were all in 
Crown Courts in England and Wales from 2006 to 2008. Upon evaluation, it 
could be argued that this study was a greater research undertaking than one 
which simply interviewed mock jurors. As another example, about Diversity and 
Fairness in the Jury System, Thomas confidently states that it is “the first 
empirical study ever undertaken in this country on the influence of race on jury 
decision-making.”75  
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7.) Louis Blom-Cooper 
 
Louis Blom-Copper, well-known public lawyer in England is sceptical on the 
efficiency and ability of a jury to achieve a fair trial unlike Cheryl Thomas. 
Blom-Cooper stated that “The question of evaluating evidence in the courtroom 
is a professional job, it’s not for amateurs.”76 Blom-Cooper argues Thomas as 
“While the research into jury trials is welcome, the report by Professor Cheryl 
Thomas does not answer (not purport to answer) the crucial question: whether 
our system of trial by jury for serious crimes produces a quality of criminal 
justice as good, if not better, than would a wholly professional system.”77 
 
According to him, “There is nothing illiberal about questioning the value of the 
jury system of criminal justice. It is more a question of deciding whether trial by 
judge and jury in the Crown Court for more serious criminal offences is as good 
if not better than any alternative, such as trial by judge alone, or assessors.”78 
For him, a non-jury trial needs to be one of the options for a defendant 
especially in complex fraud cases.
79
 He claimed “Defendants should also have 
the right to be tried by a panel of experts instead of a jury.”80 Blom-Cooper 
adds as the condition of organising a non-jury trial, court needs to decide the 
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question whether a trial is appropriate to be heard without a jury in each case, 
“even if both parties agreed that they wanted a professional tribunal.”81 
 
8.) Conclusion for the chapter  
 
Although the English jury system has been vastly accepted in statistics, as the 
theorists in this chapter provided, there are various perceptions on the efficiency 
of a jury in England. The advantages and disadvantages of the English criminal 
jury system will be examined in the next chapter.
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Part 2: The argument for the weaknesses of the jury process  
1. The analysis of the role of a jury and its misconduct 
1.) The role of a jury  
a.) As a mean of establishing the facts of a case  
 
The main job of a jury is the finding of fact in a trial. Unlike in the Middle Ages, 
a juror is not a witness. A juror must not decide facts by using their prior 
knowledge of the case or even concerns raised by the case.
1
 If a juror does these 
actions, it will be a perverse verdict by juror misconduct and it would constitute 
a legitimate reason for an appeal.
2
 However, could a juror actually figure out 
facts of a case only based only on the evidence in a trial?  
 
According to Blake, “One of the persistent arguments canvassed against juries is 
that they are not intelligent enough.”3 Even though the trial is a complex case, a 
jury needs to sit to hear and decide its verdict. In a complex case, the English 
judiciary does not have the intention to let experts decide verdicts without a jury 
at the moment. The English jury sometimes decides cases which would be a 
matter for experts in the other countries.
4
 In R v Turner, it was stated that expert 
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evidence is inadmissible if it is “within the common knowledge and experience 
of jurors.”5 
 
b.) As a mean of applying the law: a problem of jury nullification   
 
A jury has only a fact-finding function in a criminal trial. It does not have power 
to apply the law. Deciding the law in a trial is the prime role of a judge. Before a 
jury deliberates, a judge tells a jury about the legal direction and advises on the 
case. The judge will tell the jurors what kind of laws will be applied in this case. 
However, if the jurors do not follow the judge’s direction and ignore any laws 
which the judge specifies, what will the judge do? Will the jurors be punished? 
Will the trial be restarted again? If the jurors have the constitutional rights to 
ignore any laws, will there be any limits? These topics are in relation to the 
problem of ‘jury nullification.’ Jury nullification is the ‘right’ of jurors to ignore 
the law by their consciences. It is also called ‘jury equity.’  
 
Why could ignoring the law be a right of a jury? There is a discussion about 
whether the constitutional right of nullification actually exists or is permissible 
for a jury. Darbyshire states that legitimising jury nullification means that the 
court cannot punish jurors even though their judgment was a perverse verdict 
and contrary to the judge’s instruction.6 Originally, the right to ignore the law 
was first approved in R v Bushell in 1670.
7
 There have been various reasons 
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why jurors ignore the law. For example, there would be jury nullifications 
against too unreasonable sentences, racism and improper Government action.
8
 
The recent case which affirmed jury nullification was R v Wang in 2005.
9
 In 
this case, the House of Lords affirmed that juries can deliver an acquittal even 




In addition to these judgments, there have been theories which positively accept 
the existence of jury nullification. For example, Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas 
suggested that the right of jury nullification is the jury’s main democratic 
function.
11
 They stated that it is because the verdict by jury “is a matter entirely 
between God and their own conscience.”12 Grieve suggests “Do we want a legal 
system in which the jury can return a verdict which seems to us to fly in the face 
of the evidence? My answer is yes, it is essential that juries are trusted to take 
decisions, with proper direction, even if very occasionally those decisions will 
not accord with the view that lawyers, judges or the Crown may hold.”13  
 
Conversely, Brooks stated that “properly understood, juries do not have any 
constitutional right to ignore the law, but they do have the power to do so 
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nevertheless.”14 In other words, his theory is that there is no permission for the 
jury nor any rights of nullification; however, in fact, they have such power. 
Actually, jury nullification is not the right nor power to ignore the law itself. As 





However, a difficult problem raises in the case that juries just misunderstand the 
facts and give a decision unlike that directed by judges. As Legal Commission 
has pointed out that, “There may of course be some jurors who ignore the 
judge’s direction simply out of curiosity or even in bad faith.”16 For example, 
the perverse verdicts because of less understanding in complex trials will be 
possible.
17
 Even if it is misjudged, or without any intention to nullify the law, 
will jury nullification be legitimate? As Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas have 
pointed out, there is no clear distinction between jury nullification and 
miscarriage of justice by jurors who are lack of understanding or prejudiced.
18
 
This is one of the reasons which people, against legitimate jury nullification give. 
For example, Singer states that jury nullification is often argued as 
“anachronistic, inconsistent, threatening anarchy, and a license for unjust 
acquittals.”19 Jackson claims that the court must not legitimise a conviction by 
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ignoring the law which was based on any extra-legal standards.
20
 However, 
Baldwin and McConville have pointed out researches about doubtful jury 
convictions are not enough.
21
 The severe restriction of disclosing the jury 





As Brooks suggested jury nullification is subject to criticisms because it will 
possibly damage to the rule of law.
23
 He indicated the racial bias examples 
among a jury.
24
 Jury nullification is difficult to legitimise completely ignoring 
any problems and risks. 
 
Has jury nullification occurred so often in this contemporary English judicial 
scene? Of course, there will be several racial problems or sometimes, a judge 
gives a direction by his or her prejudice. A jury has an opportunity to nullify the 
application of law and judge’s direction by the use of its conscience.  
 
Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas states that jury nullification is essential to the 
democratic role of the jury.
25
 However, realistically, it is difficult to imagine 
that a jury will go against the Government in criminal or civil trials in England, 
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because the situation like R v Bushell in the seventeenth century will not happen 
in twenty-first century England. The jurors will be selected among most citizens 
who live peacefully and there will be no conflicts between them and the 
Government. As Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas suggested, a judge’s direction will 
be powerfully influence on jury verdicts.
26
 Jurors will basically follow the 
judge’s instruction.27 
 
The possibility of jury nullification has decreased compared with the past.
28
 
Jury nullification will no longer be a practical concern nor a central difficulty 
which the English jury system has. Jury nullification can be discussed as just a 
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2.) Jury’s misconduct and prejudice 
a.) The category of a jury’s misconduct 
 
If a juror is guilty of misconduct, the jury panel will be discharged or a new trial 
will be restarted. What sort of action will be assumed as a jury’s misconduct? 
These have been categorised by Halsbury’s Laws of England, as “if the jurors 
separate without the leave of the court,
30
 eat or drink before the verdict at the 
expense of one of the parties, hold communication with any person or receive 
evidence, oral or documentary, out of court,
31
 determine their verdict by lot
32
 
or, being unable to agree, have ‘split the difference,’33 or if a stranger was with 
them for a substantial time
34
.”35 In addition, it includes “drunkenness,36 alleged 
racism,
37
 improper pressure on other jurors,
38
 consulting an ouija board in the 
course of deliberations,
39
 declining to take part in the deliberations of the jury,
40
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making telephone calls after retirement,
41
 and lunching with a barrister not 




b.) Jury’s prejudice 
 
It is difficult to prove the existence of prejudice in a juror’s mind, because the 
prejudiced juror may not recognise that he has been affected by the prejudice.
44
 
Slapper has put a question: “To what extent is prejudice on the basis of, say, 
race, sex or class a significant feature of how juries discuss and decide cases?”45 
The standard of actual prejudice is categorised “whether a fair-minded and 
informed observer would conclude that there was a real danger that a juror was 
or would be biased in the sense that he might unfairly regard with favour or 
disfavour the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him.”46 
However, eventually, the judge would use his discretion to decide whether the 
juror had prejudice or not case-by-case basis.
47
 Prejudice has effects which 
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“may encompass deliberate hostility,48 inadvertent knowledge of the 
defendant’s bad character,49 alleged racism,50 acquaintance with prosecution 
witnesses
51
 or a close nexus with the case in some way.
52”53  
 
3.) Factors of the weaknesses of the jury process 
a.) Jury composition 
 
To avoid a misconduct of jury and a prejudice which influences the fairness of a 
trial, a jury composition is an important element. If a jury is composed of people 
who have a certain age, a gender or a race, the diversity of jury will decrease and 
it will be difficult to achieve a fair trial. In this section, diversity, acquittal rate 
and public confidence of jury trial will be examined, compared with magistrates’ 
courts system. 
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b.) Diversity  
 
It is the principle that a juror must be selected at random from a panel.
54
 A 
judge does not have the power to influence the composition of a jury. According 
to Thomas, only in exceptional circumstances, a judge can direct to compose a 
racially mixed jury.
55
 However, in R v Ford, the Court of Appeal prevented the 




The abolition of peremptory challenge in 1988 has increased the diversity of 
jury qualification. Nowadays, even a judge may be eligible to become a juror.
57
 
The abolition of peremptory challenge also eliminated a potential way of 




The Roskill Committee which examined the ability of a jury to hear complex 
fraud trials noted “the efficacy of the jury system depends upon acceptance of 
the principle of random selection.”59 However, because there is little diversity, 
the contemporary jury and lay magistrates have been concerned as fact finders 
which are selected from social elites. For example, Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas 
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stated that “The ‘elite’ nature of the composition of the jury had come to be seen 
as a threat to its legitimacy in a democratic society, and to claims that it 
introduced common sense and protected the ordinary citizen from the state.”60 
 
Actually, the gender balance of jury and magistrates has been well-managed. 
The number of male jurors was slightly larger than female in 1993.
61
 The 
number of male and female lay magistrates was also almost even in 2005 and 
2010.
62
 Thomas argues “Serving jurors were remarkably representative of the 
local community in terms of ethnicity, gender, income, occupation and 
religion.”63 For instance, retired and unemployed jurors are under-represented 
among serving jurors, and conversely, the employed are over-represented.
64
 Her 
empirical research shows that it is a myth that English jury has little diversity. 
According to Thomas, it is clear that ethnic minorities are fairly represented in 
almost all the Crown Court in England.
65
 If her empirical research is precise, a 
judge does not have to prepare any racially mixed jury. 
  
As in a jury, lay magistrates are required to have diversity to give a fair 
judgment. Slapper states that the standard of selection of magistrates is “the 
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people with common sense and personal integrity, with a good knowledge of 
people and their local community, the ability to listen to all sides of an argument 
and to contribute to fair and reasonable decisions.”66 Even lay magistrates who 
are representatives of the people sometimes argued to be from wealth people in 
the English society.
67
 Slapper’s research shows “Members of the working class 
who work in call centres, factories, quarries, steelworks, on the railways and in 
office cleaning do not feature in any great numbers on the bench. Similarly, only 
4.5 per cent of magistrates are disabled, compared with 15 per cent of the adult 
working age population in England and Wales.”68 In 2003, only 3.7 per cent of 
the magistrates in England were aged under forty, and 79.8 per cent of them 
were over fifty.
69
 In addition, according to the same statistics, 93.7 per cent of 




Conversely, the English judiciary proudly stated in its website that all lay 
magistrates are “mixed in gender, age, ethnicity etc. whenever possible to bring 
a broad experience of life to the bench.”71 According to Slapper, it is because of 
the Governmental effort to enlarge the social base of magistrates’ pool for the 
last two decades.
72
 In addition, according to Sprack, the Lord Chancellor make 
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effort to maintain a gender and age balance, for instance, introducing “younger 
people in their thirties or early forties to the magistracy.”73 To evidentially 
support such an effort by the Lord Chancellor, there are statistics which show 
about 8.1 per cent of the 25,170 magistrates came from minority ethnic 




However, unlike the diversity of lay magistrates, the diversity of District judges 
who are professionals has not been well-balanced. According to the Judicial 
Diversity statistics in 2012 April, among 141 District judges at magistrates’ 
courts in England, only 29.1 per cent are female.
75
 In terms of ethnicity, 104 are 
white, four are Asian background, and 33 are unknown. Surprisingly, only 
twelve magistrates are under fifty year-old, and the other 129 are over fifty 
year-old. It predicts District judges needs more diversity than lay magistrates 
and a jury.  
 
c.) Acquittal rate  
 
It has been said that a jury tends to have a high acquittal rate compared with 
magistrates’ courts and non-jury criminal trials. This was counted as one of the 
merits of the English criminal jury system to assure fairness and justice. In 
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2013-2014, the conviction rate of defendants in the Crown Court was 80.5 per 
cent and in the magistrates’ courts was 84.4 per cent.76  
 
Therefore, it seems to be not so large differences between the Crown Court and 
the magistrates’ courts. Jurors seem to think their verdict were well-balanced. 
According to Crown Court Study in 1993, when jurors asked whether the 
sentence was unexpectedly high or low, 32 per cent of them answered the 
sentence was as same as they had expected, and the same amount of jurors 
responded there are no objections as regards sentence.
77
 14 per cent of jurors 
thought the sentence was more severe than they predicted and conversely 23 per 




According to Crown Court Study in 1993, white defendants tend to be acquitted 
more than non-white defendants.
79
 However, Thomas’s recent empirical 
research shows that the conviction rates by jury have only small differences 
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d.) The cost in both money and time  
 
It is often asserted that jury trial wastes so much money and is time-consuming. 
For example, the Law Commission suggested that “Trial by judge alone could 
be quicker and cheaper than with a jury.”81 However, is it real? Elliott and 
Quinn suggested that “A Crown Court trial currently costs the taxpayer around 
£7,400 per day, as opposed to £1,000 per day for trial by magistrates.”82 
Compared with a magistrates’ trial, jury trial needs more money obviously. The 
Bar Council’s statistics in 2002 showed 27 per cent of sampled English people 
supported reducing the number of jury trials for the purpose of saving money.
83
 
It also indicated that 69 per cent of the sample would oppose such a reduction 
for cost saving. From this data, the cost problem would not be the decisive 
reason for the restriction of the English jury system, although whether the 
sampled people actually realised how costly the English jury is recently 
referring to an appropriate statistics were uncertain. 
 
Ministry of Justice suggests the jury service will usually finish within ten 
working days.
84
 In addition, the average hearing time for defendants who 
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pleaded not guilty in sent for trial cases in the Crown Courts was 19.5 hours.
85
 
Dabyshire stated that two weeks jury service is not an unreasonable burden on 
an English citizen “who appears to ‘believe’ in the jury system.”86 However, 
Elliott and Quinn have pointed out that a jury tends to spend much of its time 
“waiting around to be summoned into court.”87 According to Judicial and Court 
Statistics 2010, the average waiting time for defendants sent for trial at the 
Crown Court was 19.3 weeks.
88
 Moreover, offence-to-completion time of a jury 
trial at the Crown Court was an average of 187 days in 2010.
89
 On the other 
hand, the estimated average offence-to-completion time in the magistrates’ 
courts was 109 days in December 2010.
90
 In other words, a juror needs to keep 
the dates around the trial free regardless of whether they will be actually 
summoned or not. The uncertain schedule would be clearly burdensome for a 
juror.  
 
Kirk stated that “It may be said that when the modem jury system was put in 
place, in the 19th century, and until the 1970s, the duty of the citizen to serve on 
a jury was very unlikely indeed to extend beyond two weeks.”91Are there any 
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solutions for addressing a long trial and the substantial burden from a jury? 
When a trial is estimated to spend longer time, the Crown Court asks 
prospective jurors whether this will cause any difficulties in their schedule.
92
 
According to Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, a jury summoning officer has the 
discretion to excuse jury candidates or grant a deferral, for the reason of their 
schedule of work, childcare, or holidays.
93
 It has been seen to be a solution for 
avoiding the burden for a juror’s because they feel a business has a priority than 
the jury service. However, to have got a grant for a deferral, a genuine reason is 
essential.
94
 A jury candidate will not basically be excused because of their 




In most cases, jury deliberations finishes within an hour or two hours: Crown 
Court Study showed “over 62 per cent took under two hours and 87 per cent 
took under four hours.”96 Jury deliberation is not a reason for the long trials. 
According to Crown Court Study: where the trial lasted under half a day, the 
jury deliberation will be finished within two hours in 96 per cent of cases.
97
 
Where the case lasted three to four days the jurors and the jury deliberation was 
same length, the rate was only 15 per cent.
98
 When it lasted over two weeks, the 
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 It continues “Eleven per cent of jurors said their jury was out for between four and eight 
hours and two per cent said they were out for over eight hours.” See the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (n 61) 224  
97





jurors needed more than four hours in nearly 75 per cent of the cases.
99
 Only 




As Darbyshire has pointed out, that “Jury service can be very stressful, 
emotionally and physically.”101 If the length before the jury deliberation is 
shortened, it will ease the jury burden. Moreover, Crown Court Study found that 
longer cases will be more likely decided by majority verdicts.
102
 This 
association between the length of the case and a majority verdict shows the 
difficulty and complexity of a case would be the reason for a long trial. If the 
case is easy to understand or leads to one decisive verdict promptly, the trial will 
be shortened. In the case of a sensitive or complex one, some people insist that a 
non-jury criminal trial will be the solution towards the problem of 
time-consuming in a criminal jury trial. Conversely, Darbyshire stated that 
“reducing jury service to a week would be likely to increase the acquittal 
rate.”103 Ease of jury burden from a long trial will be compatible with an 
assurance of a fair trial. Taking a balance between them will be the significant 
element to consider the solution of cost in both money and time. 
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4.) Maintaining public confidence in the justice system  
 
As Lord Falconer suggested, the theory of Government is that “Allegations of 
juror impropriety should continue to be handled by the courts on a case by case 
basis given the diverse nature of behaviour that may be legitimately complained 
of.”104 No statute has specified the composition of a jury in detail. The 
assurance of diversity of a jury to achieve fairness is dependent on each judge’s 
conscience and discretion. It is a significant responsibility since the composition 
of a jury decides not only the destiny of the defendant, but the credibility of 
English criminal jury system. 
 
Lord Falconer stated that “Confidentiality is key to the jury process.”105 
Thomas suggests jury has been widely supported by English citizens according 
to her statistics. Thomas has pointed out over 80 per cent of the public have 
confidence in a jury. It is obvious that this rate is relatively high. People who 
support the jury system believe that a juror may reach the right decision, that 
jury trial is fairer than judge-only trial and that juries have produced better 
decisions related to justice since the age of R v Bushell.
106
 Although public 
support for the English jury system seems to be strong, the basis for this has 
been unclear. During the question time after my presentation on ‘The Pressures 
on the Judicial Participatory Democracy in England’, at the Howard League 
International Conference 2013 in Keble College, Oxford University, one of the 
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audience raised her hand and stated that the reason for the high level of public 
confidence in the English jury system is because “it is our tradition, like 
drinking a cup of tea, which will never become extinct.”107 When I heard this 
quite sentimental opinion, I was a bit confused, but I realised we must probably 
not completely deny that the traditional element of support for the long-lived 
English jury system is an important reason why there is such high level of public 
confidence. According to Roberts and Hough, “Since levels of public 
knowledge have not been tested, it is hard to know whether people favour the 
retention of jury trials because they appreciate the role that the jury plays in the 
criminal justice system, or, rather, simply out of adherence to the general notion 
of community input.”108 
 
The ICM research also shows that public support for a right to a fair trial before 
a jury was 89 per cent in 2006.
109
 According to Mathews et al., 50 per cent of 
the people who received a jury summons before their trials stated that they are 
enthusiastic on their service.
110
 They positively perceived their jury service such 
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Conversely, 31 per cent of the jury summoned people were reluctant.
112
 The 
reason for their reluctance was mainly because of their business (45 per cent) or 
family pressure (37 percent.)
113
 Mathews et al. have correctly pointed out the 
complex and sensitive feeling of those reluctant people that, “Among those who 
were reluctant, however, it was often not because they did not feel that jury 
service was important, or that they did not want to perform their civic duty, but 
because they had concerns about the possible impact on their employment 
prospects and their domestic lives. Because of the difficulties some people 
envisaged in trying to fit jury service into their normal lives, many applied for a 
deferral.”114  
 
Mathews et al. also found that 63 per cent of the jurors changed their perception 
of the English jury system positively after their jury experiences.
115
 Most of 
them seemed to appreciate the well-prepared court management treating the 
cases and defendants and professionalism by the trial judge and court staffs.
116
 
On the other hand, only eight per cent of jurors changed their image of 
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negatively, and 28 per cent of the people were neutral.
117
 The negative opinions 
were largely against the delay of the proceedings, the trivial nature of cases and 
the court facilities.
118
 Mathews et al. stated that, “Jurors who had initially stated 
that they were ‘enthusiastic’ about engaging in jury service were also most 
likely to express a positive perception of the process. However, significantly, 
just over half of jurors who stated that they were reluctant, for whatever reasons, 
to undertake jury service initially, ended up with a positive attitude towards the 
jury system”119 at the result of their jury experiences. There is another statistics 
which shows that 77 per cent of jurors noted they were satisfied with their jury 
experience after the trial.
120
 From these statistics, their jury experiences seemed 
to have not so large negative changes and influences on their perception of the 
English criminal jury system.
121
 Although 55 per cent of jurors responded that 
they are happy to repeat their jury service again in the future, 15 per cent of 
them replied they do not want to engage it any more.
122
 Mathews et al. have 
pointed out that “while 11 per cent stated they would not really want to do it 
again, although some qualified this adding that they would be reluctant, but 
would do it again because it is a ‘civic duty.’”123 It could be said that this 
reflects the juror experienced people’s sensitive feelings on the jury service. 
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Despite this high public confidence, the possibility of miscarriages of justice by 
a jury cannot be denied. The Runciman Report suggested that, “We have simply 
to acknowledge that mistaken verdicts can and do sometimes occur and that our 
task is to recommend changes to our system of criminal justice which will make 
them less likely in the future.”124 
 
If jury trial does not satisfy the defendant and there are legitimate reasons, the 
defendant will appeal the case to the Court of Appeal. Grieve has pointed out 
that “Appeals against conviction which rely on complaints about failings of 
jurors are rare.”125 However, there are data in 2010 which shows 45 per cent of 
the appeals from the Crown Court were allowed or varied.
126
 30 per cent were 
dismissed and 25 per cent were abandoned or disposed.
127
 In other words, over 
majority of appealed verdicts by a jury was revised at the Court of Appeal. This 
rate raises a doubt about the credibility and the efficiency of jury verdicts in the 
English criminal justice system.   
 
On the other hand, The Judicial Statistics Annual Report in 2006 showed that 
the number of appeals from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court was only 
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 It could be said that the appeal rates both from the magistrates’ 
courts are not so high compared with the appeal rates from the Crown Court.  
 
There are statistics which show that 70 per cent of defendants prefer jury trial to 
judge-only trial in the Crown Court.
129
 In other words, for 30 per cent of 
defendants, there are different preferred choices including magistrates’ trial or 
judge-only trial.  
 
Blom-Cooper suggests “There is every reason for retaining the jury system, if 
only because the British public appears to have confidence in it. But advances in 
technology, communication and science, together with the complexity and 
sophistication of today’s criminal law, the intricacies of admissible evidence and 
the length and cost of jury trial, should lead any politician or legislator to 
consider modifications of jury trial.”130 The gradual rising public concerns and 
pressure to jury trial in certain cases moved the English legislators to the reform 
of jury trial recently.
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2. The practical weaknesses of jury trials— dealing with jury tampering  
 
Although jury trials seem to still have strong public confidence in England, it 
has directed several pressure because of its practical weaknesses in 
contemporary English society. In this part, firstly, the problem of jury tampering 
will be discussed as a serious pressure on the English criminal jury system.    
 
1.) Jury tampering and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part7 
 
Jury tampering is one of the most controversial problems among the difficulties 
in the contemporary English jury system. Recently, the Central Criminal Court 
(the Old Bailey) judged R v Twomey and others which involved a jury 
tampering in the spring of 2010 as the monumental first non-jury criminal trial 
in the contemporary English legal history. Since the case, the English judges are 
hesitating and being prudent about the use of a non-jury criminal trials although 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part 7, makes law them. This situation shows the 
court considers how the jury tampering problem is very sensitive and needs to 
be deliberately approached, since it restricts the traditional people’s right to jury 
trials. 
 
This section will especially focus on the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which 
introduces a non-jury criminal trial in a case of jury tampering. It will 
demonstrate several cases which attempt to use non-jury criminal trials and their 
complex difficulties. Although the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part 7, introduces 
77 
 
a non-jury trial, it is not the first time in the contemporary United Kingdom. 
There have already been non-jury criminal trials in Northern Ireland since the 
1970s. They are the so-called ‘Diplock courts.’ The Diplock courts were 
introduced because of the complex political, ethnic and religious conflicts in 
Northern Ireland. Although the historic background is different, the experience 
in Northern Ireland gives us meaningful lessons when we consider the 
effectiveness of jury trials in contemporary England. Therefore, the latter part of 
this section will analyse Northern Irish experience of non-jury criminal trials 
and compare with the contemporary English jury tampering problem.  
 
a.) The notion of jury tampering 
 
Jury tampering is also called ‘jury nobbling’ or ‘embracery.’ Jury tampering has 
two categories; bribery and jury intimidation. Once a jury tampering is exposed, 
a judge needs to stop trials and discharge jurors since there is an element which 
would makes the trial unfair and untrustworthy.  
 
The reason which makes jury tampering a troublesome problem is that it leads 
the jury to perverse verdicts.
1
 Once jurors are subject to tampering, some of 
them may be disturbed and damaged physically or emotionally.
2
 Therefore, 
such a burden on a jury will inevitably influence its verdict and harm the 
fairness of the trial and justice. 
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The purpose of jury tampering is an attempt to influence jurors in order to acquit. 
Conversely, there are jury tampering cases to find the defendant guilty. An 
offender often approaches a juror near his or her house or on the way to the 
court.
3
 Therefore, police usually provides jurors with protections on their 
commute to the court. Although police protects them, this alone was not a 
decisive enough solution to the problem. Various legal frameworks and 
strategies against jury tampering are essential.  
     
i.) Bribery 
 
Providing money for a jury which let them to acquit or convict the defendant is a 
form of jury tampering. This is bribery. Bribery has been achieved by offering 
money between a few hundred to thousands of pounds.
4
 Once a juror receives 
the money, the favoured party will influence the jury verdict indirectly through 
the bribed juror to achieve a preferable goal for the party, thus it will 
contaminate a jury verdict. Ian Blair, the Deputy Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police Service, raised several jury bribery cases in his interview 
including one in Essex.
5
 In the case, cash money was left on one of the juror’s 
car windscreen.
6
 He also raised another instance in Merseyside where a juror 
was allegedly offered bribery of £10,000 from the defendant side.
7
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ii.) Jury intimidation 
 
Another type of jury tampering is jury intimidation. Jury intimidation would 
certainly include a risk of inflicting physical and psychological harms on a juror. 
Offenders will not always approach and intimidate a juror face to face. For 
example, persistent staring at jurors from the public gallery in the court room is 
treated as jury intimidation.
8
 Writing letters to the jury to ask a juror to acquit 




Moreover, once jury intimidation happens, the jury trial will collapse very easily 
and quickly. The example in Merseyside collapsed after four weeks since it was 
discovered that two jurors had been threatened.
10
 Therefore, jury intimidation 
will also be a menace to fair jury trials in the same way as bribing a jury. 
 
Ward and Davies stated that practicing lawyers have directed numerous 
collapsed trials or difficulties by jury tampering.
11
 As Ian Blair mentioned in 
the Home Affairs Committee, there has been a wide range of variation in jury 
tampering.
12
 Jury tampering is an efficient way to contaminate a fair trial and an 
                                                   
8
 In the trial at Norwich Crown Court of R v Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245, [2002] 1 Cr  
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b.) The various attempts against jury tampering 
 
According to Ian Blair, jury intimidation which perverse the course of criminal 
justice is not a something new, and it has been growing.
14
 The resolution of jury 
tampering problem was not so effective and decisive. Until the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 was enacted, the only action which a trial judge did if he or she found 
any jury tampering was discharge part of the jury, or the entire jury, and 
terminate the trial.
15
 Pattenden has pointed out the inconvenience and expense 
of a retrial after a judge found jury tampering and discharged a jury.
16
 To 
exercise his or her right to discharge or terminate the trial, the judge needs to 
find any strong evidence of jury tampering or attempts of jury tampering.
17
 
Therefore, since the 1960s, several legal frameworks have been established 
against jury tampering to assure the fairness and credibility of jury trial. 
 
i.) Majority verdicts: the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and Juries Act 1974 
 
For the most part of the long history of English jury trials, it was required that 
the jury’s verdicts be agreed upon unanimously. However, to assure the fair jury 
                                                   
13
 See The Economist (n 3) 
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 See Blair (n 6) 
15
 See Home Office, Justice for All (Cmd 5563, 2002) 75 and Ward and Davies (n 11) 78 
16
 See Rosemary Pattenden, ‘R v T: trial by judge alone’ (2009) International Journal of 
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17
 See Justice for All (n 15) 
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trial avoiding jury tampering problems, majority verdicts system was introduced 
to avoid jury tampering by the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The Government 
predicted a jury to decide the verdict smoothly by majority regardless of any 
tampering and assure fair criminal jury trial. Blake criticised the majority 
verdicts system has been introduced without based on any evidence of specific 
jury tampering which was substantially not existed.
18
 This difficulty in finding 
evidence of jury tampering has been continually discussed and criticised in the 
later Parliament debates on the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and 
the situation has remained unchanged.  
 
ii.) Jury intimidation as a criminal offence: the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 
 
Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is the first piece of 
English legislation which clearly labels jury intimidation as a criminal offence in 
the English legal history.
19
 The Section makes an action which attempts to 
intimidate or harm a juror or witness a criminal offence.
20
 Such an offender is 
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 See Nicholas Blake, ‘The Case for the Jury’ in Mark Findlay and Peter Duff (ed), The 
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st
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punishable, and in the most serious case, he or she will be imprisoned for a 




Unfortunately, Section 51 was not efficient enough to prevent jury tampering, 
especially the trials by jury on organised crimes. Therefore, any additional 
solution by court was required to deal with jury tampering on its own until the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 was enacted.  
 
iii.) Court management against jury tampering 
 
Court has also made an effort in its management including several attempts to 
avoid negative influences on jury verdicts caused by jury tampering in addition 
to these legal frameworks. 
 
Court will need to carefully treat the name list of the jurors since it will be 
highly private information which will open the door to jury tampering if it is 
passed to malicious parties. For example, in R v Bowen, the defendant took note 
of the name of the jurors when they were called to the jury box in the trial. The 
defendant searched and found their telephone numbers and even addresses by 
use of a public telephone directory.
22
 It is natural to assume that most 
defendants have a strong desire to be acquitted. If they have an opportunity to 
contact the jurors to influence their decision in some way for an acquittal, they 
will take the opportunities. This logic is applied to the potential desire of the 
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victims’ side in the same trial. Therefore, the court management that lacks these 
considerations and necessary care, including calling the name of jurors at court 
in front of all parties, could cause a possible risk of jury tampering. 
 
There is another case which attempts to solve the jury tampering problem and 
court management. In R v Comerford,
23
 the trial judge of the Crown Court 
received the evidence of jury tampering after the opening of the prosecution.
24
 
Therefore, he discharged the jury, and ordered necessary police protection for 
the second summoned jury. In addition, the court directed the procedure to hide 
the name of each juror in the jury-box before they were sworn, and to call them 
by numbers instead of their names. In the case, although the defence counsel 
voiced its complaint against such a direction by the judge, since no reason for 
the judge’s decision to order jury protection and evidence of danger of jury 
tampering was shown to the defendant, the judge of the Court of Appeal 
affirmed that the direction by the trial judge of the Crown Court appropriately 
satisfied the requirements of the Juries Act 1974.
25
 The defendant’s counsel 
                                                   
23
 R v Comerford [1998] 1 Cr App R 235.Similar treatment by the court was carried out on 
the trial of R v Martin at Norwich Crown Court. In R v Martin, once a possibility of jury 
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also argued that “The prosecutor should, whenever possible, make his 
application in the presence of the defence and give reasons for making it and call 
evidence in support of the application.”26 The judge stated that such a 
suggestion from the defendant’s counsel was “an ideal which cannot always be 
achieved in practice”27 and in this case, it was impossible to do so. Moreover, 
thanks to the judge’s direction, the jurors had been sworn successfully and 
safely in R v Comerford.
28
 Therefore, it will not be any harm to the defendant’s 
legal rights to challenge for each juror cause, and it will not be unfair although 
the jurors will be called by a number rather than their name.  
 
The layout and design of the Crown Court is also important to avoid jury 
tampering. At the Crown Court, people usually see the faces of jurors clearly 
from a public gallery in the court room. This may lead to a risk of jury 
tampering. For instance, in the trial of R v Martin at Norwich Crown Court, 
there were complaints that some people persistently stared at the jury from the 




The Runciman Report suggests that “If the public gallery in a particular 
courtroom is sited in such a way as to facilitate intimidation of the jury by 
members of the public, then sensitive cases should if practicable be assigned to 
                                                                                                                                           
Review 285, 286 
26
 R v Comerford (n 23) 242 
27
 Ibid 242 
28
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29
 Eventually, there was no evidence of such staring from the public gallery, therefore the 
complaint was rejected in the trial. See R v Martin (n 8) 
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another courtroom in the same Crown Court Centre.”30 The Report cares about 
the court layout and design since it is an important mean to prevent jury 
tampering.
31
 It suggests that a jury box have to be covered from the public 
gallery at a court room “to make the identification of individual jurors more 
difficult, and to protect jurors from threatening behaviour from spectators.”32 
This is correct and needs to be avoided supplying the parties with any 
opportunity to approach jurors in the Crown Court since it would have a 
potential risk of jury tampering.  
 
It is not difficult to predict that the Central Criminal Court has enough court 
rooms which accommodated jurors in the public gallery which will not be seen 
by potentially dangerous parties. It is unlikely to prepare such a considerate 
court room in all the Crown Courts in England when considering the cost 
performance and budget. Unfortunately, the layout and design of the Crown 
Court does not always fully separate the spaces for the parties involved and the 
jurors. 
 
During a trial, jurors need to get a permission from the court to leave from the 
jury area or building of the court.
33
 The jury will be also instructed to avoid 
visiting local café and pubs, instead eat only in the canteen for jurors at the 
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 Ibid 143 
33
 See Ministry of Justice, ‘Your Role as a Juror’ (2012)  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JP7slp-X9Pc&feature=relmfu> 





 This is certainly understandable since there was a case, R v Thompson, 
in which somebody in relation to the party approached a member of the jury at 
the canteen of the Crown Court.
35
 According to Mathews et al.’s empirical 
research, 17 per cent of jurors responded that, they met the accused in the street 
near the Crown Court, and 14 per cent of them saw the family of the accused 
coming into or out of the Court.
36
 It can be subject to criticisms as a default of 
the court management and constitutes significant carelessness. Hence, a 
remarkable idea in the Runciman Report needs to be respected that “so far as 
practicable, jurors should not need to wait or eat in areas to which ordinary 
members of the public have access and, to the extent that the design and layout 
of the court centre permits, separate areas should be set aside as waiting rooms 
and restaurants for jurors.”37 Although it requires a large monetary commitment, 
it is necessary for the Crown Court to separate the zones and spaces for the 
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th
 edition, Longman, 
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35
 See R v Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 1623, [2011] 1 WLR 200 (CA(Crim Div)) 209 
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 See Rodger Mathews, Lynn Hancock and Daniel Briggs, ‘Jurors’ perceptions, 
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8 March 2015, 70 
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 Runciman Report (n 30) 143 
38
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iv.) The police protection for jurors and its difficulties 
 
Although the judge discharges the jurors, approached by the offenders in these 
types of cases, he or she may need to continue the trial with new jurors. It will 
be certainly nonsense if the second summoned jurors are also approached.
39
 
Therefore, the trial judges of the Crown Courts sometimes ask police to protect 





Jury protections is started by police when “a real and present danger”41 of jury 
tampering is “perceived to exist,”42 according to the judgment of R v Comerford. 
The Court of Appeal also states that “It is enough to say that if there is material 
from which the judge can fairly infer that the risk of interference is substantially 
increased then he can authorise protection.”43 
 
The statistics of the amount of jury protection are not released clearly. 
According to the Home Affairs Committee, from 1999 to 2002, jury protection 
was applied in around four to five trials per year on average by the Metropolitan 
Police Service.
44 
Therefore, the amount of jury protection by police against jury 
tampering is not so extensive, but definitely there is the demand for jury 
protection. 
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 Such a nonsense happened in the second and third trial of R v Twomey and others [2009] 
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According to the Home Affairs Committee, there are two kinds of jury 
protection by the Metropolitan Police Service.
45
 The first type, is the jury 
protection for twenty-four hours every day with seventy-two constables and 
three sergeants.
46
 On average, the total length of this kind of protection was 
eighty-three days in the financial years 2000-2001.
47
 There were five cases of 
this level of jury protection by the Metropolitan Police Service in 2000 and four 
cases in 2001.
48
 This strict and significant type of jury protection has been 
provided only by the Metropolitan Police Service in the United Kingdom 
according to the Home Office Committee.
49
 Hence, the Home Office 
Committee made it clear how the problem of jury tampering in London is 
noticeable.
50
 The second type of the jury protection by police is the shuttle 





The police protection for jurors has been placed as a traditional treatment by the 
court to protect jurors from any tampering in the contemporary English legal 
history. The Home Affairs Committee has pointed out, nobody knows whether 





                                                   
45
 See Criminal Justice Bill Second Report of Session 2002-2003 (n 12) Ev 18 
46
 Ibid, Ev 18, 34 and 82 
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 Unfortunately, the number of this sort of jury protection has not been released since it  
was so few as to negligible. Ibid 
52
 Ibid, Ev 14  
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Firstly, vast amount of money is required to carry out jury protection by police. 
Although, the amount of jury tampering cases is few, Ian Blair maintained at the 
Home Affairs Committee in November 2002 that the cost for jury protection is a 
major problem to actually protect a jury.
53
 According to Zander, police 
protection for jurors is extremely expensive.
54
 The Metropolitan Police Service 
had spent around £9 million from 2000-2002 on jury protection.
55
 According to 
the Home Office Committee, the cost is equal to 130 police officers on the 
streets of London on annual basis.
56
 Hence, it is obvious that there needs for the 
Government to prepare a large budget allocated to protect the jury. Nevertheless, 
in the House of Lords when the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was 
discussed, there were the peers who argued that the costs for jury protection 
need to be acceptable since it is necessary and the amount is very small.
57
 They 
are rarely easy to definitively conclude that this amount of money is a waste of 
the tax payer’s money. It is clear that the budget for the jury protection by the 
Metropolitan Police Service is substantial. 
 
Secondly, there are some criticisms of jury protection by police that it is 
annoyingly burdensome to a juror.
58
 Blair New Labour Government stated that, 
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if the trials continue over a couple of months, jury protection by police “would 
be extremely disruptive and an unreasonable intrusion on the lives of individual 
jurors.”59 In addition, jury protection can be assumed as a mean for police to 
monitor each juror and their family members’ actions and movements.60 It is 
true that police will monitor the daily life of jurors and their families during the 
course of the protection for a certain length of time, regardless of whether it is 
looked upon positively or negatively. Therefore, it will definitely be unusual and 
will be possibly uncomfortable for each juror and their family who are being 
protected. 
 
The Government and the judiciary understand that jury protection by police 
disturbs juries and their families’ daily life. For instance, Auld has pointed out 
that, “It is an interruption of the normal rhythm of their lives, causing variously 
inconvenience, disruption of their family and/or working routines, and financial 
loss.”61 The Court of Appeal reasonably suggested that, jury protection by a 
police should be considered “in the context of both the burdens on the jury of 
any necessary protection, and its impact on the public, both in terms of cost and 
of the inevitably significant drain on police resources.”62  
 
As Zander has pointed out, police protection for jurors is also “extremely costly 
and burdensome for police, such protection needs to continue over a period of 
                                                   
59
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60
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months.”63 Therefore, the statement by Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, “the main 
justification put forward for limiting the right to jury trial is that jury trials are 
expensive and time consuming,”64 cannot be denied completely. 
 
Thirdly, whether such a special treatment makes a jury create a prejudice for the 
defendant and influences their verdicts. If the second summoned jury in a case is 
informed by the trial judge that police will escort and protect them and their 
families from now on for a certain length of time during the trial because there is 
an evidence of jury tampering or attempt of jury tampering in the trial by the 
first summoned jurors, the second summoned jurors will definitely be nervous 
and probably confused. In addition, once the second summoned jurors know that 
the defendant’s side had approached their predecessors, it is difficult to avoid 
that the jurors will get a certain negative image of the defendant which will 
eventually result in creating a prejudice in the juror’s mind.  
 
In R v Comerford, the judge understood that it will prejudice the jurors against 
the defendants, if the reasons for the police protection were clearly given to the 
jurors.
65
 Therefore, the judge denied the necessity for informing the jury about 
the reason for the jury protection. In the jury trial of R v Dodd and Others,
66
 the 
trial judge of the Central Criminal Court argues to the jury why they would need 
to use police during the trial: 
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What I was proposing to say was this: during the course of this trial you will be 
under the surveillance of police officers when you are not in court. These 
officers have no connection with this trial. This is just a precaution. You should 
not be alarmed. It is a precaution that is taken from time to time and by no 
means does it follow that anything untoward will happen to any of you. Most 
importantly, you must not allow this fact in any way to influence your decision 
in the trial, which decision you will take upon the evidence and upon nothing 
else. In particular, do not allow yourselves to be biased in any way against any 
of these three defendants by reason of the precautions that are being taken. And 
then I was proposing to tell the jury that further details of procedure would be 




The Lord Judge O’Connor of the Court of Appeal concurred with this judge’s 
statement in R v Ling
68
 as “What the judge said in this case was short, simple 
and sufficient, and not open to any possible objection.”69 Although the judge of 
the Court of Appeal stated that “The practice is to warn the jury in very clear 
terms that they must not in any way hold it against the defendant that such 
measures have been taken,”70 there is a question which remains; what kind of 
sentence is ‘very clear terms?’ By what grounds, can the judge have such high 
level of confidence in his sentences? 
                                                   
67
 The statement was asserted from the original transcript of R v Ling [1986] Cr LR 495.  






 In the case, the judge continues like “Such a warning was given in this case, and no  
compliant is made that it was in any way in adequate.” Moreover, “We have no reason to  




In R v J, S and M,
71
 the similar concern was discussed. The trial judge in the 
case had struggled since the jury protection because it would be realised by the 
jurors that they were being made the unusual protective measures, although he 
ordered the jury protection by police for two weeks.
72
 The judge suspected that 
if the jurors realise the reason for the protection by police was tampering of 
themselves, it will be impossible for the jury to evaluate the defendant and reach 
the verdicts of the case objectively.
73
 This consideration eventually made the 
trial judge terminate the jury protection by police, discharge the jurors, then use 
a non-jury trial which was introduced since the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It is 
peculiar that court is so concerned about whether the jury will realise the 
existence of jury tampering or not. Realistically, it is difficult to predict that the 
jurors will not realise the reason for the jury protection. Therefore, probably, as 
Taylor has correctly pointed out, “If there is a risk, real or apparent, of jury bias, 
then the trial should not proceed to verdict.”74 
 
Finally, in relation to a basic difficulty in solving the jury tampering problem, it 
needs to be mentioned that finding the evidence or attempt of jury tampering 
which is necessary to direct the police protection for the jury is difficult. 
According to the Home Affairs Committee, unless there is some evidence of 
                                                   
71
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jury tampering, the court cannot order jury protection.
75
 How to find the 
evidence of jury tampering is one of the significant tasks for the court. 
 
Although there are these complex factors of jury protection by police, the police 
protection for a jury was one of the best judicial treatments for the court to 
assure the fairness and efficiency of jury trials in the same manner as 
discharging the approached jurors until a non-jury criminal trial by Section 44 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was introduced. At the recent case, the jury of the 
Mark Duggan trial were threatened and chased from the courtroom. The court 




To sum up this section, the words of William Hughes will be asserted from these 
that appears in his Memorandum to the House of Commons Home Affairs 
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c.) Non-jury trial and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part7 
i.) Brief background of the sections on jury tampering of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, Part 7  
 
The introduction of a non-jury criminal trial is placed as a historic event on the 
English legal history. The reason why a non-jury criminal trial was established 
is because the existing legal frameworks and judicial attempts had not worked 
well enough to solve the jury tampering problem, especially from the early 
1980s, the time when there had been an ‘outbreak’ of jury tampering. For 
instance, according to The Economist, in 1981 alone, there were thirteen cases of 
jury tampering at the Central Criminal Court.
78
 Although it was indicated as the 
flow of jury tampering as an ‘outbreak,’ the number of jury tampering cases was 
relatively few.
79
 However, jury tampering was absolutely something pointing to 
very serious problems.
80
 As an early example of the outbreak, in R v Dodd and 
Others, police submitted evidence that the defendant’s side attempted to bribe a 




In addition, a much worse is that there was a case in which jury intimidation 
worked very effectively without any attempts to stop its influence to the verdict 
and the defendant got an acquittal in July 1999. Three jurors in a trial in the west 
Midlands were threatened on the way from the court to their houses, and the 
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 See R v Dodd and Others (n 66) 53 
96 
 
foreman was threatened by a man who gestured to shoot him.
82
 Nonetheless, the 
defendant was acquitted by the jurors and the judge affirmed their verdicts.
83
 
The reason for the judgment is because the evidence of jury tampering and the 
tampering of the verdict could not be discovered and proved well enough by the 
prosecutor. It was same in the R v Martin, and the claim of the jury intimidation 
was not affirmed finally after the investigation by the Lord Chancellor’s 




The level of intimidation has become vicious. For instance, in autumn 2001, the 
jurors in a trial at Kingston Crown Court suffered from having paint stripper 
sprayed on their cars, therefore, the jury was discharged and a special protection 
was provided for the retrial jury.
85





The Government gradually started to consider the criminal jury reform instead 
of high cost and complex police protection process. The Government declares 
“Any change in the law must enhance the criminal justice system and not 
undermine a principle of confidentiality of the jury room that has long been seen 
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85
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as essential to the effective and fair administration of justice.”87 It was the time 
to ‘enhance the criminal justice system.’  
 
In response to this outbreak of jury tampering since the 1980s to the 2000s, it 
was necessary for the Government to prepare the new Criminal Justice Bill 
which would give a vital wound to any attempts of jury tampering. For example, 
in Parliamentary debate on the new Criminal Justice Bill at the House of 
Commons in 2002, it was stated that “alternatively (or additionally), the court 
must be satisfied that the risk of jury tampering would remain sufficiently high 
notwithstanding any steps (including police protection) that could reasonably be 
taken to prevent it, to make it necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to 
be conducted without a jury.”88 This theory would result in the enactment of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
A historic restriction for the criminal jury system culminates in the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, Part 7. The Act removes the opportunity of trial by jury for 
cases involving complex fraud or jury tampering and introduces a non-jury 
criminal trial. Therefore, the reform involved active political debate in 
Parliament and also produced serious conflicts among the legal practitioners and 
academic commentators. According to Ward and Davies, introducing a non-jury 
trial in the Crown Court was the most politically charged part of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.
89
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The basic design of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was established by the Auld 
Commission. The Auld Commission published the Review of the Criminal 
Courts of England and Wales in 2001.
90
 In the report, the Committee argues on 
the necessity for a non-jury criminal trial in a case of jury tampering. Proceeding 
this, the Government published a White Paper, Justice for All, in 2002 which 
“aims to rebalance the system in favor of victims, witnesses and communities 
and to deliver justice for all, by building greater trust and credibility.”91 The 
White Paper absolutely represents the Blair New Labour administration’s 
perspective to modernise and reform the English criminal justice system.
92
 
Justice for All proposed a non-jury criminal trial to prevent any sort of jury 
tampering.
93
 The White Paper suggests that even if there was an attempt to 
influence the jury, and eventually the trial was stopped, the judge has the power 




Looking back at the formidable outbreak of jury tampering since the 1980s, this 
logic absolutely is reasonable. In the Memorandum to the House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, Hughes said that, “It is hoped that any legislation 
arising from this consultative process will possess the credibility to sustain 
radical criminal justice reform which we believe is necessary in the fight against 
organised crime.”95 The White Paper Justice for All does not mention any 
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statistic evidence of the increase in jury tampering.
96
 This point was subject to 
criticisms by the legal practitioners and academic commentators. 
 
Unlike the criticism from the English legal society, the police officials strongly 
supported that criminal justice reform. As a positive reaction, for instance, Ian 
Blair believes that “Far from diluting a fundamental principle of the legal 
system, these proposals will protect its integrity in those small, but increasing 
number of cases and will preserve the wider principles of justice in this 
country.”97 In another instance, the Metropolitan Police Service submitted the 
Memorandum to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee which stated 
that its strong support for the plan which introduced a non-jury criminal trial in a 
case of jury tampering.
98
 These police officials’ significant requests were 
achieved by the enactment of Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It is 
natural for police to support a non-jury criminal trial because of their burden 
when they are protecting jurors, especially in terms of the cost performance. 
Therefore, according to Bailey et al., the introduction of a non-jury trial by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 is “not based on principle but rather on administrative 
efficiency.”99 It cannot be denied completely. 
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ii) Analysis of the sections of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part 7 on jury 
tampering 
 
By such a background, Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which 
introduces trial without jury
100
 in the case where any risk of jury tampering was 




To be conducted only by a judge, the two conditions which are outlined in 
Section 44, must be fulfilled.
102
 Firstly, there need to be “evidence of a real and 
present danger that jury tampering would take place.”103 Secondly, 
“notwithstanding any steps (including the provision of police protection) which 
might reasonably be taken to prevent jury tampering,”104 there need to be “the 
likelihood that it would take place would be so substantial as to make it 
necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted without a 
jury.”105  
 
In addition, Section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides the necessary 
steps for a trial judge who seeks to discharge the jury because of the appearance 
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of jury tampering. Before the discharge, a trial judge must take three steps 
specifically. Firstly, the judge must “inform the parties that he is minded to 
discharge the jury.”106 Secondly, the judge must “inform the parties of the 
grounds on which he is so minded.”107 Thirdly, the judge must “allow the 
parties an opportunity to make representations.”108 Once these three conditions 
are fulfilled, the judge will discharge the jury and continue the case without jury 
only if he or she is satisfied of the existence of jury tampering
109
 and convinced 




As another choice for the judge after the discharge of a jury, he or she can 
terminate the trial “if it is necessary in the interests of justice”111 and start a new 
trial without jury in the case that the two condition of Section 44(4) and (5) were 
“likely to be fulfilled.”112  
 
In a non-jury criminal trial which is by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the judge 
will assume the jury’s first function: deciding the facts on the case. Specifically, 
Section 48(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 prescribes, once a trial has been 
continued or restarted as a non-jury criminal trial, the judge will perform all the 
functions which a jury would have exercised; determining any questions, and 
making any findings.
113
 A big difference between jury trial and judge-only trial 
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is giving the reasons for the verdict. For their judgment, jurors do not need to 
argue any reasons. Section 48(5)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 stated that 
“The court must give a judgment which states the reasons for the conviction at, 
or soon as reasonably practicable after, the time of the conviction.”114 Another 
difference would be that the judge will be able to address all the witness 
statements in a non-jury criminal trial unlike juries. Including this point, 
introducing a non-jury criminal trial caused strong oppositions from the legal 




On the contrary to this flow of the criticisms, Section 44 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 has not been altered after the Labour Government was defeated in the 
last general election in 2010, and there is no plan to revise Section 44 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 under the current coalition Government’s policy 
schedule.
116
 According to Lord Falconer, the introduction of a non-jury trial in a 
case of jury tampering is in the course of the English jury reform for 
“maintaining the confidence of jurors and the public in the fairness of the 
criminal justice system.”117 Same as the previous Labour Government, the 
current coalition Government and the position of the court trust the efficiency of 
Section 44 and the aptitude of a non-jury criminal trial against jury tampering.  
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iii) Non-jury criminal trial cases 
R v Twomey and others 
 
Since Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was enforced in 2007, the 
first non-jury trial was judged in the spring of 2010. It was R v Twomey and 
others which has been called the ‘Heathrow Robbery Case.’118 The case was a 
historic landmark case in the English legal history since it was the first 
judge-only criminal trial without any jurors in England after the Star Chamber 
was abolished in 1641. In addition, the case raised several controversial factors 
regarding a non-jury criminal trial.  
 
In the case, the four defendants were accused of robbery with firearms and of 
stealing £1.75 million from a warehouse at the Heathrow Airport in February 
2004.
119
 The judgment stated that the offense was “a carefully planned and 
professionally executed armed robbery.”120 The four defendants all denied the 
charges of the offenses.   
 
The unprecedented incidences of the case are that in total, three trials and three 
different juries for each trial were summoned for the case. This was because of 
the discharge of the jurors by the judge who found jury tampering by the 
defendants. In other words, these three trials all failed because of continual jury 
tampering. For instance, the reason why the jury was discharged in the second 
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trial in 2007 was because one of jurors told that being under stress and rejected 
to return to court room.
121
 During the third trial in 2008, two jurors were 
approached by the defendant’s side.122  
 
In addition to such a repeated fearful situation, the judge found a substantial 
amount of inadmissible and prejudicial materials.
123
 Thus, the prosecution 
asked the judge to start the retrial by judge only.
124
 Finally, after finding a real 
and present danger of jury tampering, the trial judge aborted the hearing then the 




There were two choices for the presiding judge in this case to solve the problem 
and protect the jury.
126
 Firstly, spend more money and increase the number of 
police on the jury protection. Secondly, use a non-jury criminal trial which has 
been made law under Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In the former 
choice, there was a problem of the cost. Police argued that if the court held 
another jury trial, it would have cost up to £6 million, and require up to 
eighty-two police officers to protect the jurors from any tampering.
127
 
Conversely, according to Pattenden, if the fourth trial was organised with the 
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Moreover, since the judge found evidence of ‘a real and present danger’ which 
was stipulated in Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as a condition of 
the application of a non-jury criminal trial, he decided to order a judge only trial 
without any jurors. On 18 June 2009, the Court of Appeal permitted the fourth 
trial to be judged as a non-jury criminal trial by Section 44 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. The judge of the Court of Appeal states that “The danger of 
jury tampering and the subversion of the process of trial by jury is very 
significant.”129 The judge also questioned the aptitude of the jury protection by 




Following the decision of the Court of Appeal, the fourth trial of R v Twomey 
and others was heard at the Central Criminal Court as a non-jury trial. The 
judgment of the trial without jury was decided on the 31
 
March 2010, and the 
verdicts for all the four of the defendants were guilty. The defendants 
complained that organising a non-jury criminal trial in the case was 
inappropriate and unfair since there was no evidence to testify to the existence 
of jury tampering. The presiding judge did not show any evidence of jury 
tampering to the defendant as he deemed it inappropriate for “public interest 
immunity” grounds,131 although he argued detailed reasons why he assumed 
that a non-jury criminal trial was the best solution in the case.
132
 The appeal of 
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the defendants was dismissed at the final judgment of the case at the Court of 
Appeal.
133
   
 
In the view of the judge of the Court of Appeal, a non-jury trial and the verdict 
by the judge only is a “stark”134 but “fair”135 system. Furthermore, the judge of 
the Court of Appeal states that “If criminals choose to subvert or attempt to 
subvert the process of trial by jury they have no justified complaint if they are 
deprived of it.”136 To assure a fair trial and eliminate the rights to trial by jury 
from the defendants, the court should have explained more about the evidence of 




Eventually, the Court of Appeal affirmed the aptitude of a non-jury criminal trial 
in this case. Therefore, the long lasting trial was ended. After the Court of 
Appeal gave the first decision to use a non-jury criminal trial in R v Twomey and 
others, David Howarth, the Shadow Justice Secretary of the Liberal Democratic 
Party at the time, criticises the decision by arguing that the Court of Appeal 
avoided the jury trial because of the cost of providing adequate police 
protection.
138
 He adds “surely the best way to protect a jury is to arrest those 
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who are threatening it.”139 It is, however, an unsupported view. The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the organisation of a non-jury criminal trials by using Section 
44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and this was because it was really difficult 
to arrest the criminals who intimidated the jurors and it would be a costly 
process to achieve. Therefore, Howarth’s suggestion has been seen as 
inappropriate in the case of R v Twomey and others. 
 
On the contrary to Howarth’s criticism, Taylor supports this historic application 
of non-jury criminal trials by stating that “If a court were not able to remove the 
right to trial by jury because the evidence concerning the tampering was so 
sensitive and sophisticated that it could not be disclosed to the defendant, it 
would defeat the purpose of the legislation.”140 Therefore, the decision of the 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeal would be appropriate in terms of that. 
 
There is a question of why the Crown Court could not stop the jury trial before 
the start of the third trial. The answer to this question is in relation to the prudent 
attitude of the judiciary about the use of a non-jury criminal trial even now 
although organising a non-jury criminal trial has been made law under Section 
44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 since 2007. In several other cases after the 
enforcement of Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the judges have 
shown prudent attitudes about the use of a non-jury criminal trial.      
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R v J, S and M  
 
After the judgment of R v Twomey and others was decided by a judge only 
without any jurors, according to Taylor, “A widely held concern is that this case 
represents the door being kicked open to further non-jury cases, perhaps 
including those of a less exceptional nature.”141 However, there have been less 
cases recently. R v J, S and M
142
 is one of a small number of remarkable cases 
that have involved jury tampering.  
 
It was alleged that the defendants conspired to pervert the course of criminal 
justice.
143
 In other words, the defendants attempted to influence some of the 
jurors in the case. Therefore, Sheffield Crown Court firstly put the jurors under 
the police protection for two weeks. After that, the trial judge affirmed the 
evidence of real and present danger of jury tampering which was by Section 44 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, thus he assumed that the case needs to be 




The Court of Appeal denied the trial judge’s suggestion to use a non-jury trial in 
the case. The Court of Appeal states that “If, during the course of this, or indeed, 
any trial, attempts are made to tamper with the jury to the extent that the judge 
feels it necessary to discharge the entire jury, it should be clearly understood that 
the judge may continue with the trial and deliver a judgment and verdict on his 
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own.”145 At the trial, the Court of Appeal declared its cautious position of the 
use of a non-jury criminal trial. The judgment states that a non-jury criminal 
trial “remains and must remain the decision of last resort, only to be ordered 
when the court is sure (not that it entertains doubts, suspicions or reservations) 
that the statutory conditions are fulfilled.”146 The Court of Appeal did not 
believe that this case fulfilled all the pre-conditions within Section 44 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, therefore it accepted the appeal of the defendant, and 
gave no permission for organising a non-jury criminal trial. 
 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal further says that even the police protection for 
the jury in this case was unreasonable since it would create some prejudices for 
the defendant and destroy the jury’s ability “objectively and dispassionately to 
dispose of the case.”147 The judge of the Court of Appeal was concerned that if 
unnecessary and overwhelming police protection caused any prejudice on the 
defendant in the jurors’ minds, it would harm the fairness of the criminal jury 
trial. The trial judge realises this risk, therefore, the judge ordered an end to the 
jury protection after two weeks and decided that a non-jury trial may need to be 
the preferable.
148
 This decision of the trial judge was overturned by the Court of 
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R v KS  
 
There was another interesting case, R v KS
149
 which failed to use a non-jury 
criminal trial and coincidentally was decided around the same time as R v J, S 
and M. In the case, the defendant was suspected of engaging in a VAT fraud.
150
 
In the trial at Birmingham Crown Court, the trial judge found “convincing”151 
evidence of jury tampering after the jury had already retired, thus the trial judge 
discharged the entire jury and attempted to continue the case as a non-jury 
trial.
152
 Although the presiding judge of the Court of Appeal supported the trial 
judge’s decision to discharge the jury, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
trial judge’s suggestion to use a non-jury criminal trial in the case, and accepted 
the appeal from the defendant against the use of a non-jury criminal trial.
153
 The 
Court of Appeal stated that the requirements of Section 44(5) of the Criminal 




In this case, the court apparently showed their prudent position about the use of 
a non-jury criminal trial in the same manner as R v J, S and M. Unlike R v J, S 
and M, jury protection by police was affirmed by the Court of Appeal as a 
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 Ibid 6. The judge of the Court of Appeal states that “We underline that although the  
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the threat of jury tampering falls for examination when the question arose by Section 
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possible and practical course in this case.
155 
The Court of Appeal states that 
“The new statutory arrangements [the Criminal Justice Act 2003] do not 
undermine, but rather confirm, the need for the issues of jury protection to be 
handled in a realistic and proportionate way.”156 The judgment continues that, 
“The necessary decisions will, of course, be made by the trial judge, but, on the 
material we have seen, appropriate protection for this jury would be likely to be 
established at a fairly low level.”157 The thought of the judge is that jury 
protection by a police must be proportionate to the danger.
158
 Hence, from these 
descriptions, it is interpreted that the court is prudent to assume jury protection 
by police as in R v J, S and M.     
 
Another interesting point of this jury tampering case is that the jurors had 
regular contact with the public, including associates of the defendant during the 
smoking breaks of the trial.
159
 It was absolutely an opportunity for the parties to 
make contact with any of the jurors. It would be the fault of the layout and 
design of Birmingham Crown Court as the Runciman Report has pointed out.
160
 
A criticism can be made that Birmingham Crown Court needed to care more 
about their court management.
161
 A more peculiar point is that the Court of 
Appeal showed an optimistic view on this. According to the Court of Appeal, 
this sort of opened smoking area which was shared by defendant and jurors at 
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the court was an irregular incidence.
162
 In addition, the Court of Appeal holds 
the opinion that “This is very far from the kind of case, with which each member 
of the court is familiar, where individual jurors were identified, and contact with 
them made away from the precincts of the court, or its immediate vicinity.”163 
There is a question of what kind of grounds is the basis of these optimistic views 
of the Court of Appeal. 
 




 is also a notable case as the first use of a trial judge’s power to 
stop the jury trial and continue the trial by judge alone without a jury which was 
designed in Section 46(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
165
 In R v Twomey 
and others, the presiding judge of the Court of Appeal decided on the 
application of a non-jury criminal trial, in R v Guthrie, the Recorder (trial judge) 
decided on the application of her own judge only criminal trial by herself.  
 
In this case, there was a person who regularly approached a female juror in the 
trial to persuade her to push for an acquittal of the defendant.
166
 After such jury 
tampering had been exposed, the Recorder at London’s Wood Green Crown 
Court discharged the jurors and decided to continue the existing trial by the 
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 Since there seemed to be no unfair elements for the 
defendants, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Recorder’s “carefully structured 
judgments”168 to sit alone. Therefore, after the first non-jury criminal trial in 
England since the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 took place, this 
decision became the first judge only trial that continued the case which was 




R v Thompson 
 
The final example of recent jury tampering cases is R v Thompson.
170 
In this 
case, the defendant argued that the victim’s brother approached several jurors in 
a lunch break of the trial.
171
 This also represents a problem of jury tampering 
which was caused by the serious carelessness of the court management and the 
default of the layout and design of the Crown Court which has been pointed out 




Eventually, the Court of Appeal did not find any evidence of the jurors’ 
misconduct and irregularity, thus the court dismissed the appeal from the 
defendant.
173
 There is a question which has remained about why the jurors and 
any of the relatives and friends of the parties could eat at the same canteen at the 
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Crown Court during a trial. It is significantly careless in terms of the court 
management.   
 
In addition to the suspicion of jury tampering, this case has also raised the new 
topic of the jury’s ability to do research. This topic involves the Internet and jury 
tampering.
174
 In R v Thompson, the Internet caused the risk of jury tampering. 
In the judgment, the Court of Appeal states that it is necessary for a person to 
use the Internet in his or her daily life.
175
 If there is no restriction on the jury’s 
use of the Internet during the trial term or their ability to communicate with 
somebody else on social media, most likely a person wanting to influence the 
jury will have the newer technology to approach jurors and cause jury tampering. 
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2.) Efficacy and complex factors of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part7  
 
Various legal frameworks and judicial attempts dealt jury tampering in the 
contemporary English legal history. The Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part7 was 
the monumental restriction on the English jury system against jury tampering. It 
will not be denied that the efficacy of the Act which contributes to protecting 
fair trials and the credibility of juries. Meanwhile, they have involved several 
complex factors. 
 
a.) How can a judge discover the existence of jury tampering? 
 
Jury tampering definitely exists and it causes several serious problems in various 
cases. Therefore, there have been demands for legal treatments and judicial 
remedies to avoid jury tampering.  
 
The number of jury tampering case is low. In addition, although there are 
several cases where jury tampering is suspected, the court sometimes rejects 
existence of tampering because they could not find enough evidence. The lack 
of statistics on the amount of jury tampering is related. When the Government 
attempts to alter the laws on the jury system, there has always been criticism 
because of the lack of grounds for insisting that jury tampering exists. The 
criticisms tend to claim that the statistics of jury tampering are not fully 
calculated and disclosed.
1
 For instance, in the discussion of the enactment of 
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Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, at the Home Affairs Committee, 
when Bob Russell MP, a Liberal Democrat member of the Committee, asked Ian 
Blair about the number of the trials which involved jury tampering, Ian Blair 
answered that he did not know the figure although he stated that he can 
“certainly find that out.”2 In the same Committee, John Burbeck, the Chief 
Constable of Warwickshire Police, was asked about how much the cost of jury 
protection had increased specifically. He continued “I do not have the figures on 
cost [of jury protection], but it is an increasing problem.”3 These uncertain 
answers by the police officials caused the several criticisms. For example, at the 
House of Commons Second Reading on the Criminal Justice Bill in November 
2002, Dominic Grieve MP, the spokesman on criminal justice of the 
Conservative Party at the time, stated that “Where are the cases? Where is the 
evidence of the cases that relate to jury tampering?”4  
 
In addition, it is difficult to find evidence of tampering. Ian Blair suggested that 
police would provide the information on jury tampering for the judge if any jury 
tampering was exposed before the trial has started.
5
 Although such a 
communication between the Crown Court and police exists, finding the evidence 
of jury tampering has been difficult. There are several possible reasons of this. 
Firstly, the people who bribe or intimidate jurors will try not to leave any 
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evidence of such tampering. The Department for Constitutional Affairs suggests 
that, “Jurors sometimes have to make what may be publicly unpopular decisions 
on emotive cases, but if that is the right decision based on the evidence in the 
case then a juror should not be subjected to undue pressure to change their mind 
or allege that a verdict is unsafe.”6 This is unlikely. It is also natural to think 
that jurors, intimidated do not want to reveal information that they were 
threatened by someone else because it will involve considerable risk of 
disclosing such facts to the court or to police. This is especially true in the case 
of intimidation by organised crime groups.  
 
Secondly, the means for a judge to discover jury tampering has not been 
effective. Although a judge will ask the jurors in the trial to tell him or her to 
report whenever the jurors were approached by anybody else in relation to the 
case like in R v Martin,
7
 the jurors will not always report punctually to the court 
when they are subject to tampering because they already have beneficial 
relationships with the offenders who approached the jurors, or they fear 
revenges by the offenders for revealing the tampering.  
 
Thirdly, it is difficult for a court to grasp the movement and actions of all the 
related people to the jury; family, relatives and close friends. Ian Blair has 
pointed out that “If a juror, or a member of his or her family, were prepared to 
accept payment for prejudicing a trial our current protection arrangements would 
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be unlikely to identify or prevent this.”8 In addition, it is certain that the court 
must not monitor juror’s mail, telephone calls and bank accounts.9 In other 
words, it is impossible for the court to completely understand the range of the 
human relationships of each juror. Once these people are approached by the 
cunning parties, how could the court discover and testify to the existence of 
tampering? The clear answer is that it is difficult.  
 
Fourthly, it requires the fully satisfied establishing the evidence to insist on the 
existence of jury tampering in the court. This severe requirement is all for the 
purpose of avoiding any unfairness in the trial. Therefore, it is predicted that the 
evidential material of jury tampering needs to be fully testified.
10
 This severe 
requirement is one of the possible answers to the question of why the number of 
jury tampering cases is unlikely despite the fact that it is such a serious problem 
in contemporary English society.  
 
Well-established evidence is essential before one can testify to the existence of 
jury tampering, use a non-jury criminal trial, order the discharge of the jurors, or 
ask for the police protection of the jury.
11
 This is all to maintain the fairness of 
criminal trials. It is understandable that it would be also true that this strict 
requirement also makes the jury tampering problem difficult to solve.    
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To discover the evidence of jury tampering is a difficult task. There is a question 
as to whether the criterion to discover jury tampering is decided by the judge 
with the application of a subjective standard. Looking back at the cases and 
judicial attempts against jury tampering, the judges have carefully examined the 
facts. A judge will not use a non-jury criminal trial until he or she finds fully 
established evidence of tampering. In addition, there are enough clear standards 
which are shown in Section 44 and 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Thus, 
the existing judicial standard to establish the evidence of jury tampering is not 
subjective.  
 
To solve these difficulties in discovering the evidence of jury tampering, the 
judge will need to continually ask and require the jurors to report if any of them 
is subject to any form of tampering during the trial. For instance, in R v 
Martin,
12
 the judge asked the jurors to report whether any offenders have 
intimidated them during the trial process.
13
 In addition, there needs to be more 
means to make discovery and establishing the evidence of jury tampering easier. 
 
b.) Has the police protection for jury been useless?  
 
When the enactment of Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was 
discussed, Ian Blair asserts that “The police believe the only viable alternative 
                                                   
12
 R v Martin (n 7) 
13
 The Runciman Report suggested that the guidance to the jury “should clearly set out the  
steps which they should take if they feel intimidated in any way.” See Royal Commission  
of Criminal Justice, Royal Commission Report on the Criminal Justice System (Cmd  
2263, 1993) 143. The so-called Runciman Report.  
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where there is a real risk of intimidation is to remove the jury and allow the 
judge to hear the evidence sitting alone.”14 He warns that “If the system is not 
improved here, we may face violent, sophisticated and organised criminals who 
become untouchable.”15 In other words, does introducing of a non-jury criminal 
trial mean the failure of the police protection for jury as an effective attempt? 
Actually, there were several controversies about jury protection by police. 
Among these controversies, the most serious one was the vast cost factor of the 
police protection. It moves the Government towards the introduction of a 
non-jury criminal trial. Therefore, in R v Twomey and others, the presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeal ordered the fourth trial as a non-jury criminal trial 
instead of ordering a new fourth jury trial with expensive jury protection.
16
 
Moreover, in R v Dodd and Others,
17
 R v Comerford
18
 and R v J, S and M,
19
 
the court was concerned whether the police protection would cause any 
prejudice against the defendant in the jurors’ minds.  
 
If jury protection by police is not an effective solution for avoiding jury 
tampering and it just creates prejudices among the jurors against the defendant, 
the meaning of police protection will be lost. After the enforcement of Section 
44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, police protection for the jury has been 
considered and affirmed by the Crown Court. For example, in R v KS, the jury 
protection by police was positively evaluated by the Court of Appeal as the 
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 See R v Twomey and others [2009] EWCA Crim 1035, [2010] 1 WLR 630, [2011] 
EWCA Crim 8, 634 
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possible and practical way to protect jurors from jury tampering.
20
 The Court of 
Appeal argues that the new sections which were provided in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 “do not undermine, but rather confirm,”21 the jury protection by 
police. Therefore, it would be possible to conclude that the police protection for 
the jury remains as an option to be used against jury tampering for the court 
although it costs a large amount of money. The enactment of Section 44 does 
not mean the denial of the efficacy of the traditional jury protection by police. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that police cannot protect jurors.  
  
c.) Judge’s authority and ability to avoid jury tampering 
 
The criticisms of the introduction of a non-jury criminal trial sometimes argue 
that the judge would need too much power in a trial without a jury.
22
 Whether 
the judge’s decision to organise a non-jury criminal trial can be efficient for 
solving and avoiding jury tampering would not be fully affirmed. In addition, 
each judge’s ability to provide an appropriate decision in the appropriate timing 
would influence the fate of the cases to avoid jury tampering. 
 
A judge warns the jurors about jury tampering in a trial. For example, in R v 
Martin, the judge asked the jury to report whether they had been intimidated by 
somebody else during the trial process.
23
 Whether the jury follows this direction 
                                                   
20




 Section 48(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has recognised such power to the judge.  
About the criticisms, see Richard Taylor, Martin Wasik and Rodger Leng, The Criminal  
Justice Act 2003 (1
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 edition, Oxford University Press, 2004) 53 
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and performs their duty to report the existence of any jury tampering is 
unfortunately uncertain, and sometimes less trustworthy.
24
 Therefore, the 
efficiency of the judge’s direction to the jury on tampering is questionable.  
 
Sometimes, the irresolute judge failed to solve jury tampering problem in a case 
because he or she lost the proper timing and could not provide the appropriate 
decision to avoid jury tampering. Losing the proper timing would also be a 
problem for solving jury tampering. In R v KS,
25
 the judge of the Court of 
Appeal sharply criticises the trial judge. Firstly, and surprisingly, totally ten 
trials were organised on a trial before it was brought to the Court of Appeal 
because the court did not suggest any jury tampering.
26
 This means that there 
was a serious delay of the appropriate action to discover any jury tampering by 
the trial judge and the fact even makes clear that there was a serious waste of 
time and money. Secondly, until the Court of Appeal received the case, no jury 
protection by a police had been ordered from the trial judge.
27
 Thirdly, the trial 
judge completely lost the opportunity for discharging the single juror, subjected 
to tampering. Therefore, the only choice left for the judge by that time was to 




The judge will need to inform the jury of the rules which relate to jury 
tampering more thoroughly and require that the jurors report it if any of them are 
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subjected to tampering. In addition, the judge needs to thoroughly prohibit the 
jury from having any contact with any person in relation to the parties involved. 
If the judge informs the jurors of how very serious it will be for them if they 
violate these rules, the jurors will be more careful with their behaviour during 
term of their trial. Moreover, the judge needs to argue that jurors need to reject 
any approach from the parties strictly. The judge’s ability is closely in relation 
to solving the problem of jury tampering, especially after the enforcement of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
d.) The misuse of non-jury criminal trial by the defendant 
 
The purpose for the non-jury criminal trial is to assure the fair trial and the 
credibility of the English criminal justice system. Moreover, to protect the jury, 
who are originally lay people, from any possible risk of jury tampering. If jury 
tampering tends to be caused by the defendant’s side, will a non-jury criminal 
trial always be a favourable trial system for the victim’s side? The answer will 
be ‘No,’ although many criticisms have argued that the non-jury criminal trial 
which was introduced by Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, will harm 
and eliminate the inherent right to jury trial from the defendant.
29
 On the 
contrary, there is an interesting indication that jury tampering would also be a 
reason for the defendant to avoid jury trial or retrial. For instance, at the Second 
Reading of the Criminal Justice Bill at the House of Commons in November 
2002, Chris Mullin MP warned that “We should scrutinise carefully whether an 
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allegation that a jury is about to be tampered with is being used as a device for 
escaping jury trial.”30  
 
Moreover, before the enactment of Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
the Government had already affirmatively predicted the need to permit 
defendants to exercise the right to ask for a non-jury trial in the Crown Court.
31
 
Therefore, the legal framework attempts to allow the defendant to use the 
opportunity of a non-jury criminal trial to receive a fair and appropriate 
judgment. However, Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not 
permit any misuse of the right of the defendant to use a non-jury criminal trial to 
avoid judgment by jury. The severe conditions of organising a non-jury criminal 
trial which was provided in Section 44 and 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
will be the appropriate obstacle to prevent the perverse desire of the defendant to 
misuse a non-jury criminal trial. In addition, the judges need to understand this 
risk when he or she will decide on the application to organise a non-jury 
criminal trial. As the Auld Report stated that “Trial by judge alone, if defendants 
wish it, has a potential for providing a simpler, more efficient, fairer and more 
open form of procedure than is now available in many jury trials, with the added 
advantage of a fully reasoned judgment.”32  
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 See Home Office, Justice for All (Cmd 5563, 2002) 68. The Auld Report also suggested  
that the “defendants, with the consent of the court after hearing representations from both  
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e.) Jury tampering cases which provide the benefit for the victim’s side 
 
Jury tampering is not always caused by the defendant. It is sometimes by the 
victim’s side. For instance, jury tampering which was seen in R v Martin was a 
tampering ‘against’ the defendant, not ‘for’ him.33 In addition, another example 
can be seen in R v Thompson.
34
 In that case, the victim’s brother approached 
some jurors at the canteen of the court.
35
 Eventually, the Court of Appeal could 
not find any evidence for the incidence which was raised by the defendant, thus 
the appeal was declined. 
 
These cases would make the people realise that it is possible for the victim’s 
side to influence the jury to get preferable verdicts for their side. It is natural 
since both parties of a trial would have a desire to get the beneficial judgment 
for them. Jury tampering which was caused by the defendant’s side tends to be 
noticed more, thus people tend to forget the possibility of jury tampering which 
was caused by the victim’s side. It needs to be recognised that the risk of jury 
tampering is caused by either side’s parties. 
 
f.) Jury tampering by another jury 
 
Nobody can check the conversation among jurors in the jury deliberation room 
in England because of the severe restrictions against the disclosure of jury 
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deliberations. If some jurors took oppressive attitudes toward other gentle jurors, 
and led the verdicts into the dominant jurors’ preferred direction, how can the 
court be expected to assure the fairness of the trial? In fact, in R v Smith and 
Mercieca, some unscrupulous jurors badgered, coerced and intimidated other 
jurors into changing their verdict towards the conviction.
36
 The dominant jurors 
asked the other jurors, for example, “Do you want a re-trial at the tax payers 
expense?” “Even if they [the defendants] are not guilty do you really want these 
people to go free?” and “If they are guilty and we find them innocent they would 
have got away with it, but if they are innocent and we find them guilty they can 
always appeal.”37 These facts were reported by a juror via a mail to the court, 




This case indicates the risk of dominant and oppressive jurors’ opinion will be 
easily applied. It will possibly result perverse verdicts and miscarriage of justice. 
The dominant jurors action in R v Smith and Mercieca was absolutely jury 
intimidation by a juror. To avoid this, ideally, foreman should keep the fair and 
productive discussion at the jury deliberation. However, it seems to be difficult 
to impose so much burden to the foreman, who is also lay person and exclude 
irrational jurors in every jury trial resolutely. 
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127 
 
g.) Court’s prudent attitude about the use of non-jury criminal trial and 
police protection for the jury 
 
The opponents of non-jury criminal trials which were introduced by Section 44 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, are concerned that these trials become the 
typical form of English criminal trials. It is clear that the English judges tend to 
show their prudent attitude about the use of non-jury criminal trials at the 
moment.
39
 In R v Twomey and others, the outcome by the judge of the Court of 
Appeal states that: 
 
For the time being, although the statutory provisions relating to trial on 
indictment by judge alone have been in force for some years, this case is unique, 
and we must hope that it will remain so. The proper operation of the criminal 
justice system requires that the verdicts returned by a jury, as with any other 




As Taylor has pointed out that, “the Court of Appeal has provided some 
guidance within the bounds of the current legislative framework to ensure that 
the provisions are used in exceptional circumstances.”41 Moreover, in R v KS, 
the Court of Appeal shows its prudent attitude even about ordering police 
protection for a jury. The court considers that police protection for the jury 
needs to be ordered in “a realistic and proportionate way.”42 The court 
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disagreed with the necessity for jury protection in the situation of R v KS 
eventually, because they assumed that “appropriate protection for this jury 
would be likely to be established at a fairly low level.”43 The cautious attitude 
of the court was clearly declared by the sentence “the proposed protective 
measures must be proportionate to the threat.”44  
 
These prudent attitudes of the court about both organising a non-jury criminal 
trial and police protection for the jury to keep them as a “last resort”45 for 
solving jury tampering problems can be positively evaluated in terms of 
avoiding abuse of these means and retains the credibility of the judiciary. If the 
court is too cautious towards the use of a non-jury criminal trial, the purpose and 
meaning of Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the existence of the 
police protection will be defeated.
46
 Like in R v Twomey and others
47
 and R v 
Guthrie,
48
 once the judge has found enough evidence of jury tampering or the 
attempt of jury tampering, he or she needs to make the appropriate decision to 
use a non-jury criminal trial and the police protection for jurors without any 
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h.) How would the court prevent ‘judge tampering’? 
 
Even though a trial will be conducted by a judge only without jury to avoid the 
influence of jury tampering, there would be a question of whether the judge will 
not be bribed or intimidated by anyone in relation to the parties? Brooks shared 
such a question. He asked “Why should we think that juries— which decide 
verdicts by super majority vote in England and Wales— are more likely to be 
affected by intimidation than a single judge or a lay magistrate?”50 Ward and 
Davies also ironically warns “It is to be hoped that organised criminals 
appreciate that Section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is to be implemented 
and that there is little now to be gained by influence jurors in such 
circumstances— provided their attentions are not turned to the judge instead.”51 
 
There will need to be extra expense to protect the judge from any kinds of judge 
tampering although this cost is not as expensive as the money for preventing the 
tampering of each juror. In addition, Justice for all suggests that, a non-jury 
criminal trial needs to be proceeded by a new appointed trial judge, not the same 
judge of the previous jury trials which was collapsed by jury tampering.
52
 This 
would also be a mean to protect a judge from judge tampering. 
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If a party attempted to achieve its ideal result, it needs to successfully intimidate 
three or more jurors.
53
 However, if it was a non-jury trial, there will be only a 
single judge to target. Thus, although the influence of jury tampering avoided by 
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3.) The Northern Ireland experience and lessons from the Diplock courts 
 
The introduction of a non-jury trial by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, is assumed 
a historic turning point for the English jury system. It was not the first non-jury 
criminal trial in contemporary British legal History. Non-jury criminal trials had 
existed from the 1970s in Northern Ireland: these were the so-called ‘Diplock 
courts.’ The non-jury experiences in Northern Ireland supply us with a number 
of significant lessons. Therefore, in this section, non-jury criminal trials at the 
Diplock courts will be analysed in comparison to contemporary non-jury 
criminal trials in England.  
 
Needless to say, the political and historic situation in Northern Ireland was 
extremely complex. When we discuss the Diplock courts, it is difficult to avoid 
the issue of terrorism since it is closely in relation to non-jury trials in Northern 
Ireland. It is not too much to say that the Diplock courts were introduced 
because of the complex political, ethnic, and religious conflicts in Northern 
Ireland.  
 
a.) Historic Background  
 
As Finn correctly stated that “Northern Ireland was literally in a state of 
constitutional crisis.”1 It was because “Northern Ireland is not a homogeneous 
                                                   
1
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society” according to the Gardiner Report.2 This thesis will not discuss the 
complexities of Northern Irish constitutional crisis, nor its criminal justice 
primarily. However, to understand the necessity for non-jury criminal trials in 
Northern Irish society from the 1970s to the 1990s, the historic background of 
the contemporary Northern Irish situation needs to examine briefly. 
 
The jury system was brought to Ireland in the late twelfth century. The jury 
system, with the function of arbitration, was formed in the seventeenth century 
when the indigenous Brehon law was replaced. The jury system occupied a 
central part of the Irish legal system in the same way as the English common 
law system until partition in 1921.
3
 As the nationalistic movement increased in 
Ireland during the late nineteenth century, the controversy surrounding the jury 
trials grew up, including perverse verdicts by packing the jury which had 
sympathy for the defendants. In Northern Ireland, prejudiced jurors have always 
been a problem because they have mostly been Protestants against Roman 
Catholic and Republican defendants.
4
 In 1882, the British Government sought 
to pass a law to provide jury trials in Ireland in cases of political or agrarian 
crime by introducing a non-jury trial; however the attempt collapsed because of 
the outcry from the Irish Parliamentarians and judiciary.
5
 Since that time, there 
have been several attempts to introduce non-jury criminal trials in Northern 
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Ireland to guard against perverse verdicts which were not realised by 




From 1921, Ireland has been divided into two parts; Northern Ireland which is a 
part of the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland had a 
regional Parliament at Stormont
7
 by the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1922. The Act provided ‘emergency’ measures in Northern 
Ireland.
8
 Although it stated that ‘emergency,’ in fact, it became an almost 
“permanent feature of the legal system”9 according to Harvey. From the early 
1960s, the civil rights movement arose in Northern Ireland, influenced by the  
American civil rights movement. One of the significant objectives of the civil 




Moreover, from the establishing the Stormont Parliament, the continual menace 
for the British Government was the IRA. From the 1920s to the 1950s, the IRA 
repeatedly engaged in violent campaigns against the Stormont Parliament and 
the British Government.
11
 On 12 December 1956, the IRA formally declared 
war against the “Northern Irish State.”12 The British Government had never 
showed any compromise attitude towards the peaceful civil rights movement 
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and the violent IRA. Sometimes they sent their troops Northern Ireland and 
increased direct control on the local security forces.
13
 The British military 
intervention did not succeed. 
 
In the early 1970s, violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland were real threats 
and constitutional crisis over the Stormont Parliament and the British 
Government.
14
 The violence in Northern Ireland especially became worse after 
the ‘Bloody Sunday’ at Derry (Londonderry) on 29 January 1972. Both the 
national and international concerns over the Northern Ireland situation increased, 
and a new efficient solution for the crisis was expected.
15
 The Heath 
Government in Westminster accepted the resignation of Northern Irish cabinet 
and dissolved the Stormont Parliament in March 1972,
16
 at that time, direct 
control of Northern Irish affairs by the British Government started.
17
 The 
British Government firstly emphasised military control in Northern Ireland. 
Military control gradually shifted to judicial measures to control the area.
18
 
During this movement, the Diplock Commission was appointed by the British 
Government in 1972. 
 
The Diplock Commission was appointed to consider “what arrangements for the 
administration of justice in Northern Ireland could be made in order to deal 
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more effectively with terrorist organisations by bringing to book, other than by 
internment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist activities, 
particularly these who plan and direct, but do not necessarily take part in, 
terrorist acts; and to make recommendations.”19 The Diplock Commission 
found that Northern Irish criminal justice system had been unable to work 




In addition to the fear of terrorism, jury tampering had been a significant 
problem in Northern Irish society. According to the Diplock Commission, jury 
tampering was serious, particularly in the Catholic areas in the trial of 
Republican terrorists, and the Diplock Commission had “ample evidence.”21 
The Diplock Report has pointed out that, “because of the way in which 
‘Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’ are concentrated geographically this results in it 
being composed predominantly of ‘Protestants’, of whom the great majority 
have Loyalist sympathies.”22 Moreover, the possibility of being a juror among 
Protestants is much larger than the Catholics’23 because of the property 
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 According to the Diplock Commission, it is two to one. Ibid 
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qualification for jury service. Therefore, the Diplock Report concluded that “the 
result of all these factors is that juries who have tried Republican terrorists, who 
until recently have been almost the only detected perpetrators of terrorist crimes, 
have been juries the great majority, if not all, of whom have been Protestants.”24 
According to Boyle et al., in the 1970s, “as more and more Protestants began to 
come before the courts for serious offences,”25 the risk of jury tampering 
increased. Jury tampering in Northern Ireland did not expand, but it was even 
“well founded.”26 The family and relatives of jurors were also targets, and 
sometimes they were kidnapped by associates of the defendant.
27
 Jury 
intimidation in Northern Ireland was effective for achieving the offender’s wish. 
According to the Baker report, “not only the fear but the knowledge that threats 
of violence or torture will be carried out will deter even the most resolute.”28  
 
The Diplock Report stated that “A frightened juror is a bad juror even though his 
own safety and that of his family may not actually be at risk.”29 The prime 
concern of jury tampering was “borne out by perverse verdicts, where juries 
allowed seemingly guilty individuals to go free.”30 In addition, according to the 
Diplock Report, there was no efficient safeguard in a jury trial against the danger 
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 Therefore, the Diplock Report suggests that, “We think 
that matters have now reached a stage in Northern Ireland at which it would not 
be safe to continue to rely upon methods hitherto used for securing impartial 
trial by a jury of terrorist crimes, particularly if the trend towards increasing use 
of violence by Loyalist extremists were to continue.”32 In other words, the 





In addition, the Diplock Report stated that jury tampering “cannot be overcome 
by any changes in the conduct of the trial, the rules of evidence or the onus of 
proof which we would regard as appropriate to trial by judicial process in a court 
of law.”34 It is because of the “deep-rooted communal division in Northern 
Ireland that jury verdicts would be influenced unduly by sympathy for or 
hostility towards the accused on religious or political grounds.”35 The Diplock 
Report suggested the problems in Northern Irish criminal justice would be 
solved by the introduction of non-jury trials for certain indictable ‘scheduled 
offences.’ 
 
After examining the significant violence, including the serious fear of jury 
tampering and a collapsed criminal justice system in Northern Ireland, the 
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Diplock Commission concluded its examination, made suggestions for the new 
Northern Irish criminal justice system by publishing the so-called Diplock 
report in December 1972. The ideas eventually influenced widely to the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 which was passed in July 
1973. Section 31(2) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 
ceased the effects of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1922. By the act, non-jury criminal trials, the so-called ‘Diplock courts,’ 
were established on 8 August 1973. From 15 October 1973, the Diplock courts 
started to hear cases of defendants for scheduled offences by non-jury trials. 
  
b.) The Composition of the Diplock courts 
 
The Diplock courts were established by the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1973
36
 as non-jury criminal trials in Belfast.
37
 The Act 
provided the composition of non-jury criminal trials with its ‘scheduled 
offence.’  
 
Section 2(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 stated 
that “A trial on indictment of a scheduled offence shall be conducted by the 
court without a jury.” Instead of a jury, a single judge decides both the facts and 
law for a criminal trial. The judge had the power as Section 2(2) of the Northern 
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Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 stated that “The court trying a 
scheduled offence on indictment under this section shall have all the powers, 
authorities and jurisdiction which court would have had if they had been sitting 
with a jury, including power to determine any question and to make any finding 
which would, apart from this section, be required to be determined or made by a 
jury, and references in any enactment to a jury or the verdict or finding of a jury 
shall be construed accordingly in relation to a trial under this section.” In the 
Diplock courts, the trials are generally heard by the High Court judge. At the 
request of the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, a County Court judge 
would sit and act as the judge in the Diplock courts by Section 4(3) and (4) of 




In a jury trial, the jurors do not give the reasons for their verdict. Conversely, the 
judges in the Diplock courts were required to give “a reasoned judgment in 
support of a decision to convict.”39 By Section 2(6)(a) and (b) of the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973,
40
 the defendant had an automatic 
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 A County Court judge tended to hear less serious offences. See Finn (n 1) 99 
39
 Jackson and Doran (n 30) 11-12. Louis Blom-Cooper highly evaluated this point; he  
suggested that, “One reason for public recognition of the Diplock courts in the Northern  
Ireland Crown Court was that the trial judge was obliged to give a fully reasoned  
judgment for the verdict which meant it was possible for there to be a fully appellate  
review.” See Louis Blom-Cooper, ‘Judgment reserved on jury trials’ the Guardian  
(London, 20 February 2010) 
40
 The Section stated that “A person convicted of any offence on a trial under this section 
without a jury may, notwithstanding anything in Section 8 of the Criminal Appeal 
(Northern Ireland) Act 1968, appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal under that section” 
in two cases; firstly, “against his conviction, on any ground, without the leave of the 
Court of Criminal Appeal or a certificate of the judge of the court of trial,” and secondly 
“against sentence passed on conviction, without such leave, unless the sentence is one 
fixed by law.” 
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Schedule 4 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 specified 
the ‘scheduled offences’ which were the offences which should be heard in the 
Diplock courts. The offences included murder, manslaughter, arson, riot, most 
non-fatal offences against the person, offences involving firearms, explosion, 
robbery, aggravated burglary, membership of proscribed organisations, and 
intimidation. Schedule 4 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1978 added kidnapping, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and several actions in a 
prison to the scheduled offences. It was obvious that the scheduled offences 
covered “the major terrorist-type offences.”42 
 
Notes 1 and 2 of Schedule 4 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act 1973 gave the Attorney General for Northern Ireland discretion to exclude 
any particular murder, manslaughter or grievous bodily harm cases from the 
scheduled offences. In other words, as Jackson and Doran have pointed out that, 
“This is made possible by the fact that a number of scheduled offences may be 
de-scheduled and tried by jury if the Attorney General exercises the 
de-scheduling power he has under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act when there is perceived to be no terrorist involvement.”43 To render such 
discretion to the Attorney General has been subject to criticisms. For instance, 
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 See Jackson and Doran (n 30) 11-12 
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 John Jackson and Sean Doran, Judicial Fact— Finding in the Diplock Court in Northern 
Ireland (1990) Working Paper No.2, The University of Manchester 1 
43
 Ibid 2 
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Lord Devlin criticised this by arguing that, “It is unsatisfactory that the exercise 
of a constitutional right should depend upon an executive decision.”44 Jackson 
and Doran stated that “Certain offences such as armed robbery do not differ 
significantly from other kinds of offences such as ordinary robbery which are 
triable by jury.”45 According to them, the Attorney General frequently 
permitted to certify offences which are not on the Schedule.
46
   
 
One of the noticeable differences from the previous criminal jury trials was that 
many trials “were carried on primarily on the basis of documentary evidence and 
depositions rather than the verbal evidence of witnesses.”47 Boyle et al. 
suspected the reason for this is because of lack of the available evidence which 
was often limited to confessions or admissions.
48
 Thus, the rules governing the 
admissibility of the confessions were changed.
49
 Moreover, “The elimination of 
the jury did reduce the scope for the traditional skills of advocacy and 
cross-examination, and led to more direct discussion between counsel and 
judges on the basis of the written statements.”50 Meanwhile, respect of 
documentary evidence had merits. For example, as Donohue has pointed out, 
“The written findings required a high level of discipline in the fact-finding phase 
of the trial: appellate courts tended to reverse Diplock convictions more 
                                                   
44
 Patrick Devlin, Foreword in Greer and White (n 3) ix 
45
 Jackson and Doran (n 42) 2 
46
 See Jackson and Doran (n 30) 21-22 
47
 Boyle et al. (n 4) 98-99 
48
 Ibid 99 
49
 See Jackson and Doran (n 30) 11-12 
50
 Boyle et al. (n 4) 99 
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frequently than jury convictions—most likely because the requirement that the 
judges write out their findings made it easier to challenge their conclusions.”51 
 
The Diplock courts heard approximately one-third of all serious criminal cases 
in Northern Ireland.
52
 According to Jackson and Doran, over 10,000 defendants 
were heard in the Diplock courts from 1973 to 2002: the largest number of cases 




c.) Efficacy of the Diplock courts 
 
Boyle et al. stated that the introduction of the Diplock courts “succeeds in 
eliminating the more blatant forms of discrimination between Protestant and 
Roman Catholic defendants in the selection of charges, the granting of bail, the 
incidence of conviction and acquittal and the level of sentencing.”54 According 
to Boyle et al., most Protestants thought they had got a fair criminal trial by a 
judge only.
55
 In addition, Protestant defendants in the Diplock courts tended to 
plead their guilt and rely “on the judge’s leniency than from seeking an acquittal 
on the more serious charges.”56 According to Carlton, the reason for rate of 
Protestants pleading guilty rose from 31 per cent to 70 per cent.
57
 He analysed 
that, this was because the Protestant defendants could no longer rely on a 
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 Ibid 19 
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 Ibid 97 
57




“friendly jury.”58 There were also criticisms from the Protestant side. For 
example, the inconsistency of the sentences has been pointed out, and others 
argued that, the Diplock courts had a prejudice against Protestants.
59
 According 
to Boyle et al., there were many Roman Catholics thought the Diplock courts 
were prejudiced against Catholics, thus Roman Catholic defendants would not 
get a fair trial at courts.
60
 Conversely, Donohue has pointed out that, more than 
the majority of Roman Catholics thought the Diplock courts were a better 
system than internment without trial which existed until 1973 in Northern 
Ireland.
61
 According to Carlton, from the establishing the Diplock courts, 
judges acquitted 5 per cent of Protestant defendants.
62
 On the other hand, they 
acquitted 12 per cent of Catholics.
63
 Boyle et al. found that “The acquittal rate 
for Roman Catholics was in fact substantially the same as that in cases tried 
before the introduction of the Diplock courts, in which there had been a high 
level of directed acquittals.”64  
 
d.) Abolition of the Diplock courts  
 
Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages of the Diplock courts, only a 
few people, including the members of the Diplock Commission, predicted the 
long life of the Diplock courts which lasted for more than 30 years.
65
 After the 
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 Boyle et al. (n 4) 97 
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144 
 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, several Commissions, 
including the Gardiner Committee
66
 and the Baker Commission, examined the 
efficacy of the Act and whether there was any necessity for amending the 
provisions. The Gardiner Committee analysed 482 witness and jury tampering 
instances between 1
 
January 1972 and 31 August 1974.
67
 The Commission 
concluded it is reasonable to predict that jurors has been equally directed the 
risks of intimidation.
68
 Although the Gardiner Committee stated that “We 
believe that trial by jury is the best form of trial for serious cases, and that it 
should be restored in Northern Ireland as soon as this becomes possible,”69 it 
was impossible to do so unless Northern Irish situation was improved. 
According to the Baker Commission, there was a suggestion to bring juries from 
the mainland of the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland and let them try the 
criminal trials for scheduled offences.
70
 The Commission rejected the idea as so 
unrealistic.
71
     
 
                                                                                                                                           
jury for all indictable offences in Northern Ireland “is unlikely in the near future and even 
if the emergency method of trial were to be discontinued, this would probably be 
achieved by a gradual phasing out of the Diplock trials, rather than by an immediate 
return to jury trial of all cases.” See Jackson and Doran (n 30) preface, ix and 11-12 
66
 The Gardiner Committee was appointed to “consider what provisions and powers, 
consistent to the maximum extent practicable in the circumstances with the preservation 
of civil liberties and human rights, are required to deal with terrorism and subversion in 
Northern Ireland, including provisions for the administration of justice, and to examine 
the working of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973; and to make 
recommendations.” See Gardiner report (n 2) 1 
67




 Ibid 10-12. Meanwhile, the Gardiner Committee recognised the efficacy of the Diplock 
courts and concluded “The right to a fair trial has been respected and maintained and that 
the administration of justice has not suffered.” Therefore, the Commission suggested that 
non-jury criminal trials need to be remained in the Diplock courts. The Baker 
Commission was lead to the similar conclusion. See Baker Report (n 27) 139 
70





Although the Diplock courts existed for a long time, there were continual 
criticisms of courts; some of them insisted on the abolition. As the first example, 
there were concerns that the number of ordinary offences which are not related 
to the Northern Irish political and social conflicts and which would generally be 
tried by a jury were categorised as ‘scheduled offences.’72  Therefore, Walsh 
stated that, the defendants lost their right to trial by jury unfairly.
73
 The Baker 
Commission suggested that, “All scheduled offences which are triable 
summarily or which carry a maximum sentence of imprisonment for five years 
or less, should be capable of being certified out, ie as not to be treated as 
scheduled offences.”74  
 
As a second example, some people argued that an untrustworthy confession 
would damage the fairness of non-jury trials at the Diplock courts.
75
 According 
to Greer and White, it was “the most common dispute”76 in the Diplock courts. 
It could be assumed because the judges totally or virtually by confessions in 




In a criminal jury trial, the voir dire will operate for a judge to examine the legal 
admissibility of alleged confessions, if it is challenged by the defendant before 
the trial starts and jurors sit.
78
 Once the judge is satisfied of its admissibility, the 
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 See Greer and White (n 3) 15. According to Walsh, 40 per cent of the cases at the 
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jury will be summoned and asked to consider the confession at the trial. If not, 
the confession will not be mentioned to the jury in the trial, so that the jury will 
not know of the existence of the ‘confession’. According to Walsh, the purpose 
of the voir dire is “to allow the jury to make up its own mind on how much 
weight, if any, to attribute to the confession; a question of fact.”79 In other 
words, the voir dire prevents the jury from having any unfair prejudice against 
the defendant.
80
 If there is no jury, it will mean the judge always knows of the 
existence of a confession regardless of its admissibility. Therefore, is there a 
possibility that a judge has a prejudice against the defendant by a confession?  
 
Louis Blom-Cooper suggested that, “The experience in Northern Ireland over 
three decades suggests that serious organised crimes can effectively and 
efficiently be tried before a professional court- a single judge or perhaps three 
judges.”81 Moreover, as the tension between the British Government and the 
IRA eased, the average annual number of cases at the Diplock courts decreased 
from over 1,000 in the early years to over 400 from 1991 to 1993.
82
 After the 
Good Friday agreement between the British Government and the Republic of 
Irish Government in 1998, the number of cases in the Diplock courts decreased 
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Eventually, the Diplock courts were abolished in July 2007 by the Justice and 
Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. Nevertheless, as in other areas of the 
United Kingdom, non-jury criminal trials have still existed in Northern Ireland. 
Recently, non-jury trials in Northern Ireland deal not only with the problem of 
Republican versus Loyalist paramilitaries, but also with Al-Qaeda terrorists. In 
the first example of such a case, an Al-Qaeda sympathiser who had information 
on bombing an airliner was arrested and found guilty, with a sentence of six 
years at the non-jury trial in Northern Ireland on 20 December 2005. In R v 
Mackle in 2007, a juror in a trial in Northern Ireland reported he was approached 
by two partly masked men who attempted to bribe the juror if he gave them any 
information about the case.
84
 Therefore, the judge discharged the jury and start 
a new trial without a jury.
85
 In January 2012, the trial of Brian Shrivers and 
Colin Duffy, suspected as being the Real IRA murderers of two British soldiers 




According to Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency’s statistics in 
2007, public confidence of Northern Ireland jury was 74 per cent which was 
increased from 64 per cent, the rate in 1992/1993, although the people who 
argued the jury is less confident is as in 1992/1993 and 2007: 18 per cent.
87
 
There have been seen no big differences in public confidence rates of Northern 
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 See Henry McDonald, ‘Brian Shivers found guilty of Massereene murders’ the Guardian 
(London, 20 January 2012) 
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 See Julian Roberts and Mike Hough, Public opinion and the jury: an international 
literature review (1
st
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Irish jury between Protestants and Catholics.
88
 However, significantly, Amelin, 
Willis and Donnelly’s research in 2000 indicated that public confidence of the 
fairness of juries, 75 per cent, was slightly less than the one of judges and 
magistrates, 77 per cent.
89
 This would show Northern Irish perception on the 
jury and a non-jury trial has not been so different recently. 
 
e.) Lessons from the Diplock courts 
 
Since the Diplock courts are not directly in relation to the problem of jury 
tampering in modern English society, the analysis of the Diplock courts in this 
thesis will not be so detailed. Nevertheless, the experiences of non-jury trials in 
Northern Ireland supply us with meaningful lessons to consider when we 
examine jury tampering problem and English non-jury trials after the 
enforcement of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As a conclusion of this section, it 
notes the possible lessons from the Dipock courts.  
 
Firstly, as in the contemporary situation in England, finding evidence of jury 
tampering was difficult. As Walsh suggested, “No firm evidence was ever 
produced to show it was a very real factor”90 in jury tampering. It is easy to 
concur with the Baker Commission’s statement that “Scheduled offences should 
be tried by judge alone was based on the fear that jurors might be intimidated, 
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coupled with some perverse acquittals of loyalists, rather than on actual 
evidence of intimidation.”91  
 
Secondly, jury protection in cases of jury tampering by police was not always 
efficient enough. In Northern Ireland, terrorism itself inherently “means wide 
spread intimidation in all sections of the community.”92 Not only, jurors, but 
jurors’ families and relatives were approached. Therefore, the scope of the 
efficient protection of jurors could not always be decided, and it would have 
been not enough to prevent any influence from tampering if police has protected 
jurors only.  
 
Thirdly, although there was no jury in the trial, the Diplock courts did not alter 
the traditional adversarial criminal justice system. Criticisms against non-jury 
criminal trials argued it was a serious change from the adversarial to the 
inquisitional criminal justice system. As Jackson and Doran stated that “The 
transition to trial by judge alone did not require any major upheaval of the 
adversarial trial structure.”93 Judges did not correct evidence by themselves; this 
was the role of other parties in the criminal trial.
94
 Moreover, judges needed to 
give the reason for their judgments in trials, and it enforced their rights to find 
the facts in the Diplock courts deliberately. Therefore, the criticism that “The 
absence of the jury may well create a situation in which a greater degree of 
                                                   
91
 Baker Report (n 27) 27 
92
 Gardiner report (n 2) 42 
93
 Jackson and Doran (n 30) 11 
94
 See Jackson and Doran (n 42) 20 
150 
 
intervention by the trial judge is accommodated”95 would not always be 
applicable.
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3. The practical weaknesses of jury trials— dealing with cases of serious 
and complex fraud  
 
As found in the previous chapters, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 attempted to 
propose a non-jury trial in cases of serious and complex fraud as well as jury 
tampering. This differs from Section 44 of the Act, which provided for non-jury 
trials in the case of jury tampering and was enforced in 2007. Section 43 of the 
Act, dealing with fraud trials, has not yet been enforced. This chapter will 
explain serious and complex fraud cases and the background of a non-jury trial 
on such a case. 
 
1.) The notion of fraud  
 
As Blake has pointed out, crime has become more complicated recently: in 
particular, fraud cases.
1
 Fraud is highly ambiguous criminal offence. Criminal 
offences of fraud “include obtaining property by deception, false accounting, 
fraudulent trading, theft and the common law offence of conspiracy of 
defraud.”2 The Fraud Act 2006 more specifically categorises criminal offences 
of fraud. 
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Fraud trials tend to be more complex and much longer because they are rarely 
easy for jurors to understand fully.
3
 Especially, in serious and complex cases, 
fraud trials require to support the jurors’ understanding the issues with a great 
effort.
4
 What sort of offence could be distinguished as a serious and complex 
fraud case? According to Attorney General’s guidelines on pleas discussions in 
cases of serious or complex fraud, if at least two aspects of below are present, 




the amount obtained or intended to be obtained is alleged to exceed £500,000; 
there is a significant international dimension; 
the case requires specialised knowledge of financial, commercial, fiscal or 
regulatory matters such as the operation of markets, banking systems, trusts or 
tax regimes; 
the case involves allegations of fraudulent activity against numerous victims; 
the case involves an allegation of substantial and significant fraud on a public 
body; the case is likely to be of widespread public concern; 
the alleged misconduct endangered the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom, for example by undermining confidence in financial markets. 
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 Her Majesty’s Attorney General, Attorney General’s guidelines on pleas discussions in 
cases of serious or complex fraud (1
st





2.) The problematic elements of a serious and complex fraud trial by jury 
a.) Cost in both money and time 
 
Serious and complex fraud trials tend to take a long time to be decided. 
According to Kirk, it is just a recent phenomenon: most fraud case lasted within 
two weeks before the 1970s.
7
 As reasons for the longer fraud trials seen more 
recently, Kirk raised the failure of the prosecution and court management to the 
complexity of modern life.
8
 Nowadays, a criminal jury trial on serious and 
complex fraud may take over one hundred days,
9
 much longer than a general 
jury trial. The jury in a serious and complex fraud case may be required to read a 
large amount of documentary evidence.
10
 In a trial, the parties and the judge 
may need to explain complex fraud matters to the jury many and long times to 
ensure their understanding of facts.
11
 Long jury service can prove inconvenient 
to the jurors. According to the White Paper Justice for All, the time commitment 
of a fraud trial had a negative effect on jurors’ personal and working lives.12 
The Roskill Committee raised the question, whether it is “fair, and ultimately in 
the interests of justice, to impose such burdens upon the ordinary citizen?”13 
Moreover, the Roskill Committee put forward strong evidence to indicate that it 
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is almost impossible for the average juror to memorise all the facts and figures 




To detain the jury for a long case entails vast expense. Thus, the cost is also one 
of the serious negative aspects of fraud jury trials. However, Ireland suggested 
that if the judge can manage the time of the trial more efficiently, even though 
the trial is conducted by jury, the problems of being overly time consuming will 
be resolved.
15
   
 
One of the English longest and expensive fraud trials was R v Rayment and 
Others,
16
 the so-called ‘Jubilee Line trial.’ It had lasted 21 months by the time 
of verdict.
17
 The trial totally cost over £25m according to Wooler.
18
 
Lloyd-Bostock suggested “The Jubilee Line trial clearly placed an unacceptable 
burden on the jurors.”19 Indeed, almost two years jury service must influence 
each juror’s life and business negatively. Wooler argued that, such a long period 
of trial will exceed the extent for a citizen to be able to bear simply as part of 
civic duty, unless the court will take any measures to avoid the burden.
20
 The 
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burden” for a juror. See Ibid x 
20
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Court of Appeal affirmed that, no jury seemed to remember the evidence fully 
when the jury deliberation was started because of the extraordinary length of the 
hearing.
21
 On the other hand, according to Grieve, the reason for the delay of 
the trial of R v Rayment and Others was not because of the jury incapability, but 
the unusual combination of the factors which proved unavoidable.
22
 
Lloyd-Bostock stated that “It confirms that jury trial is valued, and that 
improvements through trial preparation, and trial and jury management, should 




Black maintained, “Jurors have little familiarity with the type of situation 
confronting them in fraud trials and so their inferences are not supported by a 
consolidated body of knowledge.”24 However, most citizens have little 
experience of serious crime, so the question is raised— why should a fraud trial 
be especially problematic for jurors? Fraud trials tend to be complex compared 
                                                                                                                                           
and to provide authoritative assistance in resolving difficulties directly attributable to the 
length of jury service.” Wooler recommends that this ‘authoritative assistance’ may 
include detailed and clear explanation for a jury on the fraud case. Wooler (n 18) x and 
xiii 
21
 Ibid 86. Young has pointed out that, the jury capability of comprehension and recalling 
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to other type of criminal cases. In serious and complex fraud cases, both the 
number of defendants and the charges against each of them may be multiple.
25
 
The juror may not remember or distinguish between the offences of each 
defendant. The Roskill Committee concluded that “The background against 
which the frauds are alleged to have been committed— the sophisticated world 
of high finance and international trading— is probably a mystery to most or all 
of the jurors, its customs and practices a closed book. Even the language in 
which the allegedly fraudulent transactions have been conducted will be 
unfamiliar.”26  
 
As Home Office’s consultation paper stated that “A key consideration is 
whether it is necessary to have a detailed understanding of inherently 
complicated financial procedures in order to assess if a person has acted 
dishonestly.”27 Bekerian et al. found that jurors who deeply and correctly 
understand evidences and information at the complex fraud trial tend to more 
likely convict the defendant.
28
 Therefore, lower levels of comprehension may 
be more likely to lead to an acquittal verdict.
29
 As the Roskill Committee 
explained, “Fraudsters are often highly intelligent individuals. They exercise 
great skill in conducting their operations, and may use companies or bank 
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accounts overseas through which funds are channeled.”30 Therefore, the 
defendant of a serious and complex case may eventually be able to cheat even 
jurors who may not understand the facts appropriately and acquit the defendant 
in the trial.
31
 Of course, there may also be a risk of wrong conviction as well.  
 
From above, it could be said that whether a juror properly understands facts and 
evidence in a serious and complex fraud case is a significant aspect in achieving 
a fair trial.
32
 If “an overall impression of guilt or innocence in the minds of 
jurors”33 without deep understanding of the facts of the case, decided the verdict, 
this would constitute an unfair trial. The Roskill Committee concluded that, 
“Many of our witnesses have asserted that many jurors are almost certainly out 
of their depth in complex fraud cases.”34 Williams stated that the least 
suitability of jurors for the serious and complex fraud cases.
35
 He found that 
even the simplest evidences of proper accountancy or business practice would 




There is an interesting empirical research by Logie et al., which examined the 
mock jurors’ memory on a serious and complex fraud cases, and asked them to 
listen to an extract from the judge’s summing up in a real fraud case. The extract 
                                                   
30
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lasted around one and half hours, and summarised the trial.
37
 Logie et al. found 
that few mock jurors adequately understood the charges or the circumstances on 
the case.
38
 Thus, there has been a concern that opinions of such a minority of 
jurors, who understand the evidence precisely, may be overly dominant and 
influential.
39
 It could also be said that if the ‘wrong voice’ among less 
understanding mock jurors were louder because of the larger number, it will 
have also risks to constitute a miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, Ireland 
has stated that “There is no evidence that juries are not understanding fraud 
cases; indeed, fraud offences are defined by reference to the standards of 
ordinary people.”40 
 
The judge, prosecutors and police also must be competent in order to understand 
serious and complex fraud cases. The Runciman Report has pointed out that, in a 
complicated long fraud case, all parties should be “well trained, carefully 
selected, and provided with effective administrative support.”41 Therefore, 
appropriately allocating capable judges who “must recognise that specialist 
knowledge and experience”42 would also be significant in some cases.  
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 See Roskill (n 2) 141. Kirk concurred with this concern. See Kirk (n 7)  
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 Ireland introduced a media interview for one of the jurors of R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, 
CA. In the interview, the juror stated that she easily understood the evidence. See Ireland 
(n15) 2 and 6 
41
 Runciman Report (n 3) The judge, prosecutors and police also must carefully deal with 
any forensic evidence. It should be expected that any failures in a jury trial may 
sometimes stem not from the nature of the mode of trial but from the judge, prosecution 





3.) Discussion of the Auld Report and Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 
a.) The Roskill Committee and the Fraud Trials Tribunal 
 
The difficulties above have led to some legal associations to demand trial by 
juries to be abolished on fraud and propose other system like a non-jury criminal 
trial. In April 1984, the Fraud Trials Committee, which was chaired by Lord 
Roskill (the so-called ‘Roskill Committee’) was established “in response to 
growing public concern at the effectiveness of present methods of combatting 
serious commercial fraud.”43 The Committee discussed existing law and trial by 
jury on fraud and sought other forms of trial instead of the existing trial by jury 
on fraud. As Thompson noted, the Roskill Committee was “eminently qualified 
to consider complex fraud. The members knew much about offences against the 
rights of money.”44 In their report, the Roskill Committee suggested that new 
fraud trials should be conducted by one judge and two lay members selected 




Persons should be handpicked after a careful process of enquiry and vetting. 
They should not have any known extreme views in any direction, which might 
affect their ability to form a balanced view. 
Their integrity should not be open to doubt. 
                                                   
43
 Fraud Trials Committee (n 32) 
44
 E.P. Thompson, ‘Subduing the Jury’ (1986) 8(21) London Review of Books 7, 8 
45
 Roskill (n 2) 149  
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They must have experience of business dealings and the capacity to enable them 
to understand the kind of complex issues which will arise in this class of case. 
They should be able to devote adequate time to the job. 
They should be of different age groups and should not be restricted to those in 
retirement.  
 
The Committee named this new type of trial as the ‘Fraud Trials Tribunal’. At 
the Fraud Trials Tribunal, only the judge deals with the questions of law, 




The Roskill Committee stated that “We are satisfied that the Fraud Trials 
Tribunal would considerably reduce the length and cost of trials which at the 
same time increasing the prospects of a sound verdict being reached. The 
savings of judges and the court time and the greatly improved comprehension of 
the matters under enquiry would allow more, if not all, complex fraud cases to 
be brought to trial and provide a further deterrent to those who seek to engage in 
fraudulent operations.”47  
 
Thompson argued that “We are to be governed by experts for our own good.”48 
Moreover, the Roskill Committee used not a real jury but a mock jury to 
examine the limited comprehension of jurors because of the regulation by 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
49
 This leaded to the criticism of 
                                                   
46
 See Roskill (n 2) 150-51 
47
 Ibid 147 
48
 Thompson (n 44) 13. 
49
 See Lord Roskill (n 2) 142 
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the persuasiveness and quality of the Roskill Committee’s research.50 The 
suggestion that introduced the idea of Fraud Trials Tribunal was not 




b.) The Auld Report   
 
Following the defeat of the Roskill Committee’s proposal for ‘Fraud Trial 
Tribunals,’ the movement to abolish fraud trials by jury has still continued. The 
Runciman Commission stated that “Juries should no longer be used for trials of 
complex and serious fraud.”52 There were some specific proposals, including 
the introduction of a new straightforward offence of fraud, which would make 
cases easier to present to juries, or a system of smaller fraud juries composed of 




In 1999, Lord Justice Auld and his Committee conceived another “fact-finding 
tribunal”54 which would replace the existing fraud trial by jury. His attempt was 
considered more radical than those of previous Commissions. His proposal 
included creating two types of new fraud tribunals.
55
         
                                                   
50
 For example, see Terry Honess, ‘Juror competence in processing complex information: 
implications from a simulation of the Maxwell trial’ (1998) Criminal Law Review 763, 
765 
51
 See Peter Thornton, ‘Trial by jury: 50 years of change’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 683, 
696-697 
52
 Runciman Report (n 3) 
53
 See Robert Rice, ‘Jury Role in Fraud Trials to Be Probed’ the Financial Times (London, 
21 September 1996) 
54
 David Corker, ‘Trying fraud cases without juries’ (2002) Criminal Law Review 283, 283. 
See also Robin Auld, A Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (2001)  
Ministry of Justice, Chapter 5 (The so-called Auld Report)  
55
 One is the trial by judge alone which treats highly complicated fraud cases. Another is  




Based on the Auld Report, the White Paper Justice for All was published.
56
 This 
White Paper concurred with the proposal for the new tribunal by judge alone 
without jury for complicated fraud cases.
57
 Referring to the Auld Report and 
this White Paper, Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was enacted. 
 
c.) Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 proposed the fraud trial by judge 
alone in certain cases when requested by the prosecution at a preparatory 
hearing. Specifically, Section 43(5) stated that “If the complexity of the trial or 
the length of the trial (or both) is likely to make the trial so burdensome to the 
members of a jury hearing the trial that the interests of justice require that 
serious consideration,”58 the trial may be conducted without a jury.  
 
4.) Subsequent developments: the reasons for the denial of Section 43 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 by Parliament 
 
Lord Falconer claimed the Government was not arguing that juries lack the 
capability to understand serious fraud cases.
59
 He continued “Fraud trials can 
                                                                                                                                           
fraud trials. In detail, see also Auld (n 54) 143, 177 and 232, etc. In addition, see 
Thornton (n 51) 697 
56
 See Justice for All (n 12) 
57
 However, the White Paper does not concur with the establishment of ‘District Division’ 
because the paper considered that it will be difficult to recruit the expertises who have the 
financial knowledge and it seems to take time consuming. Ibid 75 
58
 See Section 43(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
59
 See The Times, (London, 3 December 2002) 
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last more than a year and it is too onerous to ask jurors to take months or years 
out of their lives on such cases.”60 However, Section 43 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 caused further discussion because it would eventually abolish a 
criminal jury trial in specific fraud cases. 
 
Kirk predicted non-jury criminal trial in case of serious and complex fraud cases 
will work very well and achieve shorten and cheaper trial, although the 
conviction rate on those case will increased.
61
 In addition, he estimated 
prosecutors and judges will agree with dozens of applications for non-jury 
trial.
62
 Lord Goldsmith, then Attorney General, actively suggested passing the 
Fraud (Trials Without a Jury) Bill 2006-2007 which would abolish trial by jury 
in prime criminal fraud cases and replace section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003. However, the bill was subject to criticism. This was because the standard 
which distinguished serious or less serious frauds was perceived as awkward, 
without any realistic method of deciding law to put serious frauds into different 
category.
63
 Therefore, the bill was defeated in the House of Lords in March 
2007. Even now, introducing a non-jury criminal trial in case of serious and 






                                                   
60
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 See JUSTICE, the Law Society and the General Council of the Bar, Preserve The Right 
To Jury Trials (2005) 1 
64
 Section 113 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 repealed Section 43 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. 
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5.) Improving the jury’s understanding of serious and complex fraud cases 
 
Lord Devlin suggested that, non-jury criminal trials in the case of serious and 
complex fraud cases, “mean that those accused of fraud were placed at a 
disadvantage as compared with the ordinary accused.”65 To address the 
problems of serious and complex fraud trial by jury without proposing non-jury 
criminal trials, he argued the court must take several means to improve a jury’s 
understanding of the complicated fraud case.  
 
Black’s research found that passing jurors a glossary explaining the technical, 
legal and financial terms of the serious and complex fraud case in plain language, 
before the trial starts, could be an efficient way to improve jurors’ 
understanding.
66
 According to Black, the glossary would be inexpensive.
67
 The 
idea has been shared with Runciman Commission which concluded that, “In 
complex cases, and in all cases where there has been a preparatory hearing, we 
recommend that the judge should consider whether one or more written 
documents might with advantage be given to jury.”68 Moreover, the Runciman 
Commission suggested that, written guidance on legal points at the summing up 





                                                   
65
 Patrick Devlin, ‘Trial by jury for fraud’ (1986) 6(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 311, 
314 
66
 See Black (n 24) 7 
67
 Ibid 15 
68
 Runciman Report (n 3) 134 
69
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Wright et al. stated that the use of well-designed graphs and simpler language in 
the presentation for a jury by parties at a serious and complex fraud would 
improve jurors’ understanding of facts: for example, “a graph which has 
informative captions, clearly labelled axes, grid lines, and make appropriate use 
of colour.”70 The Runciman Commission suggested a similar idea: 
“Technological aids, such as charts or tables that can be shown in colour on 
visual display units, should always be provided where this would assist in the 
presentation of complicated facts to the jury.”71 
 
Finally, there has been an idea of ‘special jury’ for complex fraud trials. A 
special jury for fraud trials was introduced by Juries Act 1825. It was composed 
of the people who have the status of banker, merchant or esquire.
72
 In 1870, the 
new condition was added to the rule, and a juror “had to occupy property with a 
higher rateable value than was laid down for qualification as a common juror.”73 
There was such a tribunal both on English civil and criminal cases, but it was 
abolished in the Juries Act 1949 except the one for some commercial cases.
74
 
The reason for the abolition was because of the unclear criteria which separated 
a special jury and common jury. Moreover, providing ‘special’ statuses to jurors 
based on the value of their properties was unacceptable in contemporary English 
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 Patricia Wright, Ann Lickorish and Audrey Hull, ‘Presenting Numerical Information to 
Fraud Trial Juries’ in Fraud Trials Committee, Improving the Presentation of Information 
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st
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71
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 However, as the consultation paper stated that “Those whose 
profession and qualifications testify to their having certain skills and abilities 
might, if workable, be more acceptable.”76 If a trial was composed of common 
jurors only, but with an expert witnesses on complex fraud, it will be possible. 
Even if some experts engaged in a serious and complex fraud trial together with 
a jury, it is not necessary that the jury will be influenced by the advice given. 
Nietzel et al. stated that “Jurors appear to give a balanced consideration to expert 
testimony. Their decisions are not dictated by experts, neither are they immune 
to expert’s opinions, especially when these opinions are expressed in 
case-specific language or include clear conclusionary statements.”77 Therefore, 
the idea of introducing a jury trial with some fraud experts in case of a serious 
and complex fraud case should not be excluded. 
 
A non-jury criminal trial in a serious and complex case has not been introduced 
in England. To abolish a traditional jury trial in any certain case could be treated 
as a revolutionary concept in the English society. Therefore, it is understandable 
that the non-jury criminal trial based on Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 has not been enforced so smoothly and easily. In addition, compared with 
jury tampering cases and serious and complex fraud cases, there appeared to be 
more serious and pressing matters, such as to debate and resolve in relation to 
fairness of a jury trial in England recently. 
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 Michael Nietzel, Denis McCarthy and Monica Kern, ‘Juries’ in Ronald Roesch, Stephen 
Hart and James Ogloff (ed), Psychology and Law (Paperback edition, Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999) 44 
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4. The practical weaknesses of jury trials—contempt of court committed by 
jurors  
 
The previous chapter suggested that there are certain types of complex cases that 
are difficult for a juror to understand. According to the Crown Court Study, 91 
per cent of jurors said it was not difficult for them to understand the evidence in 
a trial.
1
 Despite this exceptionally high rate, no one has yet examined whether 
the jurors actually understood the evidence in the trial. 
 
Gleisser suggested that, “It is apparent that a juror often is influenced not only 
by the facts in a case but also in the relationship of those facts to the juror’s 
personal attitudes toward certain crimes.”2 If a juror decides a case by using any 
information or own knowledge outside of the court evidence, will it be a 
perverse verdict? Fenwick and Phillipson indicate that, “Residual possibility of a 
miscarriage of justice was … the necessary price to be paid for the preservation 
and protection of the jury system.”3 However, is such a risk of miscarriage of 
justice really legitimated as the necessary price? This chapter will examine the 
perverse verdicts and miscarriages of justice that constitute contempt of court 
committed by jurors in the age of the Internet and assess the quality of a 
contemporary English jury as an appropriate decision-making body.  
 
                                                   
1
 See the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Crown Court Study (1993) HMSO  
Research Study No.19, 206 
2
 Marcus Gleisser, Juries and Justice, (1
st
 edition, Barnes, 1968) 174 
3
 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (1
st
 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2006) 231 
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1.) Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 
 
According to Black’s law dictionary, contempt is defined as a “conduct that 
defies the authority or dignity of a court or legislature.”4 To assure fairness in a 
trial, the court may need to monitor carefully whether the jury verdicts were 
perverse or not. As Johnston et al. state that “Broadly speaking, the courts in 
common law countries will allow an appeal from a jury verdict when extraneous 
information has been accessed by a juror or jurors and it would be unsafe to 
allow the verdict to stand.”5 How can the court ascertain each juror’s attitude 
and state of mind in the decision-making process? For example, prior to a trial, 
to eliminate the prejudiced jurors, the judge sometimes uses questionnaires for 
selection.
6




Moreover, Johnston et al. indicate “In the United Kingdom, a court can direct its 
registrar to ask the Criminal Cases Review Commission to conduct an 
investigation of a jury and its deliberations to inform itself on appeal, should 
that be required.”8 The Commission has the power to send criminal cases back 
                                                   
4
 Bryan Garner (ed), Black’s law dictionary (9
th
 edition, 2009) 360 
5
 Jane Johnston, Patrick Keyzer, Geoffrey Holland, Mark Pearson, Sharon Rodrick, and 
Ann Wallace, Juries and Social Media: a report prepared for the Victorian Department of 
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 For instance, see R v Maxwell [1995] Transcript of pre-trial ruling (27 April 1995) 
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 See R v Tracey Andrews [1995] Crim LR 156 and commentary at 157 
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 Johnston et al. (n 5) 13. The Criminal Appeal Act 1995 established this independent 
public body “to review the miscarriages of justice in the criminal courts of England, Wales 
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Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2015) 
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to an appeal court to hear the case again. Needless to say, an appellant has only 
one opportunity to appeal his or her offence. The Commission has the power to 
refer a case back to the appeal courts for a fresh appeal. In other words, the 
Commission gives appellants the final chance to testify the existence of a 
miscarriage of justice in his or her case and ask for a repeal of misjudge by the 
Court of Appeal or a jury. Nevertheless, it is difficult for the court to monitor 
thoroughly whether a juror researched or revealed information on the case by 
using the Internet or any social media.  
 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had severely restricted revealing of 
information on the jury deliberation to the outside including media and 
academics.
9
 It had also regulated the jurors’ private research on the cases and 
their based on Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.  
 
The direct trigger of the enactment of Section 8 was Attorney General v New 
Statesman & Nation Publishing Co Ltd (1981.)
10
 One of the jurors in the trial 
that acquitted the previous Liberal Democratic Party leader Jeremy Thorpe of 
conspiracy to murder, revealed information on the proceedings to the New 
Statesman magazine in 1979. This trial was high in the spotlight at that time. 
The magazine conducted an interview with the juror, asking “how the jury had 
                                                                                                                                           
2015. Based on Sections 17 to 22 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, the Commission has 
the power to obtain information from public bodies such as police, the Crown Prosecution 
Service, social services, local councils and the NHS. 
9
 The Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was repealed by Section 74(2) of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, however, the severe restrictions towards the 
disclosure of jury deliberation remains prominent. See below 
10
 Attorney General v New Statesman& Nation Publishing Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 644, 
[1981] QB 1 
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reached its decision.”11 In the case, the judgment held that the publishing of the 
article in the magazine was not regarded as contempt of court because it did not 
“imperil the finality of jury verdicts or to affect adversely the attitude of future 
jurors or the quality of their deliberations of the trial.”12 After the judgment, the 
Government immediately moved to enact the new clause; Section 8 of the 




Section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 stated that “It is a contempt of 
court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions 
expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course 
of their deliberations in any legal proceedings.”14 A breach of the Section 8 




Cram suggests two main reasons for this severe regulation. Firstly, if it 
introduced prejudicial information into jury deliberations, the rules of evidence 
will be undermined.
16
 Moreover, if such a prejudicial information was used at 
                                                   
11
 Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Cheryl Thomas, ‘The Continuing Decline of the English Jury’ 
in Neil Vidmar (ed), World Jury systems (Reprinted edition, Oxford University Press, 
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 Michael Zander, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (10
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 edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 536 
13
 See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 11) 
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st
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the jury deliberation, there will be no opportunity for parties to challenge the 
products of jurors’ private research.17 Secondly, if a retrial was ordered because 
of the outside interference, it will be unnecessarily costly.
18
 In addition to this 
financial loss, Cram has pointed out that, “There will be also a risk of additional 
trauma for victims and witnesses caught up in the proceedings when they have 
to return to court at a later date.”19 It could add to these advantages, as New 
Zealand Law Commission stated that the severe secrecy of jury deliberations 
may avoid the abuse or assault to the specific juror after the trial by the parties 




a.) Revealing the secrecy of jury deliberation to the media and researchers 
 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had severely prohibited a juror 
from revealing the secrecy of jury deliberation to the outside, including to the 
media. No press investigation into a jury deliberation is permitted once a verdict 
is launched.
21
 Lord Falconer has pointed out that “The secrecy of the jury’s 
deliberations has long been regarded as a cornerstone of the legal system.”22 
Jurors must not discuss anything about their cases with their family and 
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 See New Zealand Law Commission, ‘Juries in Criminal Trials Part Two’ (1999) 
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 See R v Qureshi [2001] EWCA Crim 1807, [2002] 1 WLR 518; Attorney General v 
Scotcher [2005] UKHL 36, [2005] 3 All ER 1, [2005] 1 WLR 1867; Attorney General v 
Seckerson [2009] EWHC 1023 (Admin), [2009] EMLR 371, [2009] All ER (D) 106 
(May) 
22
 Charles Falconer, ‘Foreword’ in Department for Constitutional Affairs, Jury Research 
and Impropriety (1
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 Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had prohibited any 
enquiry into jury deliberations and made illegal the systematic research of juror 
by observation and/or recording of their deliberations.
24
 Secrecy of jury 
deliberation assures jurors that their discussion will not be revealed and that 
other people outside will not intimidate them.
25
 If the secrecy of jury 
deliberations is assured, the jury will be able to keep their privacy and security.
26
 
As the Lord Chief Justice states that “Our arrangements proceed on the basis 
that everything that has been said in the course of these discussions must remain 
confidential to the members of the jury. And because they remain confidential to 
the jury, and are known to be so, the exchange of frank views and opinions is 
encouraged.”27 
  
Needless to say, a jury deliberation is the final part of a trial. As the Law 
Commission indicates, “Prohibiting the disclosure of deliberations prevents the 
reopening of cases and a subsequent ‘retrial’ by media, especially following an 
acquittal.”28 Cram and Taylor state that “English courts have long warned 
against ‘trial by media’ reflecting a concern that sensational and/or selective 
reporting may prevent defendants receiving a fair trial.”29 As the Law 
                                                   
23
 See the Law Commission, ‘Contempt of Court: A Consultation Paper’ (2012) 
Consultation Paper No. 209, 64 
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 See Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (n 11) and Zander (n 12) 513 
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 See Falconer (n 22) 3 
26
 See the Law Commission (n 23) 83 
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 Attorney General v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570, [2011] 2 Cr App R 21 at [33] 
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 The Law Commission (n 23)  
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Commission has pointed out, limits on media coverage are necessary to protect 
the administration of justice and a fair trial.
30
 Because of this, jurors are able to 
express their opinion freely in jury deliberations keeping their privacy “without 
fear of ridicule or recriminations.”31  
 
An old case in relation to this topic is R v Armstrong (1922).
32
 In this case, a 
juror revealed and published what happened in a jury trial through an interview 
to some newspapers after the trial was prosecuted. In the case, Lord Hewart 
stated his opinion in the obiter dictum of the judgment; this juror’s action was 
mostly improper, deplorable and dangerous.
33
 According to Williams, this is 
because Lord Hewart was concerned that disclosures by a juror would damage 




Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 followed this severe attitude 
toward the secrecy of jury deliberation. If the law permitted the media to 
approach any juror during the trial process, reporters could intentionally or 
unintentionally supply the juror with some information on the case, which might 
influence the jury’s verdict and create prejudices toward the defendant in the 
juror’s mind. This would place the fairness of criminal trials at risk. If the media 
violates the rule, they will need to be punished strictly and face penalties with 
                                                                                                                                           
ternet> accessed 8 March 2015 
30
 See the Law Commission (n 23) 1 
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 Ibid 83 
32








heavy fines or jail.
35
 In so stating this, the Section 8 of the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981 had sought to avoid any perverse verdicts and assure the credibility of 
jury deliberations. According to Vidmar, “In practice, reporting constitutes 
contempt only if the reporting gives rise to a ‘substantial risk’ that the trial will 
be ‘seriously impeded or biased.’”36  
 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had also severely restricted 
academic research on jury deliberations. For instance, in Attorney General v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd,
37
 the House of Lords affirmed the judgment to 
impose a fine on the owners of the Mail on Sunday for contempt when they 
published a juror’s story in the Blue Arrow fraud trial. The information was not 
gathered from the juror directly. It was taken from “transcripts of paid 
interviews purportedly carried out by a researcher.”38 Nonetheless, the House of 
Lords recognised that this alleged distance made no difference. It is still 
contempt, regardless of whether the information about the jury’s deliberation is 




Why had the Contempt of Court Act 1981 so strictly restricted research on jury 
deliberations? The Government has assumed that if not only the media, but also 
the researchers make contact with jurors freely, they will influence jury verdicts 
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 Attorney General v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1994] 1 All ER 556 
38
 Zander (n 12) 537 
39
 See Attorney General v Associated Newspapers Ltd (n 37) and Robin Auld, A Review of 
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on a case. Moreover, there is no assurance that researchers will not influence the 
jury both consciously and unconsciously, even if the researchers might be 
specialists in the jury system and know the rules of secrecy of jury deliberations. 
The severe restriction on jury research has been legitimised by the court and the 
Government, in the same way as the media restriction on jury deliberations.
40
 
Meanwhile, it cannot be denied that the Section has become a considerable 
obstacle for academic research on trial by jury.
41
 This is because even though 
academic scholars or researchers hold interviews of the jurors on jury 
deliberations for academic purposes, no exemptions of this Section have been 
permitted in England.
42
 Thus, there are many criticisms of severe limitations by 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 on academic researches into jury 
deliberations. For example, Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas have pointed out that, 
the increasing voices for a relaxation of this severe Section 8 in order to 
academic researches on the English jury system.
43
 Zander raised three reasons 
for the necessity for the relaxation: 
 
One is general ‘academic’ interest in how an important institution works with 
no preconceptions and no axes to grind. Another is to test whether the jury 
system ‘works’ –is it a sensible process in a sufficiently high proportion of cases 
                                                   
40
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to justify its retention. A third is to see whether the jury system or the rules of 




Zander notes that to meet these requests from the academic establishment, the 
Runciman Commission suggested that, Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981 needs to be amended to allow “authorised research”45 in the jury 
deliberation. Conversely, a later Committee chaired by Lord Justice Auld in 




Thornton argues that, Section 8 had been a hugely extensive restriction on jury 
research.
47
 Not only is it ‘extensive’ in this sense, but Section 8 had also raised 
other problems. There is no way to get information on jury deliberations for 
academic use other than by acquiring it from judges, lawyers, or police 
officers.
48
 They are all legal ‘professionals,’ unlike jurors, who are lay people. 
It is impossible to research and acquire an exact image of the jury as a group of 
lay people from information gathered from these professionals. In other words, 
most research on jury deliberation and decision-making by a jury could be 
hearing from shadow juries or mock juries. These lay people are not the actual 
jurors, participating in the whole process of jury trial; thus, there are risks that 
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information gathered from them is unreliable. Moreover, as Young predicted 
that, “Mock juries do not have the responsibility of making real decisions and 
are not exposed to real defendants and victims.”49 Slapper has pointed out that, 
no proper empirical research on the process of decision-making by a jury in a 
jury deliberation has been existed, because of the severe restriction by the 




It cannot be denied that there is a great possibility that a large amount of existing 
research on the process of trial by jury might be incorrect and unreal. For 
example, as Zander stated that nobody can predict how frequent serious 
impropriety occurred in jury deliberations.
51
 This constitutes a substantial crisis 
for academic research on this area. To remedy the situation, there has been a 
specific proposal to relax the severe restriction. For example, Daly and 
Pattenden suggested all the jury deliberations should be recorded by tapes 
routinely.
52
 They put several conditions on this new rule, for instance, tapes 
should never be released publicly and only the parties can access to an edited 
transcript from the recording, and the access is permitted by the Court of Appeal 
if the allegation of bias was plausible.
53
 However, the theory of the Government 
has not been changed: “Greater openness carries risks.”54 While the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981 attempted to assure fairness and credibility of jury 
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deliberations and protect privacy and secrecy in the trials,
55
 the severe 
restriction on interview individual jurors has ironically adversely affected 
potentially useful research that could improve the system of jury trial as a 
whole.  
 
b.) Pre-publicity influence on a jury 
 
Grieve states that it will be unlikely for a juror to have the opportunities to see 
prejudiced material, unless they spontaneously researched it.
56
 It is clear that he 
unfortunately underestimated the facts. As Lieberman et al. suggest, “In high 
profile trials, the media may report on the person’s background including any 
prior criminal record, their actions before and after the crime was committed, 
details of the case, and perhaps most damaging, opinions regarding the likely 
guilt or innocence of the accused made by legal experts and others. Those 
commenting on the case may go out of their way to publicly shame and 
excoriate the suspect/defendant.”57 Similarly, Devine has sharply pointed out 
“A basic question about pretrial publicity is which side it tends to favor, and the 
answer is: not the defendant’s.”58 Lloyd-Bostock’s empirical research clearly 
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confirmed the close relationship between a defendant’s previous criminal 
convictions and a juror’s prejudice. She argued that, revealing previous 




Lieberman et al. state that “A variety of remedies have been used to deal with 
the problem of pretrial publicity, such as delaying the start of the trial with a 
continuance, moving the trial to a different community, removing biased 
prospective jurors during voir dire, and delivering judicial admonitions to ignore 
the publicity.”60 These remedies, however, have been not so efficient or rarely 




According to Zander, English law traditionally takes the severe position against 
publishing pre-trial material by the media.
62
 Section 8 of the Contempt of Court 
Act required a juror not to be prejudiced by any information except evidence in 
the trial. Zander states that “It is a principle of fundamental importance both at 
common law and under the European Convention on Human Rights that the trial 
of an accused person must not be prejudiced by inappropriate pre-trial publicity 
or by publication of prejudicial material during the trial itself.”63 Even though it 
is difficult for the court to prove that the media’s intention to prejudice and 
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damage a fair trial, the media is liable for contempt of court.
64
 Vidmar stated 
that by Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, English law has severely 
restricted media reports on jury trials until the time when the judgment is 
made.
65
 Attorney General v Birmingham Post and Mail Ltd was an example of 
the court’s strict attitude towards the media’s pretrial publicity. In the trial, the 
judge discharged a jury because a newspaper article suggested that a murder was 
carried out by members of a notorious gang although it had not identified any of 
the defendants.
66
 The court ordered the newspaper company to pay a fine of 
£20,000.
67
 According to Vidmar, the “impact”68 of section 8 of the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981 involved two elements: “what, when, and how the media may 
publish materials about court proceedings; and what jurors may disclose about 
the jury’s deliberations.”69 
 
c.) Private research by a juror in a trial and the jury’s Internet and social 
media use  
 
A Sidney Lumet’s 12 Angry Men (1957) showed that the Juror No.8, played by 
Henry Fonda, researched evidence to demonstrate his view of the defendant’s 
innocence by privately purchasing a knife. The conscience and passion for 
fairness and justice of the juror No.8 moved audiences deeply, although the film 
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was a fiction. However, if a juror did a similar action to that of Juror No.8 in an 
English criminal trial, he or she would be accused of contempt of court.  
According to Crown Court Bench Book, in terms of the principle of the open 
justice, private research by a juror on evidence is problematic and unfair because 
the parties in a trial would not be aware of the juror’s private research and the 
parties would not able to respond to the result of the private research.
70
 In other 
words, that will result “something that is wholly contrary to the adversarial 
nature of criminal trial.”71 Therefore, Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981 strictly prohibited a jury’s private research on the case during the jury 
service term. 
 
According to the Law Commission, contempt of court covers “a wide variety of 
conduct which undermines or has the potential to undermine the course of 
justice.”72 The use of the Internet and social media by a juror could ‘undermine 
the course of justice.’ 
 
It would seem impossible for most people not to use the Internet in 
contemporary English society. According to Thomas’s empirical research, 78 
per cent of jurors stated that they had used the Internet in some way during their 
trial.
73
 Jurors will check emails and information about their interests during 
their jury service term. Needless to say, the Internet is so convenient for a juror 
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Social media has also been popular in contemporary English society. Kaplan 
and Haenlein define social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that 
build on the ideological and technological foundations of [the worldwide web] 
which allows the creation and exchange of user-generated content.”75 Jurors 
will use social media applications such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs to 
communicate with their family and friends.
76
 However, these actions could be 
problematic in some situations. As the Lord Judge argues that, modern 
technology has not been invented without any risks.
77
 Therefore, he continues, 
“In the context of current technology, we must be astute to preserve the integrity 
of jury trial and the jury system.”78 
 
As Grieve asserts that, jurors must not search any extraneous information about 
the case because they have sworn to find the facts only based on the evidence in 
their trial.
79
 Therefore, the prospective jurors are required not to “discuss the 
evidence with anyone outside your jury either face to face, over the telephone or 
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over the internet via social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter or 
Myspace.”80 
  
Unlike a traditional newspaper, it is easy for a juror to search articles in relation 
to the case online. For example, in R v McCluskey, an appeal was affirmed 
because it revealed that a juror used a mobile phone during the deliberation.
81
 In 
this age of the Internet, a juror can collect information on the case via the 
Internet that is separate from the evidence in the trial. Such information then 
flows into jury deliberation. This had been also severely restricted by Section 8 
of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. According to empirical research by Thomas, 
38 per cent answered ‘YES’ for the question: do you recall any recent news 
stories about jurors acting improperly? It could be said that this constitutes a 




According to the Lord Chief Justice, “Even assuming the accuracy and 
completeness of this information (which, in reality, would be an unwise 
assumption) its use by a juror exposes him to the risk of being influenced, even 
unconsciously, by whatever emerges from the internet.”83 Thomas defines that 
the complex problem; “In high profile cases there are likely to be internet news 
reports that many jurors cannot avoid, especially for jurors regularly obtain 
news online or access their emails through websites that contain headline news. 
This passive awareness is no different from jurors coming across stories in 
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relation to their case in the print newspapers or on television or hearing reports 
on the radio.”84 The jurors’ passive awareness will occur more frequently than 
active searching on their verdicts. In the social media age, they may receive 
“unsolicited tweets”85 about the case involuntarily or accidentally. Moreover, 
Thomas’s empirical research shows that more jurors on high profile cases used 




According to Thomas, only one per cent of jurors looked for information about 
parties in the case.
87
 On the other hand, as the Law Commission has pointed out, 
“The internet and social media may make it easier for friends, families and 
others to identify and communicate with jurors to solicit information about their 
jury service.”88 The way for a jury to release the information has been changed 
dramatically in recent years by the frequent use of social media.
89
 Thomas 
found that three per cent of jurors discussed jury service on Facebook and or 
Twitter.
90
 Indeed, as the Law Commission states that “The advent of the 
internet has had a profound impact on a juror’s ability and opportunity to seek or 
disclose information related to their trial.”91 These actions create risks of 
bringing perverse verdicts.  
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According to Grieve, it will not necessarily constitute an offence if a juror uses 
the Internet during their service.
92
 Thomas also maintains it will not constitute 
contempt immediately even though a juror actively searched for information 
about the judge, prosecutors and defence teams.
93
 As the Lord Chief Justice 
states in the judgment of R v Frail that, “The problem therefore is not the 
internet: the potential problems arise from the activities of jurors who disregard 
the long established principles which underpin the right of every citizen to a fair 
trial.”94 Moreover, a juror’s social media use has risks to shake the process of 
judicial decision-making. For instance, in 2008, a criminal juror in a child 
abduction and assault trial at Burnley Crown Court, Lancashire, posted her 
Facebook to ask her Facebook ‘friends’ to poll whether the defendants were 
guilty or not-guilty because she cannot decide.
95
 The court received anonymous 
report on this juror misconduct, thus the trial judge dismissed her. 
 
As the Law Commission has pointed out, “There is already evidence that some 
jurors ignore the trial judge’s warnings and actively seek prejudicial material on 
the internet or in the media about the defendant whom they are trying. Such 
jurors –who may already have limited respect for the rules of evidence and the 
need to approach the case with an unbiased perspective– may be reluctant to 
convict a publisher in respect of publications which prejudice a fair trial, given 
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that they themselves may be blind to the risk of becoming prejudiced.”96 Thus, 
a juror’s improper use of the Internet would entail miscarriages of justice. The 
risk of causing miscarriages of justice by a jury would increase if it was 
approved for a jury to use the Internet and social media during a trial without 
any efficient restriction by law and the judge’s direction. The Ministry of 
Justice’s report indicates that, “The consequences of juror misconduct and the 
availability of prejudicial material online are potentially very serious; 
miscarriages of justice may raise; giving rise to a risk of the acquittal of the 
guilty and conviction of the innocent, or may give rise to appeals or aborted 
trials which prolong the prosecution process and result in substantial costs. 
There is also a lack of clarity in the legislation for publishers on rules regarding 
the availability of prejudicial material online, problems which are made worse 
by the increasing use of the Internet and social media.”97 Therefore, the Lord 
Chief Justice suggests in R v Dallas, “Misuse of the internet by a juror is always 
a most serious irregularity, and an effective custodial sentence is virtually 
inevitable. The objective of such a sentence is to ensure that the integrity of the 
process of trial by jury is sustained.”98 
  
In addition, the court has severely restricted jurors from using any electronic 
devices during the trial and deliberation. However, according to the Law 
Commission, “Different court centres appear to operate different systems in 
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respect of jurors’ internet-enabled devices.”99 This uncertainty and 
inconsistency are a problem. Moreover, as Thomas has pointed out, monitoring 
externally the Internet use by all the jurors during trial is impossible.
100
 Cram 
predicted that it is unlikely to stop the private research by a juror who uses the 
Internet and social media.
101
 He stated that “What if, in any given criminal trial, 
there are four or five jurors who have separately conducted private research and 
conceal this fact from their co-jurors?”102 It is necessary to create effective 
measures by which the court can restrict jurors’ Internet and social media use, in 
order to assure a fair trial and justice. 
 
2.) The contemporary case study of perverse jury verdicts  
 
Lieberman et al. suggest “One clear axiom to emerge from social science 
research on human behavior is that people’s judgments are often fueled, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, by a wide variety of biases and heuristic 
processes.”103 Indeed, although a trial judge needs to direct a jury not to rely on 
any facts and information except evidence in the trial, there were some cases in 
which a juror did not follow the judge’s direction, perverted the verdicts and 
raised miscarriages of justice intentionally and unintentionally. As a classic case 
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of the jury misconduct, it could raise Vaise v Delaval in 1785.
104
 In this case, 
two jurors indicated in their affidavits that they tossed a coin to decide their 
verdicts in the jury deliberation. The court stated that two jurors’ action was 
highly misdemeanor. This section will introduce four well-known contemporary 
English criminal jury cases, which constituted contempt of court. 
 
R v Young 
 
R v Young was one of the typical examples of perverse jury verdicts.
105
 Since 
the jury could not reach a verdict on the first day of their jury deliberation, jurors 
were accommodated overnight at a hotel. In the hotel, some jurors used an ouija 
board in their decision-making process, “purporting to ask questions of and to 
receive answers from one of the deceased.”106 The defendant, Stephen Andrew 
Young, was unanimously convicted by the jury of two murders and sentenced as 
jailed for life. The perverseness of a jury verdict was revealed to the outside by 
anonymous information from other jurors after the judgment. Therefore, the 
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal from the defendant against the conviction. 
The Court of Appeal stated that “The answers obtained from the ouija board 
went to the heart of the case and were strongly adverse to the appellant, there 
was a real danger that what had occurred might have influenced some jurors and 
thereby have prejudiced the appellant.”107 Therefore, the court abandoned the 
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original verdicts and ordered a new trial. Eventually, the new jury convicted the 
defendant again, but in a fair trial.  
 
R v Pryce and Huhne 
 
R v Pryce and Huhne in 2013 was one of the most sensational recent cases in the 
English courts.
108
 The defendants were a divorced couple, one of whom was a 
well-known economist and the other a high-ranking Liberal Democrat politician. 
The trial has led to a question of the appropriateness of a jury in certain criminal 
cases.  
 
Vicky Pryce was a senior economist and the ex-wife of Chris Huhne, the 
previous British Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. In March 
2003, Huhne was driving a car that was caught speeding by a speed camera on 
the motorway. If Huhne had taken his penalty points, he would have lost his 
driving licence since he had already accumulated several penalty points. To 
avoid damaging his public image, Huhne asked Pryce to accept his speed 
penalty ticket instead of him. Pryce followed his request and signed the form for 
police. The form specified that the driver was Pryce, not her husband. 
 
After their marriage collapsed, Pryce revealed some of the facts of this incidence 
to The Sunday Times.
109
 Police launched an investigation of the previous couple 
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and charged them with the joint offence of perverting the course of justice. 
Before the Pryce case came to trial, Huhne pleaded guilty, and he resigned his 
position as a member of the House of Commons. Pryce pleaded not guilty to 
pervert the course of justice. She insisted Huhne had coerced her to take the 
penalty points on his behalf. Pryce opted for the defence of marital coercion 
claiming Huhne offered her no choices at the time.
110
  The trials of Pryce and 
Huhne were heard at Southwark Crown Court, London in the early months of 
2013. 
 
One unprecedented aspect of the trial was that the jury put ten questions to the 
trial judge before the fourth day of their deliberations. Prior to the jury 
deliberations, the judge gave directions and advice for the jury to use when 
deciding their verdicts. All the questions were on the basic tasks of a jury. The 
questions made the R v Pryce and Huhne case a “fairly unique situation in which 
the jury attempted to understand the fundamental purpose of their presence.”111 
 
One jurors’ question was “whether a juror could reach a verdict based on a 
reason not presented in court that has no facts or evidence to support it, either 
from the prosecution or defence.”112 The judge’s answer was ‘definitely NO.’ It 
was against the jurors’ oath to decide the verdict on anything other than the 
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 The jury also asked “Can we speculate about events at the time 
Vicky Pryce signed the form saying she was the driver or what was in her mind 
at that time?”114 The answer of the judge was ‘NO’ again. The jurors “were 
entitled to draw inferences from reliable facts but not speculate, which was 
guesswork.”115 
 
In addition, the jurors asked “Please advise on which facts in the bundle the jury 
shall consider to determine a not guilty or guilty verdict.”116 In response, the 
judge advised the jurors “to review all the evidence to decide which of it you 
consider to be important, truthful and reliable and then decide what conclusions, 
common sense conclusions, you can safely draw by way of inference, from that 
evidence.”117 He continued, “It is not part of my function because I am the 
judge of the law, not, as you are, the judges of the facts to tell you which piece 
or pieces of evidence are important and which are not.”118 
 
Some of the jurors’ questions concerned the obvious duties of a jury; others 
were more peculiar. For example, they asked the judge, “Can you define what is 
reasonable doubt?”119 The judge answered; “A reasonable doubt is a doubt 
which is reasonable. They are ordinary English words that the law doesn’t allow 
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me to help you with beyond the written directions that I have already given.”120 
The jurors also asked, “Would religious conviction be a good enough reason for 
a wife feeling that she had no choice? [For example,] she promised to obey her 
husband in her wedding vows and he had ordered her to do something and she 
felt she had to obey?” The judge answered “This is not, with respect, a question 
about this case at all.”121 He added, “Ms Pryce does not say that any such 
reasoning formed any part of her decision to do what she did and the answer to 
this question will therefore not help you in any way whatsoever to reach a true 
verdict in this case.”122 In his conclusion, the judge used strong words: “I must 
direct you firmly to focus on the real issues in this case and thereby to reach a 
true verdict according to the evidence.”123 Andrew Edis, QC, the prosecutor of 
the case argued these unprecedented questions clearly indicated that the jurors 




The jury discussed the trial for thirteen hours and forty-eight minutes, over 
several days. The judge warned the jury “If for any reason one or more of you 
feel less than confident that you understand and are able to apply my directions 
of law, then it would be wholly wrong for any juror in that position to reach a 
verdict one way or the other.”125 Although the judge told the jurors he would 
accept a majority verdict, they could not lead to a verdict and were discharged 
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from their duties. The judge stated that “the absolute fundamental deficits which 
the questions demonstrate”126 the roles as jurors and the trial process. 
 
After the discharge, the new jury was eventually led to a unanimous guilty 
verdict. The jurors understood Pryce could have rejected her husband’s order to 
accept the speeding points if she had really wished to refuse it.
127
 The jury 
found Pryce was “an accomplice in the scam.”128 The court sentenced both 




R v Pryce and Huhne was seen to undermine the credibility of the English 
criminal jury system. In addition, the trial highlighted several complex aspects 
of the English criminal jury system. Firstly, at the beginning of a new jury trial, 
the judge told the new jurors “to put out of their minds anything they had 
learned of the first jury’s failure to reach a verdict.”130 This was not realistic. R 
v Pryce and Huhne was a highly profiled case in England and media had 
broadcast news about it nearly every day for weeks. It was almost impossible 
not to assume that the jurors already knew why they were summoned after the 
discharge of their predecessors and about the unprecedented ten questions at the 
previous trial. The jury’s duty was to make an effort to lead to a verdict purely 
based on the evidence they heard in the trial, however it must be difficult for 
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 ‘Consider case afresh, Pyrce retrial jury told’ BBC NEWS (London, 25 February 2013) 
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them not to be influenced by information from outside of the court. This raises 




Secondly, putting questions to the judge in itself was not unprecedented. The 
jury is made up of twelve lay people who are not specialists in law. The jury will 
need to put questions to the judge if there are any points that make them unsure. 
The judge has a duty to answer the questions regarding legal procedure from the 
jury by “an effective method,”132 eliminate ambiguity, and help the jurors make 
a fair and credible decision based on the evidence at the trial by using their 
common sense. In this case, Pryce pleaded not-guilty by ‘marital coercion,’ an 
antiquated and minor defence. Jurors might not know what ‘marital coercion’ 
was, or how rarely it occurs in contemporary English criminal trials. The trial 
judge needed to indicate the exceptional nature of the insistence by Pryce clearly 
and in detail. Lord Wolf suggests asking the judge about the definition of 
‘reasonable doubt’ by the jury in the trial of R v Pryce and Huhne was not 
peculiar since the guidance has changed over the years.
133
 Moreover, it could be 
said that not only is it the responsibility of the judge, but also that it is the 
responsibility of the prosecution and the police to collect evidence and explain 
the case much more clearly in such a rare ‘marital coercion’ case.  
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Judges in England have been seen to give their directions more carefully and in 
greater detail after R v Pryce and Huhne. For example, at the trial for William 
Roache in 2014, Justice Holroyde at Preston Crown Court warned jurors not to 
be influenced by anger or sympathy for William Roache, a well-known British 
actor accused of rape and sexual assault on girls aged below sixteen in the late 




Is R v Pryce and Huhne an exceptional case in contemporary jury trials? In 
relation to R v Pryce and Huhne, Thomas states that “Empirical evidence shows 
that this jury was highly exceptional, as hung juries only occur 0.6 per cent of 
the time when juries deliberate.”135 Justice Sweeney, the trial judge of R v Pryce 
and Huhne, states that he had never come across a similar situation in thirty 
years of his career.
136
 Even though R v Pryce and Huhne is counted in this 0.6 
per cent and is an ‘exceptional case,’ its social influence signals a need to 
question the credibility of the English criminal jury system. Joshua Rozenberg, a 
legal journalist, asserts “It may be time to consider whether we are right to 
entrust the most serious criminal cases to the hands of unqualified lay 
people.”137 Similarly, Krik has also pointed out that R v Pryce and Huhne “has 
caused some alarm bells to ring—if the members of a jury cannot reach a verdict 
in what any standards is a simple case, and if they can demonstrate by their 
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questions such a total ignorance of the fundamentals of the jury system, what 
hope is there?”138 
 
It could be said that R v Pryce and Huhne has definitely awakened the 
discussion on the appropriateness of the criminal jury system in twenty-first 
century England. As Rozenberg commented, “If we start to fall out of love with 
juries in the future, this case may be seen as the beginning of the end.”139 
 
R v Fraill  
 
In summer of 2010, Joanne Fraill, a juror of the trial of Jamie Sewart in the 
Crown Court at Manchester did private research on the case by the use of the 
Internet during her jury service.
140
 Moreover, she contacted and entered into a 
conversation with the defendant by Facebook during her jury service. Fraill 
showed her sympathy for the defendant and told the defendant about the 
information on the state of the jury deliberation during this Facebook 
conversation. After the counsel who had acted for Sewart in the trial gave this 
information to the trial judge, the judge discharged the jury as a whole and 
summoned the new jury. Regardless of the judge’s warning in the trial of not to 
use the Internet, Fraill used the Internet and Facebook as a tool of 
communication with the defendant. The misconduct by Fraill constituted 
contempt of court against Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and she 
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was arrested. The Lord Chief Justice argues that “Quite apart from the broad 
considerations of sentences which must protect the jury system generally, the 
particular features of this defendant's actions are that although many verdicts 
had already been delivered by the jury, the verdicts overall were still incomplete, 
and the jury was discharged. Significant public resources were wasted.”141 
According to BBC, the trial cost was £6m.
142
 Eventually, Fraill was sentenced 
to an imprisonment for eight months. Although it was indicated that this case is 
“exceptional,”143 through the sentence, the court seemed to ensure the integrity 




R v Dallas  
 
Theodora Dallas, a university lecturer, read the newspaper that reported the 
information on the trial and did private research on a case in her home during 
her jury service for the trial of Barry Medlock at Luton Crown Court in July 
2010.
145
 Dallas knew that there is a rule that a juror must not research on the 
case privately nor by the use of the Internet, nevertheless, she did private 
research by the use of the Internet and told other jurors during the jury 
deliberation that the defendant in the case had once been accused of rape.
146
 As 
Johnston et al. state that “An incident of this right is that information relating to 
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prior convictions of an accused should not be made available to the jury as it 
may bias their verdict.”147 There was no information about the rape among the 
evidence that was mentioned in the trial. One of the jurors reported this to a 
court staff before the jury verdict was decided, therefore, the jury was 
discharged and the trial was restarted by a new jury. The Lord Chief Justice 
argued that, because of Dallas’s misconduct, the other jurors were suffered by 
unnecessary time-consuming, and the public was expense was additionally and 
unnecessary wasted. It obviously damaged the administration of justice.
148
 
Therefore, Dallas’s misconduct clearly constituted contempt of court, which has 
been reached to the criminal standard.
149
 Dallas was sentenced to six months in 
jail.  
 
After the judgment, Dallas tried to appeal the case to the Supreme Court, 
however it was rejected.
150
 It should be noted that the problem in the trial was 
not only limited to Dallas, and there was another male juror who maintained that 
he had read about the information on the defendant’s previous offence of rape in 
a newspaper.
151
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3.) Comparison with the rules in the US, Australia and New Zealand 
 
Analysing the jury reform on contempt of court in England, it would be 
meaningful to consider the questions: if the severe rules of contempt of court 
committed by jurors have been subject to so much criticism, could it be said that 
the regulations are peculiar ones only in England? And further, how are the 
situations in other common law countries? In this section, the Section 8 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 will be compared with the regulations in the US, 
Australia and New Zealand on contempt of court committed by jurors. 
 
a.) The rules in the US 
 
Around 80 per cent of all criminal and civil jury trials take place in the United 
States.
1
 Therefore, comparison with the American regulations, which are the 
standard for the largest population among the common law countries, could be 
an appropriate and meaningful comparison for an analysis of jury’s misconduct 
and perverse verdicts in England. 
 
According to King, “The American public has always been fascinated by crime 
and criminals, eagerly consuming news of crime before, during, and even after a 
prosecution.”2 Although King has pointed out that, most criminal trials are 
broadcasted only by local media, high profile cases could be pressed actively by 
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the media, the Internet, and social media all over the US.
3
 For American 
citizens, jury trials would be more familiar and closer to their life than for the 
English people. Meanwhile, King has pointed out the concern of the influence of 
publicity on jury verdicts is much greater than in other countries.
4
 He continues 
that “A defendant’s inadmissible confession or prior record, the details of the 
victim’s loss, legal pundits’ speculation about the trial and sentence, reports of 
rulings made outside the hearing of the jury, and other inadmissible information 
may be freely broadcast into the homes and delivered to the doorstep of every 
juror and potential juror prior to and during the trial.”5 Why can the media 
broadcast so freely on information on the defendant and his or her jury trial in 
the US unlike in England? It is all because of the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution. 
 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution assures free press, including 
pre-trial publicity on a defendant and his or her jury trial. This needs to be 
compatible with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which protect a defendant’s 
right to a fair jury trial. In addition, there is the Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) 
which provides that, “During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that 
occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or 
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or 
indictment.”6 However, according to Ruva et al., it is obviously difficult for the 
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courts to take the balance between the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
7
 There have 
been long-standing conflicts and dilemmas between these Amendments.
8
 The 
First Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the 
press except when ‘necessitated by a compelling Governmental interest’, and by 
the measures ‘narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’9 On the other hand, in the 
United States, the publicity on the names of juvenile offenders or victims is 
prohibited.
10
 Similarly, the media restrictions to protect privacy rights of sexual 




The wide range of the guarantee of freedom of press and pretrial publicity in the 
US has a risk of interfering with the defendant’s right to a fair jury trial. Vidmar 
and Hans find that “Compared to jurors who have not been exposed to pretrial 
publicity, those who read or watch substantial amounts of pretrial publicity 
about a case in the mass media are more prone to believe the defendant is 
guilty.”12 In other words, there are foreseeable risks of prejudices in jurors’ 
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minds by pre-trial publicity. Ruva et al. have pointed out that, “Even if jurors are 
instructed not to use information contained in the pre-trial publicity to make 
decisions about guilt, they may be unable to do so because of source memory 
errors or negative impressions they have formed about the defendant. If jurors 
are mistakenly using information provided in pre-trial publicity to make verdict 
decisions, then the defendant cannot receive a fair trial.”13  
 
To resolve these risks, Devine suggests several ways for a judge to maintain a 
fair trial without any prejudice from pretrial publicities: voir dire, continuance, 
judge instructions to jurors, and change of the venue of trial.
14
 In England, voir 
dire called ‘the trial within a trial:’ it is the process to examine the admissibility 
of contested evidences and witnesses to exclude prejudicial ones for a jury.
15
 
However, in the US, voir dire means the process for attorneys to select or reject 
certain prospective jurors to hear the case.
16
 They will choose the most ideal, 
appropriate and preferable jurors for each parties in the case. Thompson has 
pointed out that the length of time for voir dire in the US is more prolonged than 
in England: it sometimes takes more than 20 days in the states, although it 
generally takes less than an hour in England.
17
 During voir dire in the US, the 
judge (in some cases the attorneys) asks prospective jurors several questions in 
order to examine their qualification as jurors, and to confirm whether they 
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prejudice the defendant and cases that would damage the fair jury trial.
18
 
Sometimes, jury selection consultants will support the judge and attorneys with 
the development of such questionnaires.
19
 According to Lieberman and Olson, 
“Rather than relying on gross generalisations of groups of individuals, jury 
selection consultants attempt to identify backgrounds and attitudes of 
individuals who live in the jurisdiction from which the jury will be drawn that 
are relevant to the specific case at hand.”20 
 
In the US, the voir dire procedure tends to be viewed as a very significant 
element to the result of a trial, although a social science research asserted that 
the characteristics of a juror do not have strong influence on jury verdicts.
21
 As 
Ruva et al. have pointed out, “It is important to investigate whether jurors can 
discriminate between information presented at trial and information presented 
prior to trial. If jurors cannot discriminate between these two sources of 
information this is extremely problematic for our criminal justice system.”22 To 
make jurors to distinguish real evidences and their unrealised prejudice, a 
judge’s instructions to a jury could be said important role. 
 
Through the voir dire procedure, the jurors who have been influenced by 
pre-publicity on the case and got a conscious or unconscious prejudice can be 
                                                   
18
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examined and excluded from the jury panel by means of challenge for cause or a 
peremptory challenge.
23
 If expressed information or opinions by a juror seems 
to indicate the person has been prejudiced in the voir dire process, an unlimited 
number of challenges for cause could have been approved by the judge’s 
discretion: this is a challenge for cause.
24
 If the parties feel a strong suspicion 
that a juror is prejudiced without any clear evidence to testify such a doubt, they 
will not need to state any reason for eliminating the certain amount of jurors: 
this is a peremptory challenge.
25
 After the jury selection, the judge will instruct 
jurors to follow his or her instructions not to pay attention to media information 
or other discussions of the case during their jury service, “subject to dismissal 
from the jury should they disobey.”26 
 
In addition, if there is any necessity, the court will not reveal the names and 
addresses of jurors to the parties and the press. In so doing, a juror will be 





According to King, the court can prohibit the media and others from 
approaching jurors and pressing information on jury trial and deliberation in 
most cases.
28
 For instance, in United States v Cleveland, the judgment stated 
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that no juror shall be interviewed by anyone on the jury deliberation without a 
judge’s special order.29 However, it is not prohibited for a juror to release the 
information on the jury trial after the trial has been finished. Even though a 
judge could take several measures for avoiding unfairness in a jury trial which 
are compatible with the guarantee of freedom of press and pre-publicity, is it 
easy for a judge to control jurors’ actions which reveal information on jury trial 
and deliberation to the outside including the media after the trial finished?
30
 In a 
similar manner as a juror, it has been legitimised by the Supreme Court to 
restrict an attorney not to comment on any details about a jury trial after it has 




It is needless to say that the Internet and social media are actively used as a 
popular communication tool in the US as well as in England. For instance, 
according to Grow, a tweet referring to ‘jury duty’ was posted almost every 
three minutes.
32
 He argues, the juror’s Internet and social media use has 
frequently resulted serious perverse jury verdicts and caused numerous 
difficulties for court management by the judge.
33
 Against this new risk of 
perverse verdicts, American courts seem to be not wholly prepared.
34
 In United 
States of America v Frank Hernandez et al. at US District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida in 2009, after the jurors were retired and ready to 
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start their jury deliberation, one of the jurors came back to his home and 
researched on the complex terminologies which were mentioned in the trial by 
the use of the Internet.
35
 This was reported by another juror to the judge. After 
the judge enquired each of jurors whether they used the Internet to research 
about the case, a surprising fact was exposed: eight of twelve jurors did their 
own Internet research.
36
 Therefore, the judge discharged the trial. One of the 
possible inducements for the jurors’ Internet research was because there were 
frequent medically complex testimonies.
37
 In a trial in Macomb County, 
Michigan in 2010, a juror, Hadley Jons, had posted on Facebook: “Excited for 
jury duty tomorrow…it’s gonna be fun to tell the defendant they’re guilty.: P.”38 
It was revealed before the verdict, thus, she was convicted of contempt. She was 
given a sentence with $250 fine; moreover, the court imposed the defendant on 
writing a five-page essay on the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution.
39
 
For another example, in Dimas-Martinez v State, a juror had continuously 
tweeted in the middle of a criminal trial ignoring the trial judge’s admonition 
which prohibited the Internet and social media use during the trial.
40
 Although 
the trial judge knew and warned the juror’s tweeting, the trial judge did not 
discharge the juror, and eventually jurors returned the guilty verdicts for a 
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defendant sentencing a death penalty.
41
 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment and criticised the trial judge who underestimated the juror 





Conversely, in Commonwealth v Werner, the trial judge did not order any 
retrials, although it was exposed that some jurors used social media and posted 
articles related to their ‘annoying’43 jury services on their Facebook which has 
been publicly sighted during the trial. After the defendant had convicted by a 
jury verdict, this fact was identified by the defence counsel through reading 
media reports about some jurors’ inadequate social media use.44 Nonetheless, 
the trial judge did not found the posted information on their Facebook was the 
something which should change the convicted verdicts for the defendant, and the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court judge affirmed the judgment.
45
 According to the 
Appeals Court judge, “Although the posts examined by the judge appeared on 
open profiles on Facebook, and were thus accessible by any of the millions of 
Facebook members, there was no identifying information in any of the posts 
about the particular defendant or crime; and the judge credited the jurors' 
testimony that they had not been exposed to any extraneous information in any 
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other postings or responses.”46 This generous position of the court could be said 
quite different from the severe attitude towards juror’s Internet and social media 
use in England. On the other hand, these cases have surely made us realised how 





In the US, there are so-called ‘google mistrials’ when jurors did research on the 
trial by the use of the Internet and it led to a retrial.
48
 Morrison argues that, a 
juror’s Internet research on the case “may not reflect misconduct so much as a 
misplaced sense of responsibility to render the ‘right’ decision.”49 On the other 
hand, a judge may order to remove a juror’s electronic communication devices 
to prevent them accessing the Internet and social media. According to Johnston 
et al., many courts in the US collect electronic devices from jurors both in the 
courtroom and the jury deliberation room.
50
 However, there is a limitation for a 
judge’s ability to restrict a juror’s Internet and social media use after the trial. 
For example, in Commonwealth v Werner, after the trial, two jurors posted their 
comments to Facebook about their jury service and one juror blogged on the 
case.
51
 Although, the Massachusetts Appeals Court refused to set aside the  
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conviction because of overwhelming evidence of the guilt of the accused, this 
case shows courts cannot manage the jurors’ friendship after the trial and stop 
releasing information on the trial. 
 
If there is any necessity for avoiding risks of perverse verdicts, a judge can order 
a change of venue to a different located court.
52
 However, this mean is criticised 
as a less realistic measure, because this may weaken the juror 
representativeness.
53
 Moreover, even if the location of the trial has been 
changed, if jurors could connect the Internet using mobile phone, it will be less 
efficient to avoid jury’s misconduct and perverse verdicts. 
 
Although the court has taken various measures to avoid a prejudiced jury, an 
unfair jury trial for a defendant could be caused by the pre-publicity and 
revealing of sensitive information from jury deliberation to the outside by the 
Internet and social media use. As King maintained, “In any event, many basic 
features of the criminal jury in the Unites States cannot be modified without 
either constitutional amendment or radical reinterpretations of the Bill of 
Rights.”54 This is a controversial feature of the rules of contempt of Court in the 
US; it is used to support the severe restriction of disclosing the secrecy of jury 
deliberation by Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 in England.  
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b.) The rules in Australia 
 
Australia, as one of the largest Commonwealth countries, has unique regulations 
on a juror’s misconduct and contempt of court. In New South Wales, Western 
Australia, South Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, 
there are laws that introduce a judge-only trial in indictable offences.
55
 The 
courts must consider whether the case “involves a factual issue that requires the 
application of objective community standards including (but not limited to) an 
issue of reasonableness, negligence, indecency, obscenity or dangerousness,”56 
“the length or complexity or both,”57 and “any risk that the jury will be 
corrupted or intimidated.”58 If the case satisfied those criteria, the court would 
apply a non-jury criminal trial. To apply a non-jury criminal trial, the accused’s 
consent is needed, except in Queensland.
59
 From 2004 to 2008, 56 per cent of 
indictable-only criminal cases in the Australian Capital Territory had been heard 
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In Queensland, a pre-trial publicity that may affect jury deliberations is 
restricted as a risk factor and may be the reason for the application for non-jury 
criminal trial.
61
 In Victoria, publishing any statements made, opinions 
expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast during jury deliberation, or to 
solicit or obtain such information from a juror.
62
 In New South Wales and the 
Australian Capital Territory has similar restrictions towards the disclosure of the 
jury deliberation.
63
 The difference from the English Section 8 of the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981 is that the Information on jury deliberation may be solicited 





Recently, the new menace for a fair criminal trial in Australia would be a juror’s 
Internet and social media use. In New South Wales, the Schedule 1.8 of the 
Courts and Other Legislation Further Amendment Act 2013 specifically 
prohibits a juror’s Internet and social media use. However, how can the court 
identify a juror’s misconduct on the use of the Internet and social media? 
According to Burd and Horan, there is a theory, which suggests the creation of 
an independent monitoring role on a juror’s Internet and social media use in a 
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 However, as Johnston et al. have pointed out, monitoring a juror’s 
Internet and social media use would be difficult in terms of money and time 
costs.
66
 They also suggested that, sequestering a jury in a hotel during its jury 
service term to restrict access to the Internet and social media, although they 
have affirmed it is also an expensive method.
67
 Hoffmeister concurs with this 
idea and states that sequestration is the best mean to assure juror’s impartiality 
among the existed possible measures.
68
 However, in addition to the cost 
problem, there will be a question as to whether it is an appropriate burden for a 
jury to be so limited in its freedom of movement. In a manslaughter trial in the 
Supreme Court of Queensland, Justice George Fryberg allowed defence lawyers 
to ask the jurors whether any pre-trial publicity influenced their verdicts and 
whether they had prior knowledge on the defendant and the case.
69
 The purpose 
for the questions was to examine the jurors’ possible prejudice.70  
 
The cost matters have been difficult for the Australian court to avoid juror 
misconduct and perverse verdicts. It could be said that the role, instruction and 
flexible discretion of a judge to examine a juror’s misbehavior including the use 
of the Internet and social media has increased in its significance to achieve a fair 
criminal trial in Australia.  
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 Hoffmeister continues “This is because the court has direct control of the jurors'  
environment.” See Thaddeous Hoffmeister, ‘Google, gadgets and guilt: juror misconduct  
in the digital age’ (2012) 83(2) University of Colorado Law Review 409, 441 
69
 See Mark Oberhardt, ‘Patel trial jury to be polled for bias’ the Daily Telegraph (London,  





c.) The rules in New Zealand 
 
As same as in England, the rate of the use of jury trial in all criminal cases in 
New Zealand is less than one percent.
71
 However, among the Commonwealth 
countries, the media regulation from the secrecy of jury deliberation in New 
Zealand is noteworthy since the court has attempted to avoid jury’s perverse 
verdicts cooperating with the media. As in England, New Zealand has a tradition 
of severe restriction toward the disclosure of jury secrecy to protect a fair jury 
trial and justice from the approach by the outside influences including the 
media.  
 
However, there is no provision in New Zealand, which is the equivalent of 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. In New Zealand, Section 370(2) 
of the Crimes Act 1961 merely prohibits any communication with a juror by any 
person except the court officer before the jury deliberation. The breach of the 
Section 370(2) will result in the discharge of the jury and the retrial by a new 
jury.
72
 As the New Zealand Law Commission stated that “Jury secrecy in New 
Zealand rests on convention rather than law: jurors are not required to take an 
oath of secrecy but are directed by the trial judge that the case should only be 
discussed with other jurors.”73 The severe restriction will not be strengthened 
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by any provision like Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and only the 
court judgment has an authority to prohibit the disclosure of the secrecy of jury 




The restriction towards the publicity on the case during and after the trial and 
jury deliberations is more restrictive in New Zealand than in the US.
75
 For 
example, in Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand in 1994, several months 
after the jury verdict was returned, the Radio New Zealand interviewed some of 
the jurors of the trial of David Wayne Tamihere who murdered two Swedish 
tourists and transmitted the jurors’ comments; The radio company was 
eventually convicted as contempt of court and fined $30,000.
76
 This case caused 
a criticism that the violation of rights to freedom of expression of the 
broadcasters based on Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
77
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On the other hand, the media is free to report on pretrial court proceedings in 
New Zealand.
78
 In terms of that, restrictions in New Zealand on the 
pre-publicity is much more generous than English contempt of court law. 
Moreover, in New Zealand, there is no regulation which prohibits responsible 




Cameron et al. suggest that, in New Zealand, “Name suppression also is granted 
only infrequently (although more often prior to trial than subsequent to it), and 
rarely on the grounds that it will prejudice the subsequent trial.”80 Moreover, 
according to Cameron et al., contempt proceedings are actually very rare in New 
Zealand.
81
 They asserted that, “The Solicitor General attempts to work 
cooperatively with the media to establish the parameters of appropriate 
publication, and prosecutes only when the case is a serious one and the breach is 
considered to be a blatant and gross one.”82 The establishing of a standard of 
appropriate broadcasting on jury trials to achieve a fair trial and justice is very 
significant. New Zealand’s model could be a good example for a reform of the 
regulation on contempt of court which could be compatible with freedom of 
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4.) The suggestion by the Law Commission and the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015  
  
In each English criminal case, judges set out what a juror must not do and the 
breach of this can constitute contempt of court.
83
 However, the contemporary 
English cases clearly showed that Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 
had not reflected contemporary developments, particularly in relation to the new 
technology including the Internet and social media.
84
 For the purpose of 
reacting to the progress of digital media and communication technology, and for 
confirming the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, 
The current coalition Government asked the Law Commission to examine the 




Based on the Law Commission’s prepared report, the current coalition 
Government suggested the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill on the jury reform 
in 2013 “to ensure that the law and criminal procedures strike a balance between 
the public interest in the administration of justice, the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, the rights of publishers to freedom of expression and the rights of jurors.”86 
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After the nearly two-year discussion at the House of Parliament, the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015 was just enacted by receiving Royal Assent at 12 
February 2015. 
 
At last, the Law Commission has suggested forcing jurors to take more strict 
liability on their contempt and misconducts.
87
 As the Law Commission states 
that the number of the cases of jury contempt is fundamentally not so great, 
however there is a risk that jurors could come across prejudicial material 
coincidentally and contaminate a fair jury trial and decrease public confidence.
88
 
The Law Commission suggests “Juries must not only be impartial in fact but 
also must be seen to be so.”89 
 
In addition, the Law Commission has pointed out that, the significance of 
consistency in restrictions to juror misconduct.
90
 It is because there is a need for 
a jury to be subject to standard rules to avoid confusion and inconsistency.
91
 
Specifically said, the Law Commission suggested creating four offences of juror 




The Commission states that in so doing, “A discrete offence could send an 
important message to jurors about the seriousness with which such conduct is 
regarded. It may also have other benefits, such as providing greater clarity about 
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what is and is not permitted than the present law.”93 Moreover, the Commission 
provides that, “The deviance will result in the disqualification from jury service 
for ten years for a person who has been found guilty of a contempt offence.”94 
David Ormerod, the Law Commissioner heading the contempt project, suggests 
that, “Jurors accused of contempt would benefit from the normal protections of 
the criminal trial process.”95 
 
The Law Commission predicted the concern that “Creating such an offence 
would make jurors more reluctant to admit their misconduct and their fellow 
jurors more reluctant to report any concerns, which would actively work against 
uncovering cases of miscarriages of justice.”96 This negative opinion has 
pointed out the difficulty for the court to discover jurors’ misconducts.97  
 
In addition, Grieve suggested that, “Juror contempt is a serious risk to justice but 
people are often not aware of the consequences.”98 It was difficult for a judge to 
direct “about what jurors can and cannot do, and threatening to imprison them 
for breaching the order.”99 To avoid “these conflicting tensions,”100 the 
introduction of the new statutory criminal offence is the best solution according 
to the Law Commission. 
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The proposal was realised as Sections in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 
2015. The Section 74(2) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act repealed the 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. This could be evaluated as a huge 
reform in these three decades flow of the discussion against the Section 8 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981. However, the new Act remained its severe 
attitudes towards the juror’s private research and disclosure of jury deliberation 
as same as the Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. 
 
For instance, The Section 71 to 74 of the Act made “researching details of a case 
(including online research,) sharing details of the research with other jurors, 
disclosing details of juror deliberation and engaging in other prohibited 
conduct”101 new offences. The current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State 
for Justice Chris Grayling MP states that the purpose of providing four new 
criminal offences of juror misconduct in Section of Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015 is “to ensure fair trials and prevent miscarriages of justice.”102 
 
Firstly, Section 71 of the Act newly made an offence for a juror “that tries an 
issue in a case before a court to research the case during the trial period.”103 It 
penalise a juror only if he or she intentionally sought information when he or 
she knew or should reasonably knew that the information is or might be related 
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 In other words, if the information is irrelevant to the case, the 
juror will not be penalised.
105
 The Section specifically illustrated the 
methodology of a juror’s research; asking a question, searching an electronic 
database, including by means of the Internet, visiting or inspecting a place or 
object, conducting an experiment, and asking another person to seek the 
information.
106
 Secondly, if a juror intentionally shared such an information 
above with other jurors, it will also consists an offence.
107
 Thirdly, the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015 also made disclosing the contents of jury 
deliberation an offence. A juror who intentionally “disclosed information about 
statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by 
members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in proceedings before a 
court”108 or “solicit or obtain such information”109 will be punished. 
 
On the other hand, the Law Commission proposed putting in place systems to 
make it easier for jurors to report their concerns about fellow jurors’ 
misconduct.
110
 The court needs to facilitate jurors to report to judges if they 
found their fellows’ misconduct and inappropriate action during the jury 
deliberation more efficiently. However, as Asquith is concerned: 
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Despite the emphasis placed on reporting jury misconduct, jurors still appear to 
be reluctant to inform on fellow jury members. Timid jurors may still wait until 
the case is concluded to report any irregularities, fearful of any repercussion as 
there is no anonymity protection for a juror that identifies and reports such 





Reflecting this Law Commission’s proposal and to facilitate a ‘fair’ juror to 
report the other jurors’ misconducts, the provision illustrated several exceptions 
to the Section 74(1). For example, a juror who disclosed the contents of his or 
her deliberation will not be punished, if the disclosing of the deliberations was 
“for the purposes of enabling the jury to arrive at their verdict or in connection 
with the delivery of that verdict.”112 In addition, it will also be an exception 
when a juror disclosed the other jurors’ misconducts at their deliberation or the 





Finally, Section 73 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 provided the 
“conduct from which it may reasonably be concluded that the person intends to 
try the issue otherwise than on the basis of the evidence presented in the 
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proceedings on the issue”114 as a “prohibited conduct” by a juror which consists 
an offence, if the juror engaged in it intentionally during the trial period.
115
 To 
convict a juror for this offence, it needs that he or she knew such a conduct was 
prohibited. 
 
If a juror contravened the Section 71 to 74 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015, he or she may be sentenced imprisonment for a term maximum two 
years and/or a fine as used to be by Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981.
116
 These offences have been counted as an indictable-only one.
117
 
Moreover, proceedings for those four offences may not be instituted except by 




Section 69 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 provides it will consist a 
contempt of court if a juror was not follow the order by a judge to surrender an 
‘electronic communications device.’119 Although the severe restriction towards 
a juror’s use of the Internet and social media will be continued, there shall be the 
appropriate place and time which permits jurors to use their electronic 
communications devices during their jury service. Jurors may not be able to use 
their electronic communications devices only at the specific places in the court 
                                                   
114










 Section 69 defines an ‘electronic communications device’ as “a device that is designed  
or adapted for a use which consists of or includes the sending or receiving of signals that 
are transmitted by means of an electronic communications network.” This definition is 





 Judges are just provided with a statutory power to remove such an 
Internet enabled devices from jurors whenever it is necessary in the interests of 
justice.
121
 The Law Commission suggests that, “There should not be an 
automatic prohibition on jurors having the use of internet-enabled devices in the 
court building.”122 Therefore, the Section provided the order for jurors not to 
use the electronic communications devices may be “made subject to 
exceptions.”123  
 
There were several proposals by the Law Commission which were not applied 
to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. For example, the Law Commission 
indicated that the reason for the misconduct by a juror may be because of a 
general lack of knowledge among the English people about the operation of the 
English criminal justice system.
124
 Therefore, the Commission specifically 
provided the solution including “greater education in schools about the role and 
importance of jury service; improving information provided to jurors about their 
obligations during jury service; changes to the wording of the juror oath to 
include an agreement to base the verdict only on the evidence heard in court; 
requiring jurors to sign a written declaration.”125 The Law Commission 
suggested improving the jury instruction sending a DVD to each juror and 
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 Obviously, those measures will need further budgeting. These 
specific proposals were not applied in the provisions in the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 this time. 
 
As another example, the Law Commission suggested creating an exception of 
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981: permission “for authorised 
academic research into jury deliberations, with a range of rigorous safeguards in 
place in order to protect the integrity of the jury’s decision and the anonymity of 
jurors and parties to the trials.”127 For instance, empirical studies on contempt 
of court committed by jurors have had limitations because these researches have 
often relied on self-reporting by jurors on their behaviour.
128
 The suggestion of 
the Law Commission might solve the problem of credibility and quality of 
contemporary empirical research on English jury. However, there are no 
provisions in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 to apply this suggestion 
about an authorised academic research into jury deliberations. 
 
5.) Conclusion for the chapter 
 
Although the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 repealed Section 8 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981, the severe restriction towards a juror’s private 
research and the disclosure of the secrecy of jury deliberation has been 
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continued. According to the Government, if there is no such a severe 
restrictions: 
 
Public confidence in the jury system could be damaged. 
The finality of the verdict would be put at risk. 
Jurors might be less frank if they knew the details of their discussions might be 
made known to someone else outside the jury room. 
The clause as drafted would not prohibit counsel for the defendant or the 
prosecution approaching jurors after the case to discuss it, including the 
performance of witnesses. 
Jurors could be pressured to allege improprieties without foundation not all 
research would be bona fide. 




The Government’s firm and severe attitude has been a continual subject of 
criticism of people including academics, who insist on relaxation of the severe 
restriction. However, according to Thomas, the idea that Section 8 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 had made academic research with actual jurors 
impossible is a “well-entrenched and unfounded myth.”130 Thomas is against 
the repeal of Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act because “in the last decade, 
research conducted within the boundaries of Section 8 and with actual jurors at 
court in England and Wales has been able to examine all of the following 
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fundamental aspects of the jury system.”131 Therefore, “Contrary to popular 
myth, the existing provisions of Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act present 
no barrier to conducting rigorous and reliable empirical research with actual 
juries in this country. There is no reason why reform of the law of contempt in 
relation to juries should not be based on such evidence.”132 Although her 
empirical research has been popularly known, these descriptions are reflected 
Thomas’s overconfidence of the methodology and results of her empirical 
research. Hence, this theory will be subject to criticism as a conceit without any 
strong evidence.   
 
The Law Commission has pointed out that, “Whilst the law of contempt by 
publication is intended to prevent any legal tribunal from becoming partial, the 
focus of the law has increasingly been on preventing bias amongst the jury.”133 
In other words, contempt of court committed by other legal decision-makers in 
England, including magistrates and judges, has not been focused on so much 
because they do not have so many difficult problems as jury contempt. If so, to 
put the period on the unending and controversial discussion of the severe 
restriction towards a juror’s private research and the disclosure of the secrecy of 
jury deliberation problem, why do the Government and academic researchers 
not seek to increase the use of other forms of tribunals instead of the jury trial? 
To resolve the complex aspects of a jury, and modernise the English Criminal 
Justice system, the final part of this thesis will discuss the possible alternative 
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Part 3: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Roberts and Hough state that “If the public strongly support the jury, they are 
likely to oppose any proposals to restrict the option of trial by jury.”1 Is it 
actually correct? Through my research about the defects of the English jury 
system, it has been clear that the quality of a jury as a judicial decision-making 
body lessened and the right to a fair trial is under significant pressure. The court 
and the Government have taken various measures to solve the problems. As 
Cram has pointed out, “A central theme of recent reforms in English criminal 
justice has been the desire to achieve a more efficient system of criminal 
justice.”2 In the flow of this reform, they have aimed to modernise the English 
jury system; however, there are so many complex processes to achieve fair jury 
trials. Freer states that “Consideration of alternatives usually concludes there is 
nothing better. Many of the problems outlined above cannot be easily 
ameliorated.”3 Unlike her theory, this concluding part of the thesis will 
deliberate what sort of alternative criminal justice system could be realistically 
possible instead of jury trial. The magistrates’ courts model, judge-only trial and 
the other systems like continental lay-judge system will be examined before the 
conclusions for this thesis.  
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1. The contemporary role of a judge in a jury trial 
 
Before discussing the alternative models of the English criminal trial, the 
contemporary role of a trial judge in a criminal court will be deliberated. The 
role of a trial judge is limited to ‘the finder of law.’ A judge may not need to 
address any fact finding process by a jury. As Darbyshire states that “It has often 
been said that the essence of the role of the English judge, or magistrate, is as an 
unbiased umpire whose job it is to listen to evidence presented by both sides, 
without interfering in the trial process.”4 
 
As Artigliere suggests that, “Justice in a jury trial relies on effective 
communication.”5 Ministry of Justice states that it is important for a judge to 
provide jurors necessary information and explanation which is easy to 
understand and make reassured them on the case and the jury service.
6
 
Especially, a judge’s instruction and summing up before a jury deliberation has 
significant elements which influence a jury verdict. The Judge will sum up the 
case and instruct jurors in legal information and matters on the case. Sargant 
stated that a trial judge “can freely indicate their own views on the evidence 
provided they have told the jury that they are the judges of fact and qualify their 
adverse comments and deductions with ‘but it is a matter for you members of 
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the jury.’”7 Therefore, as Young has pointed out that, the number of perverse 
jury verdicts would be likely to be reduced if judges can efficiently instruct 




A juror may be able to send notes to put their questions on the case to the 
judge.
9
 To solve the complicated contemporary problems that have been raised 
from juror’s Internet-use, Cram suggests that, facilitating jurors to ask a judge 
questions as much as they want.
10
 Moreover, it seems to be better for a trial 
judge to give jurors a written summary of the legal directions with their oral 
instructions to improve juror comprehension of the law.
11
 Artigliere suggests 
that, a judge sometimes should use visual aids in his or her jury instruction to 
deepen the juror’s understanding on the case.12 
  
It is not too much to say that a judge’s instruction will decide whether a jury 
verdict could be smoothly given and achieve a fair judgment. Nietzel et al. 
suggested that, “The courts routinely rely on judicial instructions to be the cure 
for all sorts of potential evidentiary problems and /or the guide that leads jurors 
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through a thicket of confusing or ambiguous legal standards.”13 In other words, 
the capability of a judge is a significant factor for assuring a fair trial. Australian 
regulations on juror misconduct tells us the judge’s capability and instruction is 
really significant to achieve a fair trial not only in England but in the other 
Commonwealth countries. Could a trial judge always have enough quality to 
instruct a jury appropriately? In this point, Ruva et al. were suspicious. They 
indicated that, “Until researchers can provide the courts with strong evidence of 
the mechanisms underlying the pre-trial publicity bias, the courts will continue 
to rely on questionably effective remedies such as judicial instructions to ignore 
pre-trial publicity.”14 Nietzel et al. concluded “Research on judicial instructions 
indicates that when instructions are not psychologically well crafted, they are 
minimally effective. When admonitions or directives from a judge are worded 
and delivered in ways designed to increase their effects, jurors are, to some 
degree, better informed, guided, and even constrained by these instructions.”15  
 
Devine suggests “Jurors don’t understand their instructions as well as they think 
they do, as well as judges would like to think they do, or as well as we in society 
might hope they do.”16 However, according to Crown Court Study, less than ten 
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per cent of jurors said they had difficulties in following the judge’s summing up 
on the law.
17
 Moreover, the statistics showed nearly 99 per cent of jurors 
thought the judge did their job well.
18
 To reply to the question of whether a 
judge’s summing up pointed toward acquittal or conviction, two-thirds of jurors 
answered that the judge did not favour either side.
19
 Coincidentally, 16 per cent 
of jurors thought the judge summed up for an acquittal, and another 16 per cent 
of them said the judge summed up for a conviction.
20
 Therefore, it seems to be 
that a trial judge’s instruction has gone well and has worked efficiently for a jury 
to decide its verdict.  
 
Thomas asserts her empirical research found that jurors require more guidance 
about various aspects of jury deliberations.
21
 According to her, 82 per cent of 
jurors prefer more guidance on conducting deliberations. Specifically, 49 per 
cent of them have concerns about what to do if confused about legal issues, 45 
per cent are worried how to ensure no one is pressured into a verdict, and 35 per 
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cent do not know what to do if something goes wrong.
22
 Therefore, Thomas 
suggests that, “providing juries with general deliberation guidance could help to 
reduce the time juries take to deliberate, which would have efficiency and cost 
benefits.”23 This shows that an efficient judge’s instruction will reduce the cost 
in both money and time of a jury trial. 
 
It is predicted that the role of a judge in England will be more significant since 
the globalised society and developed technologies including the Internet and 
social media have made a criminal trial more complicated: for instance, a 
serious and complex fraud trial and perverse verdicts by jury misconduct which 




Especially in a high profile case, there is a high possibility for a jury to 
unconsciously rely on impartial and incredible information from the media 
without a judge’s appropriate instruction. For instance, jurors in the criminal 
trial of William Roache, The trial judge, Justice Holroyde “told jurors not to rely 
on any assumptions they may have made about similar cases.”25  
 
There is no guarantee that a judge will not do any misconduct. One of the 
possible solutions for avoiding a judge’s misconduct in a trial would be 
facilitating open justice in criminal proceedings to assure public confidence. It 
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includes broadcasting by a video camera in a court room. As Cram stated that in 
a criminal trial, “open proceedings have a disciplinary function in that they 
ensure the proper functioning of the participants.”26 Cram predicted that judges’ 
improper action could be avoided if the outside people can monitor their 
conduct.
27
 Of course, as he stated that it needs to be compatible with the 




2. The alternative criminal justice system instead of trial by jury 
1.) The lay element in the criminal justice system   
 
The jury system has long been regarded as one of the significant pillars of the 
English common law system and a highly supported trial-model according to 
Thomas.
29
 Thompson stated that “No one would even dream of inventing such 
an institution [jury] today.”30 Steyn indicated that, “The jury system is an 
integral and indispensable part of our constitutional arrangements.”31 Indeed, it 
could be expressed as the longest judicial system in English legal history. Some 
people suggested that, why the jury system remained for such a long time is 
because of its lay element. For some people, the jury is a symbol of judicial 
democracy, which is a crucial tool that can be against the Government. For 
example, Vidmar stated that a jury is “a powerful democratic element in the 
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process of delivering justice”32 by ordinary citizens with their common sense. 
Jury nullification previously reflected this function. However, it is difficult for 
ordinary English people to fight against the Government by the use of a jury 
service opportunity in this twenty-first century. If so, what is the reason for 
keeping the lay element in a criminal trial? Why has the Government not 
facilitated trial by a professional to save money and improve the time efficiency 
in a trial?  
 
Looking at American jury, Dzur suggests that, ‘democratic professionalism’ 
which urges citizens to share the role of legal experts and to engage in criminal 
procedures more actively. In Punishment, Participatory, Democracy & the 
Jury,
33
 he argues for expanding the role of the jury in American criminal courts 
and promoting further use of jury trials in the country. Dzur describes the jury as 
an institution of self-governance. In addition, the original purpose of the use of 
the jury system in the United States was for “check and monitoring”34 of the 
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2.) The magistrates’ court model 
 
As in the US, the lay element of the judicial making body has significant virtue 
yet in England. Grieve suggests the reason for supporting the criminal jury 
system even now as below: 
 
Many people will go through life without any direct involvement in the criminal 
justice system. Their information will be gleaned from the media, drama, 
possibly anecdotes from friends or family. Depending on their generation, it 
may be Rumpole of the Bailey, This Life, or Silks. It seems to me that one way 
for the system to maintain legitimacy is for people to have a way of genuinely 
being part of the decision making process. Indeed, it is hard to think of a more 
serious or important civil duty that virtually any member of the public may be 




However, jury trial is not the only criminal justice system which has these 
virtues. If the lay element of a jury had a significant reason to support its 
legitimacy, a lay magistrate would be an appropriate alternative. Magistrates 
have two categories: a lay magistrate (the Justice of the peace) and a District 
judge (professional.) Professionals deal with, for example, serious and complex 
fraud cases efficiently. 
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It seems that a trial by District judge, a professional, only is not always an ideal 
solution for achieving a fair trial. Sargant argued that, a trial judge in the Crown 
Court should not be selected from barristers because their long practice at the 
Bar may not suit the preparation for judicial office.
36
 For Sargant, barristers 
who are the people who “trained to argue that black is white.”37 Provided 
Sargant’s descriptions were correct, a criminal trial by lay magistrate would be 
an ideal alternative rather than a trial by a district judge, an originally 
professional legal practitioner or a trial by a trial judge in the Crown Court. Lay 
magistrates will consult justice’s clerks who have legal knowledge and give lay 
magistrates legal advice on their decision-making process.
38
 Darbyshire stated 
that the magistrates usually relied too much on the justice’s clerks.39 She 
suggested “Clerks should be given no more judicial powers than are absolutely 
necessary, unless and until they are to be recognised as judges.”40 To keep as 
much of the lay element of the Justices of peace as possible, creating a clear 
standard in relation to the function and roles of justice’s clerks is significant.  
 
As the statistics showed obviously in the previous chapters, jury trial is more 
time-consuming than trial by magistrates. Especially, in the case of a perverse 
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verdict by a jury, as Lord Judge in R v Dallas has pointed out, “The time of the 
other members of the jury was wasted, and the public was put to additional 
unnecessary expense.”41 Lord Falconer suggests “Re-engineering the criminal 
justice system to deliver a process that is much simpler, speedier and in which 
summary justice plays a more significant part; simply, speedy, summary.”42 
The speedy trial by lay magistrates could be one of the main reasons for the 
alternative. 
 
There are several critics against the lay-magistrates’ court type tribunal. 
Lloyd-Bostock states that: 
 
Experienced magistrates, in contrast with jurors, have frequently taken the same 
kind of decision before, making them routine as well as expert decision-makers. 
They have ‘seen’ most cases before, in the sense that a range of typical cases is 
repeated. The more experienced they are the more likely it is that they use 




Nonetheless, she has never mentioned evidence of her theory. Baroness Helena 
Kennedy asserted that, “Changing the powers of magistrates might be a way by 
stealth of reducing the number of jury trials.”44 Conversely, Sprack suggests 
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that, “Supporters of the lay magistracy rely upon the wide experience of life 
which they bring to the bench, and the greater chance that a decision reached by 
several people will be more considered, and consequently fairer, because of the 
interaction between the members of the bench.”45 Slapper states that the 
magistrates experience will develop strong public confidence in the English 
criminal justice system.
46
 He continues that, rendering such an important role 
with the right to order conviction and acquittal to the large members of the 




According to the 2002 Bar Council survey, 73 per cent of sampled English 
people thought a jury would be more likely to be influenced by their own views 
and values rather than a judge and two magistrates, while 24 per cent felt they 
would be less influenced by their own views.
48
 Therefore, Roberts and Hough 
state that for most of the English people, juries are more representative of the 
community than are judges.
49
 However, according to the same statistics, the 
public confidence in an English jury was 80 per cent, and in an English 
magistrate it was 71 per cent.
50
 Hence, it could be said that there is not so much 
differences in the public confidence between a jury and a magistrate.  
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Section 46 to 50 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 “would implement 
the Government’s strategy to remove certain high-volume, non-imprisonable 
summary-only offences from magistrates courts.”51 The Ministry of Justice 
suggests, “Magistrates courts are clogged up by these types of cases, which 
arrive in large volumes, are usually uncontested and have predictable financial 
penalties.”52 The Section 48(3) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
permitted a single magistrate to try and sentence adult defendants in such cases 
and will abolish the requirement to hear them in an open court.
53
 If the 
defendant pleads guilty or requests an open court hearing, these changes will not 
be applied.
54
 These reform plans are influenced by the Government’s attitude 
towards the magistrates’ courts: it has respected the role and efficiency of trials 
by magistrates and predicted the further expanded use of magistrates’ courts. 
 
In England, the randomness of a jury selection tends to be respected. As 
Thompson has pointed out, the random jury selection is an essential element of 
fair trial.
55
 The peremptory challenge has been abolished to expand 
opportunities of jury service for as many English citizens as possible. However, 
according to Thompson, in the US, a juror must be a good and true man with a 
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 Therefore, the US preserves the peremptory challenge and 
respects the voir dire procedure more than in England. The English theory that 
enlarging the diversity of jurors contributes to assure fairness of a trial is 
understandable because it supplies an opportunity for a defendant to be heard by 
wide range of peers. On the other hand, as Spencer has pointed out that, “If 
juries are composed of twelve people chosen from the electoral role at random, 
it is inevitable that they will sometimes be dominated by people who are racists, 
or are irresponsible and silly, and our legal system is gravely deficient if it fails 
to guard against this obvious danger.”57 If the Government seeks to improve the 
quality of a jury as a judicial decision-making body, it will need to establish a 
criminal trial by true and ‘good and’ true men like in the US without reviving 
the peremptory challenge. The trial by lay magistrates could be a reasonable 
solution for achieving this aim.  
 
3.) Judge-only trial 
 
Section 43 and 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 aims to introduce the idea of 
non-jury criminal trial in case of a serious and complex fraud and jury tampering. 
Only the judge-only trials on jury tampering have been realised at the moment. 
The advantages and disadvantages of non-jury criminal trial have a difficult 
controversy. If the jury system is one of the significant and traditional pillars of 
the common law system, the complete abolition of the trial by lay people in 
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England, and introducing trial by a professional will not avoid the substantial 
criticisms and long discussion. For instance, Blake asserted that, “It is 
impossible to take away the centerpiece of the [jury] system and replace it by, 
for instance, a judge sitting alone without doing damage to the whole system.”58 
On the other hand, there is a theory which suggests the necessity for the 
judge-only trial for achieving a fair trial. For example, Johnston et al. state that 
“Increasing the use of judge-alone trials would overcome the risk of juror bias 
resulting from exposure to material on social media (either prior to or during a 
trial) and would also offer a solution to the problem of jurors using social media 
to disseminate information relevant to the trial.”59 
 
Justice for All, the White Paper of the Blair New Labour Government in 2002, 
suggested that, “Juries make an invaluable contribution to the Criminal Justice 
System,”60 and “We believe that trial by jury should be used for the most 
appropriate cases, and that juries should be better supported in practical ways.”61 
In other words, it was practical to keep and maximise the positive points of the 
jury system, thus that New Labour Government took the policy which limits 
trial by jury only in specific cases.  
 
The jury reform has been continued by the current coalition Government with 
the enactment of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Prior to the 
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enactment of it, the Law Commission predicts, “An alternative to trial with a 
jury would be to adopt a trial process incorporating the protections provided for 
by trial on indictment (for example, in respect of investigations, evidence, bail, 
disclosure and so on) but presided over by judge alone,”62 when the risk of a 
contempt of court committed by jurors would be expected. 
 
It is certain that the contemporary criminal jury system will be further reformed 
and the amount of jury trials will not stop decreasing. To reduce the budget for 
justice on the course of fiscal restraint of the current coalition Government, Lord 
Chief Justice Thomas of Cwmgiedd asserts that abolition of the right to trial by 
jury for numerous less serious indictable offences and complex frauds must be 




Involving lay people to the judicial making process at every possible chance 
requires large amounts of money, time, burden and energy.
64
 However, the high 
support rate of the jury, which was showed by Thomas, could be the evidence 
that a large percentage of the English citizens found virtues in the lay element in 
a criminal trial.
65
 Therefore, it is difficult to believe that complete 
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implementation of judge-only trials for all indictable-only offences and abolition 
of the lay judge system in England will occur.  
 
4.) Adversarial criminal jury and Inquisitorial criminal justice system 
a.) The comparison between two different criminal justice system 
 
The adversarial system is one of the basic characteristics of the common law 
system. Under the adversarial system, the two parties at a trial prepare their own 
devices and evidences and present them at their cases without any help by the 
court.
66
 Conversely, the European continental legal system applies an 
inquisitorial system which involves court officials in the fact finding procedure. 
Court in continental countries assumes a much greater role in collecting 
evidence and is involved at an earlier stage in the criminal procedure. However, 




As Darbyshire states that “The English legal system is unique, in worldwide 
terms, in making such extensive use of laypeople as decision-makers, as 
magistrates, jurors and tribunal members.”68 The English criminal justice 
system has respected the lay element in a decision-making body, and minimised 
the interference by the judges and court officials as much as possible to assure 
fairness, liberty and justice. There seems to be no space to add continental 
inquisitorial elements to their adversarial criminal trial procedure since the 
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English criminal justice system has functioned so well. However, to “make our 
existing system more capable of serving the interests of both justice and 
efficiency,”69 The Runciman Commission in 1993 aimed “a theoretical 
assessment of the relative merits of two legal traditions:”70 the adversarial and 
inquisitorial system. These movements after the Runciman Commission 
including introducing non-jury criminal trials and raising of the magistracy 
prompts the question: Will the new justice system alter the traditional 
adversarial system in England towards the inquisitorial system? The answer is 
clearly ‘NO.’  
 
The contemporary jury reform by the Government aimed to restrict jury trials in 
certain types of cases, modernise the English criminal justice system to be more 
efficient in the age of the Internet and the social media, and dissolve significant 
pressure towards fairness and efficiency of the English jury trial. The Runciman 
Report suggested, “We do not recommend the adoption of a thoroughgoing 
inquisitorial system.”71 There is a voice which insists the introducing of the 
continental inquisitorial system in the high position of the English judiciary. For 
example, Lord Chief Justice Thomas of Cwmgiedd asserts an inquisitorial 
system will “secure a fair trial for all whilst doing so within limited and 
reducing resources. The essence of the change would be a much greater degree 
of inquiry by the judge into the evidence being brought forward.”72 However, 
the Governmental policy has not shared this radical view. 
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If the categorisation of the two different criminal justice systems, adversarial 
and inquisitorial is not absolute and just relative, is it still impossible for the 
English judiciary to propose a new criminal justice system which has some 
inquisitorial positive elements? As Csere states that “The distinction between 
inquisitorial and adversarial systems is also rather ambiguous, as no country's 
criminal justice system can be considered purely one or the other. Rather, most 
countries are ‘mixed or hybrid systems’ located somewhere on the spectrum 
between the inquisitorial and adversarial poles.”73 
 
b.) Mixed jury system in continental countries  
 
Looking at the current continental criminal justice systems in Germany, France, 
Italy and so on, the most serious criminal cases are heard by professional judges 
with lay jurors.
74
 This is called as a ‘mixed jury.’75 It seems to be similar to the 
English magistrates court system, however in this model of the court, the judge 
would monitor jurors’ misconducts and avoid perverse verdicts in a jury 
deliberation room. The judge could also provide procedural guidance and legal 
advice to jurors to reach the verdict.
76
 Bard and Horan are concerned about the 
possibility of a judge who inappropriately influences the jury verdict through 
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 The continental mixed jury trials could be under a strong 
control and leadership by a judge in a jury deliberation. This is one of the 
characteristics of the inquisitorial criminal justice system. In other words, it is 
not a judgment by lay people only, although the lay people have been labeled as 
a ‘jury.’ It is clearly different both from the adversarial jury system and the 
magistrates court system in England. Thus, the continental mixed jury system 
will not well-function in England, which is applying an adversarial criminal 
justice system if the continental mixed jury system was directly introduced and 
used without any change of the system.  
 
c.) Spanish experience: adversarial elements in an inquisitorial criminal 
justice system 
 
There is a continental inquisitorial criminal justice system which has a number 
of adversarial elements in Spain: it is the trial by lay jurors. Thaman provided 
that, “The Spanish criminal trial was perhaps the most adversarial on the 
European Continent even before the passage of the jury law. Although the 
Spanish jury law kept the trial procedure basically unchanged, the trial judge's 
ability to control the collection of evidence has been drastically impeded by the 
lack of access to the investigative dossier.”78 For instance, he continued that, 
“The trial begins not only with the reading of the prosecution's accusatory 
pleadings, but also with the pleadings of the defendant and the private 
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prosecutor, usually representing the alleged victim, the victim's family, or their 
representatives.”79 In addition, in Spain, any sort of evidence must be presented 
“at the oral hearing (juicio oral.)”80 
  
The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 and the Law on the Jury of 1888 
provided the basis for the Spanish jury trial. The jury system had functioned 
between 1888 and 1923, when it was suspended by the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship.
81
 It was revived between 1931 and 1936. The Article 125 of 
Post-Franco Spanish Constitution 1978 provided the right to take part in the 
administration of justice through trial by jury.
82
 In addition, the Organic Law on 
the Jury Court (Ley Organica del Tribunal del Jurado) 1995 regulated further 
specific jury guidelines and procedural rules.
83
 Article 1 of the Organic Law on 
the Jury Court (Ley Organica del Tribunal del Jurado) 1995 restricted jury trial 
to particular types of crimes, including “crimes committed by public officials in 
the exercise of their duties, crimes against persons, honor, liberty, and security, 
and arson.”84 
 
A Spanish jury is composed of nine jurors.
85
 The role of a judge in Spain has 
been much more limited than in other continental countries. According to 
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Thaman, the trial judge does not organise the preliminary hearing and the 
evidentiary file is not present at the trial.
86
 A trial judge is not allowed to 




Although the Spanish criminal justice system introduced an adversarial jury 
system, it is not exactly similar to common law system. For example, the 
Spanish jury verdict is not the same style as a general verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not 
guilty’ is in an Anglo-American criminal trial.88 Historically, the Spanish jury 
verdict has followed the French model, and a jury must fulfil the list of 
questions or propositions (objeto del veredicto) at the final stage of jury 
deliberation.
89
 Finally, jurors must decide whether they will affirm or deny the 
proof of the defendant's guilt as to the ‘criminal acts’ (hechos delictivos) 




Moreover, Spanish jurors must give the reason for the verdict at the judgment.
91
 
In this stage, it is possible for jurors to call for the support by a secretary of the 
court who is a law-degree holder to formulate their reasons for the verdict.
92
 
Although there may be possible criticism on such a professional’s intervening in 
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a jury tribunal, as Csere states that “If the verdict is already decided before 
assistance is required for the formulation of the reasons, it is difficult to see how 
the court clerk could affect the actual verdict.”93  
 
The Spanish judge will discharge jurors if they failed to correct defects in their 
verdicts three times, and retry the case before a new jury. If it is still impossible 





The interesting point is that unlike English statistics, the Spanish statistics in 
1997 showed nearly 70 per cent of Spanish people disliked serving as a juror.
95
 
This attitude seems to be triggered by the Otegi v Spain,
96
 which resulted in a 
doubtful acquittal jury verdict of a defendant.
97
 On December 10, 1995, Mikel 
Otegi, a supporter of the Basque independence movement, killed two police 
officers. On March 16, 1997, a majority acquittal verdict was given to him by a 
jury, because the evidence showed that “A combination of his alcoholic 
intoxication and emotional disturbance-caused by his feeling constantly 
harassed by the Basque police-had caused him to be in a state of temporary 
insanity.”98 The jurors’ answers to the list of questions and their reasons for the 
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acquittal verdicts “despite clear evidence of an intentional double murder”99 
caused suspicion of the appropriateness of the jury verdict among the Spanish 
public. The Superior Judicial Court of the Basque Country reversed the jury 
verdict and this reversal was upheld by the Supreme Court.
100
 It could be said 




The Otagi case has indicated the difficulties of the jury system in Spain, which 
has a continental inquisitorial criminal justice system. It is understandable since 
the similar suspicion of the perverse verdict by a jury in the Otagi case occured 
in common law countries. For example, in Northern Ireland, ethnic sympathies 
seemed to influence jury verdicts before introducing the Diplock courts in 1973. 
Therefore, it could be natural that the Otegi v Spain “led to calls for the abolition 
of trial by jury or its conversion into a mixed court” in Spain.102  
 
Interestingly, the conviction rate in Spanish jury trials is high: it was 91.15 per 
cent in 2005.
103
 Perhaps, Spanish juries are more severe than professional 
judges despite the criticisms against the suspicious acquittal verdicts by the jury 
at the Otegi v Spain. 
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As Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas have pointed out, “The English jury may be long 
established, but its constitutional position leaves it vulnerable.”104 The absence 
of specific articles of constitutional statutes for the rights and duties of the jury 
could be said to be one of the reasons for the flexibility and changeability of the 
jury system which fits the needs of the society of each age. Meanwhile, this will 
also be one of the most significant incidences which potentially move the jury 
system towards its abolition or restriction.  
 
Referring to contemporary criminal justice cases, this thesis predicts that the 
abolition of the English criminal jury will be a possible realistic judicial choice 
in the future. The Spanish experience shows that the abolition of the jury system 
has been realised as possible since in that country doubt over the jury system is 
voiced more actively than in England.  
 
The main reason for the abolition of the jury would be because perverse jury 
deliberations and their verdicts have more and more often caused risks of 
miscarriages of justice. Recent English cases which were noted in this thesis 
substantiated this situation. Especially, social media use by jury in the age of the 
Internet is a significant pressure on maintaining the quality of the jury and the 
right to a fair, efficient and credible criminal trial. Although there have been 
restrictions which order a jury not to use their mobile phones and research the 
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case in a jury deliberation, and the new Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
aims to prevent negative interference in fair and efficient criminal justice by new 
technology and strengthen the regulations proposing new criminal offences 
against contempt of court committed by jurors, the court has never been able to 
monitor whether a juror followed such a direction in his or her home.
105
 As 
Cram has pointed out, “We can be certain that private online research away from 
the court building will continue.”106 In addition, it cannot examine whether a 
juror does or does not talk to his or her family and is therefore implicitly 
influenced by prejudiced information on a trial.
107
 This is a substantial problem. 
 
Davis states that “Removing the jury is seen to be an illiberal act.”108 This 
thesis disagrees with that opinion. In the coalition programme of the current 
Government, there is a sentence which refers to the jury system by suggesting, 
“We will protect historic freedoms through the defence of trial by jury.”109 The 
Government has sought to protect ‘historic freedoms’. In other words, the 
Government will not necessarily have to avoid the abolition of the jury system if 
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there are still any tribunals by lay people that reflect ‘historic freedoms.’ If  
‘historic freedoms’ cannot be protected by the defence of trial by jury, but be 
delivered by a new model of English criminal trial which has a lay-element, the 
Government will not hesitate to facilitate more efficient ways to protect this 
freedom in order to facilitate fair trial.  
 
If we still kept and expanded the efficient use of the magistrates’ courts system 
in England, the lay element which is the traditional virtue of the English liberal 
Criminal Justice system would remain and even be developed. Lloyd-Bostock 
and Thomas suggested that, “The English criminal justice system is highly 
unusual in the extent to which it relies on the services of lay judges.”110 As 
Darbyshire has correctly pointed out, “When you add to magistrates the 
thousands of lay arbitrators, tribunal panel members and jurors, you start to 
realise how many important decisions are taken by laypersons in the English 
legal system.”111  
 
This thesis does not insist on the denial of the lay-judge system nor a transition 
from a traditional adversarial system to an inquisitional one. Instead, it has 
considered some possible substitute models of the English criminal justice trial 
process without a jury: English lay-magistrates’ system, judge-only system and 
inquisitorial mixed jury. Among these tribunal models, the expanding use of a 
lay-magistrate seems to be a realistic and easy way for the Government and the 
                                                   
110
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judiciary to achieve fair and more efficient criminal trials. The thesis also 
suggests the court must not hesitate to organise a judge-only criminal trial when 
it is necessary. For instance, if the trial process was contaminated by jury 
tampering or jurors’ misconduct, and if the jury verdict seemed to be a perverse 
one and a miscarriage of justice, the judge should insist upon a non-jury 
criminal trial. A prudent attitude toward a legitimate non-jury criminal trial 
based on Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would be understandable, 
however, a prudent judge must understand his or her attitude is sometimes 
unnecessary and possibly harmful for a fair criminal trial. 
 
According to Slapper, “The move to a more representative magistracy has been 
slow.”112 However, statistics show popular use of and an expanding case of 
categories in magistrates courts. This would be evidence to predict that trial by 
lay magistrates will be an alternative to jury trial in the future if trial by jury 
could not eradicate pressure and controversy in cases of jury tampering, 
complex and fraud cases, and contempt of court in the Internet and social media 
age. As the Lord Chief Justice indicated in R v Dallas, “In the long run any 
system which allows itself to be treated with contempt faces extinction.”113 
 
Regretfully, there are only a few cases of jury research that seek productive 
suggestions towards restricting the use of a criminal jury. Most English jury 
research looks in the same direction of keeping the traditional jury system; 
therefore there is little diversity in this area.  
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If it does not mean the denial of lay participation in criminal justice procedure, 
why will the Government not facilitate the use of magistrates’ courts over the 
controversial contemporary English jury system? This thesis hopes that existing 
researchers on the English criminal jury system will re-evaluate their 
close-sightedness and neglect, and consider the possibility of an alternative 
English judicial model to replace the existing criminal jury system which can be 
compatible with the significant virtues of a lay judge system; fairness, efficiency 
and justice. 
 
It could be said that among the roles of the jury system in contemporary 
England, the eternal significance of the jury system has been to assure fairness 
of trials.
114
 There was an age in which the jury was the symbol of democracy 
and assumed the role of “the lamp that shows that freedom lives.”115 Actually, 
only two per cent of English people asserted the abolition of jury in 2000.
116
 
However, if there is an alternative criminal justice model which achieves fair 
trials and justice more efficiently than a jury, the new system will be ‘the lamp’ 
for English citizens of the future. Needless to say, the unchangeable fire in the 
lamp is the ‘lay element’. Thompson stated that “There is no single, A to Z, 
exhaustive and scholarly history of the jury, partly because it is a 
chameleon-like creature, which has altered its colour and shape in differing 
                                                   
114
 For example, Ireland takes the same position as this theory. See Sally Ireland,  
‘Fraud (Trials Without a Jury) Bill Briefing for House of Commons Second Reading’  
(2006) JUSTICE 3 
115
 Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury (6
th
 edition, Stevens& Sons Limited, 1978) 164 
116
 See ICM Research, State of the Nation Poll 2000: Summary Results (1
st
 edition,  
Rowntree Reform Trust, 2000); Roberts and Hough (n 1) 14 
257 
 
contexts.”117 If the wording of ‘history of the jury’ could be changed to ‘history 
of the criminal trial by lay people’, it would be obvious what the future of the 
English criminal justice system would look like. Therefore, the lamp that shows 
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